

Introduction

Pro-American Democracy or No Democracy at All?

SINCE THE DOWNFALL OF THE SOVIET UNION, THE WORLD HAS WITNESSED A NEW WAVE of global democratization. Freedom House, which monitors democracy around the globe, reports that between 1994 and 2009, the number of electoral democracies increased from 69 out of 167 total states to 119 out of 192. Between 1994 and 2005, the number of “free” countries in the world similarly increased from 76 to 89, while the number of “partly free” countries decreased from 61 to 54, and the number of “not free” countries decreased from 54 to 49. On a seven-point scale, with seven being the most democratic, Eastern Europe improved both its political and civil liberties by a margin greater than three points. Other regions followed suit. Countries in Africa improved their scores by over one point, and even regions like Latin America, where political and civil liberties were already much better than in other regions, witnessed significant improvements (see table 1.1).

The Arab world stands apart from this trend. Political and civil liberty scores between 1989 and 2009 remained nearly constant, improving only marginally.¹ Even Russia, which slightly regressed in terms of its political and civil liberties and abounds with stories of rebounding oligarchy, did better in general on these scores than the Arab world. The Arab world witnessed further regressions in civil liberties—this despite progress along several pertinent modernization indicators including education, literacy, gross domestic product (GDP), life expectancy, health care, and human development (see fig. 1.1).²

This reality stands in sharp contrast to expectations. As countries in the Middle East modernized and grew economically, the common reasoning goes, they should have liberalized as well. And although current developments in

¹My definition of the Arab world includes all Arab states in the Arab League: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

²See table 1.4 in this chapter’s appendix for Human Development Index scores over time in Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.

TABLE 1.1. Freedom House scores

Region	Political liberty			Civil liberty		
	1989	2009	Change	1989	2009	Change
East Asia	3.56	4.00	0.44	3.50	4.50	1.00
Latin America	5.35	5.68	0.32	5.13	5.45	0.32
South Asia	3.50	4.25	0.75	3.38	3.63	0.25
Middle East	2.15	2.08	-0.07	2.77	2.92	0.15
Former USSR*	3.79	3.36	-0.43	4.00	3.93	-0.07
Eastern Europe	2.25	5.50	3.25	2.75	5.71	2.96
Sub-Saharan Africa	2.09	3.55	1.47	2.67	3.83	1.16
Total (of regions)	3.28	4.15	0.87	3.52	4.37	0.85

Note: Data run from 1 (unfree) to 7 (free).

* Data are for 1991 rather than 1989.

Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, and Tunisia are reasons for increasing levels of optimism, the Arab world in general continues to withstand demands for more democracy and to witness persistent levels of authoritarianism. Even while citizens have demonstrated a strong commitment to democracy, existing regimes don't appear to reflect the will of the people.

What accounts for this seeming paradox of continued economic development and persistent authoritarianism? The argument of this book is simple: one can't understand the lack of Arab democratic transitions—or the nature of future political liberalization and consolidation trajectories more generally—without taking into account U.S. entrenchment. In the Arab world, U.S. involvement has stifled indigenous democratization gains of the last several decades and levels of anti-Americanism have intersected with the growing influence of Islamism to stifle citizen democratic contestation across most Arab states.

Anti-Americanism, I argue, is the key variable. Too often absent from political science theoretical models on democratization and political development, it is the preeminent factor in shaping the everyday political engagements and negotiations of ordinary citizens in the region. Understanding state-society relations and the rationalizations citizens make about democracy and the geostrategic utility of existing less-democratic regimes requires us to understand how and why anti-Americanism has come to play a crucial role in the Arab region. Exploring this state of affairs, both in theory and on the ground, is the job of this book.

Specifically, this book explores Kuwait and Jordan as two states that have similar clientelistic ties to the United States. Both are monarchies holding parliamentary elections, and each has similar levels of support for its Islamist opposition movements (estimates in each country put levels of support be-




Figure 1.1. Middle East Human Development Indicators and Freedom House scores. HDI every five years (1975, 1980, etc.). FH score reversed (7 = most democratic).

tween 35 percent and 60 percent). But the two states vary in their levels of anti-American sentiment among these Islamist opposition forces (my key explanatory variable). This core difference reveals how concerns about a country's international relations shape state-society relations more broadly.

Although the book builds its argument by focusing on the cases of Kuwait and Jordan, it also draws on evidence from two other monarchies that have varying degrees of anti-American sentiment among their Islamist opposition as well: Morocco and Saudi Arabia. Further, I extend the findings to Palestine's democratic experience, which resulted in Hamas's parliamentary victory in 2006.

THE U.S. STRATEGIC APPROACH TO DEMOCRACY

Since the end of the Cold War, comparative politics has treated the role of the United States in the international context as one that monolithically generates democracy. As Samuel Huntington argues in *The Third Wave*, "External actors significantly helped third wave democratizations. Indeed, by the late 1980s the major sources of power and influence in the world [including the United States] were actively promoting liberalization and democratization."³

³Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 93.

Studies of Latin America, the former Soviet Union, and Africa all emphasize the role the United States played in promoting democracy.⁴

Yet sometimes democracy may not suit the strategic interests of the United States. This is the case for the Arab world, a situation that has not been fully accounted for thus far in the political science literature. Studies looking at the involvement of international actors in the domestic politics of states have assumed that such involvement will result in more, not less democracy. This work assumes that the United States systematically and universally—and *not* strategically—promotes democracy across the globe, even in regions like the Arab world, where anti-American sentiment is rampant. In these settings, however, greater democratization could clearly bring groups unsympathetic to the United States into power, thus jeopardizing the interests of both the United States and the citizens of the region. The loss of patron support can result in several outcomes with devastating economic results, such as decreased access to resources in the form of aid, denial of access to external markets or preferential trade agreements, and even sanctions if the patron deems a governing authority a threat.

The Arab region is of fundamental importance to the United States, even as Arab states are highly reliant on the United States for security and economic aid.⁵ Yet U.S. engagement with the region has been structured by strategies that have placed the interests of the United States above and beyond the daily welfare of Arab citizens. Four major interests shape U.S. involvement in the region today: access to oil, the containment of Iran, support for the state of Israel, and the limiting of Islamist strength and their access to power and weapons of mass destruction.⁶ U.S. policies have been designed to secure these interests—not necessarily to increase democracy. As a result, the United States supports pro-American regimes, and most of these pro-American regimes happen to be authoritarian regimes that will

not only guarantee the United States access to Middle Eastern oil but also maintain peaceful relations with the state of Israel while simultaneously curbing the influence of Iran and Islamist movements.

In general, Islamist groups oppose these U.S. goals, and therefore it is in the interest of the United States and existing regime leaders to limit the ability of Islamists to influence policy—a reality not lost on ordinary citizens. In fact, citizens, especially those who hope to benefit from greater global economic integration, will prefer supporting the status quo rather than jeopardizing American patronage. Thus, given the conditions of U.S. entrenchment in the Arab region, indigenous demands for democracy will only grow and become sustained if the United States promises to honor the outcome of any democratic experiment, regardless of outcome. Conversely, demands for democracy will grow if democratic reformers are assured that Islamists won't jeopardize ties to the United States.⁷ That the United States has demonstrated that it will only tolerate pro-American democratic outcomes while it simultaneously does very little to weaken anti-Americanism continues to influence debates about political liberalization and democratization. Put more simply, the United States will only tolerate friends in power and has done little to win friends from within these societies.

Would-be democratic reformers understand that a push toward democracy may result in bringing anti-American forces to power—which would mean jeopardizing U.S. patronage—and therefore prefer the status quo. The U.S. democracy promotion establishment has erroneously assumed that democracy promotion would by default also bring about pro-American attitudes—regardless of U.S. policies in the region. That citizens of the Arab world could come to appreciate the underpinnings of democracy while simultaneously harboring deep resentment toward the United States was an outcome that the United States had been less prepared for.

This explanation stands in sharp contrast to standard reasoning as it pertains to the Arab world. That reasoning advances two general explanations to account for the lack of Arab democratization, both of which focus

⁴See Huntington, *The Third Wave*; Marc Plattner, "The Democratic Moment," in *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 36–48; Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992); Steven Levitsky and Lucien Way, "International Linkage and Democratization," *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 3 (2005): 20–34; Robert Bates, "The Impulse to Reform," in *Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa*, ed. Jennifer Widner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 13–28; Kurt Weyland, *The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); and Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

⁵See Sheila Caparico, "Foreign Aid for Promoting Democracy in the Middle East," *Middle East Journal* 56, no. 3 (2002): 379–95.

⁶See Marina Ottaway, *Promoting Democracy in the Middle East and the Problem of U.S. Credibility*, Carnegie Paper no. 35 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003); Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers, "Greater Middle East Initiative: Off to a False Start," Carnegie Policy Brief no. 29 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004); and Graham Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

⁷Many scholars have noted that Islamists also see themselves as democratic reformers. See Jillian Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Janine A. Clark, *Islam, Charity, and Activism: Middle-Class Networks and Social Welfare in Egypt, Jordan and Yemen* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003); Carrie Rosefsky, *Mobilizing Islam* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Quinn Meacham, "Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics," *Political Science Quarterly* 118, no. 3 (2003): 526–27; Mona El-Ghobashy, "Constitutionalist Contention in Contemporary Egypt," *American Behavioral Scientist* 51, no. 11 (2008): 1590–1610; Lisa Wedeen, *Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008); and Samer Shehata, "Inside an Egyptian Parliamentary Campaign," in *Political Participation in the Middle East*, ed. Ellen Lust-Okar and Saloua Zerhouni (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008), 95–120, as examples. In this manuscript, however, I use the term *democratic reformers* to signify non-Islamist democracy supporters.

on societal determinants of authoritarian tendencies. The first is grounded in political culture, the second in the region's political economy. Central to both approaches is the notion that Arab societies have not attained the levels of political and economic modernization that equip citizens with the requisite values and economic interests to pose significant challenges to existing authoritarian rule. Absent these by-products of modernization, citizens remain locked into supportive relations with their regimes.

Scholars and policy makers have systematically viewed political culture and economic development as central to citizen democratic contestation of existing regimes. Examples range from the feudal transition to democracy in England, to the third wave of democratization and the demise of the former Soviet Union. Because citizens had acquired new democratic values and had become more autonomous and empowered through economic development, the story goes, they could effectively assert significant pressure on existing regimes. Countries in the third and subsequent waves of democracy had another advantage: the United States had emerged successful from the Cold War and could now, without the threat of the Soviets, continue with its democracy agenda the world over.⁸

None of these theories, though, explains the lack of Arab democratization. The Arab world does not lack an appreciation of democratic values. Not only do the so-called Arab Spring protests of 2011 attest to the strong democratic current in the region but public opinion data from the region collected since the year 2000 also reveal overwhelming support for democracy. Polls across the region indicate that democracy enjoys support from close to 85 percent of the region's population.⁹ Further, the recent wave of

⁸As Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 22, notes, "The linkage between economic development and modern democracy is complex. Three factors seem particularly crucial: (a) the emergence of a politically powerful commercial-industrial bourgeoisie; (b) the development of preconditions that facilitate mass participation in politics; and (c) the development of mass support for democratic institutions and feelings of interpersonal trust that extend even to members of opposing parties." See also Christian Welzel and Ronald Inglehart, "The Role of Ordinary People in Democratization," *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 1 (2008): 126–40.

⁹Polls across the region indicate that democracy enjoys considerable support. See Zogby International, *Arabs: What They Believe and What They Value Most* (Ithaca, NY: Zogby International, 2002; accessed at http://aa1.3cdn.net/7b568f016f6ad3a301_b5m6be8kr.pdf); Pew Global Attitudes Project, *America's Image in the World* (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2007; accessed at <http://pewglobal.org/commentary/display.php?AnalysisID=1019>); and Pew Global Attitudes Project, *Global Unease with Major World Powers: Rising Environmental Concern in 47-Nation Survey* (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2007; accessed at <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=256>). Herein I use data from the Arab Barometer 2005–6 (principal investigators Mark Tessler and Amaney Jamal; accessed at <http://www.arabbarometer.org/survey/survey.html>) and the World Values Survey 2002 (accessed at <http://www.wvs.evsdb.com/wvs/WVSDData.jsp>).

protests across the region suggests that citizens long for more accountability, transparency, and representation—hallmarks of democracy.

Neither has the Arab world stagnated in its economic development. The many countries in the Arab world have gradually begun to enjoy greater economic growth, lower poverty rates, a more stable middle class, privatization and globalization, and greater rates of foreign direct investment (FDI).¹⁰

Existing Theories: Political Culture

It's worth first examining the two standard theories in greater depth before addressing the role that America has played in the lack of Arab democratization. First, renowned scholars in the field—including Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba; Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset; Samuel Huntington; Ronald Inglehart; and Robert Putnam¹¹—have linked modernization to values and orientations that would serve as democratic prerequisites. Through modernization, theories suggest, citizens would not only acquire better economic opportunities but would also develop the norms necessary for democracy.¹² That is, development encourages supportive democratic cultural orientations. Thus, economic development was deemed important to generating pertinent values useful to democratization.

The second theory highlights the importance of civil society for democracy. As societies develop, this line of reasoning goes, so too should their civil

¹⁰Jordan's plan, for example, included embarking on a process of trade and financial liberalization, as well as privatization; the nation has achieved economic growth at an annual average of 6 percent since 2004. Although the middle class has remained stable, Ibrahim Saif of the Center for Strategic Studies in Amman, Jordan, notes that the middle class has become less reliant on wages as its members have turned to increasing investment and self-employment opportunities. See chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion on Jordan's economic development trajectory. See also table 1.5 in this chapter's appendix for Jordan's GDP growth rates.

¹¹Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963); Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, "What Makes for Democracy?" in *Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy*, 2nd ed., ed. Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 1–66; Huntington, *The Third Wave*; Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*; and Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

¹²In a similar vein, Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, *The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), addresses value changes linked to economic development that are important for the building of economic markets. Chaudhry highlights the importance of economic development for creating economic markets that are structured by market cultures. In such cultures, individualism is seen as an important norm that replaces precapitalist values. See also Albert Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), 30; and Stephen Holmes, "The Secret History of Self-Interest," in *Beyond Self-Interest*, ed. Jane Mansbridge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 267–86.

societies develop in ways that would make democracy a more viable outcome.¹³ This scholarship examines the role of civic associations as schools for civic virtue and generators of social capital, and how they thus form major counterweights to existing authoritarian rulers.¹⁴ Civil society can check the powers of the state, encourages citizen participation, helps the development of a democratic culture of tolerance and bargaining, generates new channels for representing interests, creates crosscutting cleavages, serves as forum for the retention of development of new political leaders, and allows for the enrichment and circulation of information to citizens. Thus, civil society has a vital role to play in shaping democratic attitudes and behaviors among populations. Where democratic contestation is weak or lacking, one plausible arena of exploration is civil society.¹⁵ In the context of the Arab world, the region's political culture remains one key set of variables explaining the persistence of authoritarian rule.

A third theory suggests that the political culture of the region might be incompatible with democracy. In the context of the Arab world, this theme links the support for authoritarianism directly to Islam. The political culture of Islam, some argue, impedes the development of the prerequisites of modernization because Islam and democracy simply don't mix well.

This third line of argument maintains that, first, Muslims are more likely to accept the status quo, however disadvantageous it may be, as part of a doctrine of divine destiny.¹⁶ That is, citizens of the Arab world are more likely to attribute their political situations to "Allah's way." Such adherence to the status quo bars any contestation of the established order. Second, as Huntington argues in his seminal work on the clash of civilizations, Islam and democracy are inherently incompatible because Islam, emphasizes the community over the individual and does not recognize the church-state divide. Individualism, Huntington maintains, is a key asset to liberal democratic orders. Third, as other scholars like Francis Fukuyama argue,¹⁷ Islam poses a grave threat to liberal democracy because its doctrinal emphasis lacks a liberal democratic orientation. Fourth, Islam does not advocate political freedoms and in fact mobilizes people against democratic values.¹⁸

¹³Alexis de Toqueville, *Democracy in America*, ed. Richard D. Heffner (New York: New American Library, 1956).

¹⁴Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*.

¹⁵See Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, "Introduction," in *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1989), ix–xxxiii.

¹⁶Elie Kedourie, *Democracy and Arab Political Culture* (Washington DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992).

¹⁷Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*.

¹⁸As a result, a new body of scholarship has emerged to counter these assumptions, arguing that there are great possibilities for Islam and democracy. Scholars are pursuing several fruitful lines of inquiry. The first examines Islamic philosophical models—Shari'a, *fiqh*, and new

Fifth, Steven Fish finds that the status of women in Muslim societies hinders democracy.¹⁹ Daniela Donno and Bruce Russett argue that the link between the inferior status of women and democracy is only substantiated in the Arab world.²⁰

Following this logic, even if Arab societies are able to attain the necessary levels of modernization, Muslim societies are unlikely to appreciate and function within the norms of a democratic polity.

Existing Theories: Political Economy

Scholars have advanced two main formulations to explain how existing economic structures shape citizen support for their authoritarian regimes in the Arab world. The first is an extension of modernization theories. Because Arab societies have not developed economically, or because their economic trajectories have been marked by only slow progress, this line of reasoning goes, the Arab world has not developed autonomous middle-class groups that can place the necessary constraints on regimes.²¹ Scholars who work on

ijtihad—and their effect on the compatibility of Islam with democracy at the theoretical level; see Khaled Abou El Fadl, *Islam and the Challenge of Democracy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003); and John Esposito and John Voll, *Islam and Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). A second line of argumentation posits that the writings of "progressive Muslims" offer much hope for democracy; see Abdelwahab El-Affendi, "The Elusive Reformation," *Journal of Democracy* 24, no. 2 (2003): 34–39; Lait Kubba, "Faith and Modernity," *Journal of Democracy* 14, no. 2 (2003): 45–49; Radwan Masmoudi, "The Silenced Majority," *Journal of Democracy* 14, no. 2 (2003): 40–44; Omid Safi, ed., *Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender and Pluralism* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003); and Mark Tessler, "Islam and Democracy in the Middle East: The Impact of Religious Orientations on Attitudes toward Democracy in Four Arab Countries," *Comparative Politics* 34 (2002): 337–54. A third line of inquiry, based on new public opinion data, shows that Islamic religiosity and support for democracy are indeed compatible; see Tessler, *Islam and Democracy in the Middle East*; and Steven Hofmann, "Islam and Democracy: Micro-Level Indications of Compatibility," *Comparative Political Studies* 37, no. 6 (2004): 652–76.

¹⁹Steven Fish, "Islam and Authoritarianism," *World Politics* 55 (2002): 4–37.

²⁰Daniela Donno and Bruce Russett, "Islam, Authoritarianism, and Female Empowerment: What Are the Linkages?" *World Politics* 56 (2004): 582–607. See also Amaney Jamal and Vickie Langohr, "Gender Status as an Impediment to Democracy in the Muslim World: What Does Gender Explain and Not Explain?" (unpublished manuscript, 2008) for a more careful discussion of the links among women's rights, democracy, and Islam. In short, we find little evidence to support the claim that there is a direct link between cultural predispositions about gender and levels of democracy.

²¹Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, *Transitions to Authoritarian Rule*, vol. 4, *Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986); Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyn Huber Stephens, and John Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*; Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," *American Political Science Review* 53, no. 1. (1959): 69–105; Lucien Pye, "Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism," *American Political Science Review* 84 (1990): 3–19; Eva Bellin, *Stalled Democracy: Capital, Labor, and the Paradox of State-Sponsored Development* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); Kellee S.

the economic and political development of the Arab world, like Eva Bellin, Melanie Claire Cammett, Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, Jill Crystal, Pete Moore, and Benjamin Smith, have examined how existing business interests remain tied to the regimes in power.²² This lack of business and middle-class autonomy, according to this theory, explains authoritarian persistence. Absent the development of independent economic interests separate from the regime, citizens remain bound in close supportive relations with these regimes, which further solidify authoritarian rule.

Scholars have also documented the growth of autonomous middle-class sectors as a key factor explaining the emergence of democracy across the globe. Barrington Moore and Samuel Huntington in particular have highlighted the importance of creating new economic forces in society through economic development.²³ This expanding middle class—businesspeople, professionals, shopkeepers, teachers, civil servants, managers, technicians, and clerical and sales workers—gradually began to see democracy as a means of securing their own interests. “Third wave movements for democratization,” Huntington argues, “were not led by landlords, peasants, or (apart from Poland) industrial workers. In virtually every country the most active supporters of democratization came from the urban middle class.”²⁴ Karl Deutsch, Samuel Huntington, Daniel Lerner, Charles Lindblom, and Seymour Lipset have each emphasized the crucial role played by the commercial-industrial elite in the emergence of democratic institutions.²⁵ The development of the

Tsai, “Capitalists without a Class: Political Diversity among Private Entrepreneurs,” *Comparative Political Studies* 38, no. 9 (2005): 1130–58.

²²Bellin, *Stalled Democracy*; Melanie Claire Cammett, *Globalization and Business Politics in Arab North Africa: A Comparative Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Chaudhry, *The Price of Wealth*; Jill Crystal, *Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Pete W. Moore, *Doing Business in the Middle East: Politics and Economic Crisis in Jordan and Kuwait*. Cambridge Middle East Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); and Benjamin Smith, *Hard Times in the Land of Plenty: Oil Politics in Iran and Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007).

²³Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon, 1993); Huntington, *The Third Wave*. Extending his analysis to the third wave of democratization, Huntington identifies several independent variables that at their very essence again highlight the importance of political culture and economic development for forms of democratic contestation. First, he maintains that authoritarian regimes increasingly faced existing challenges when their societies had widely accepted democratic values. Second, he highlights the importance of economic development. In *The Third Wave*, 39, he notes that the “unprecedented global economic growth of the 1960s, which raised living standards, increased education, and greatly expanded the urban middle class in many countries,” was vital to the third wave of democratization.

²⁴Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 67.

²⁵Karl W. Deutsch, “Social Mobilization and Political Development,” *American Political Science Review* 55 (1961): 634–47; Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968); Huntington, *The Third Wave*; Daniel Lerner, *The Passing*

middle class, ending citizens’ loyalty to authoritarian regimes, was vital, they argue, for democratic forms of contestation. While these theories have been built upon the Western experience in particular, scholars have applied these theories to the developing world.

The second line of argumentation looks to rentierism, or the dependence of states on rents derived from natural resources. States’ abundance of wealth derived from oil or soft budgets (sources of revenue, like foreign aid) allows them to buy citizen acquiescence in the face of authoritarian rule.²⁶ Because they do not rely on taxes, rentier states remain above the concerns of citizens. Further, citizens who are recipients of rentier largesse are more likely to be supportive of their regimes. These citizens have exchanged their right to contestation for government services. Because citizens are pampered, they are more likely to support their regimes and less likely to engage in contested forms of participation.

Several countries of the Arab world could fall into this category, because either they possess massive resource wealth or they are the direct recipients of foreign aid.²⁷ The concentration of resources in the hands of government has allowed these regimes to offer services and deliver goods without any need for citizens to mobilize and demand those services. Hazem Beblawi argues that the state plays a crucial role in the rentier formulation, for it is the recipient and distributor of rents writ large. Because the society is a recipient of rents and not a payer of taxes, interest groups are less likely to take a particular interest in economic issues. Hence, society remains supportive of the regime and does not become an arena of contestation. Citizens don’t need to contest the state, but instead lend it support because the state already distributes and offers goods and services.²⁸ In rentier states, citizens remain passive and compliant.

of Traditional Society (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1958); Charles Lindblom, *Politics and Markets: The World’s Political Economic Systems* (New York: Basic Books, 1977); Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1960).

²⁶Lisa Anderson, “Peace and Democracy in the Middle East: The Constraints of Soft Budgets,” *Journal of International Affairs* 49, no. 1 (1995): 25–45; Eva Bellin, “The Politics of Profit in Tunisia: Utility of the Rentier Paradigm?” *World Development* 22, no. 3 (1994): 427; Michael Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” *World Politics* 53, no. 3 (2001): 325–61.

²⁷See Anderson, “Peace and Democracy in the Middle East.”

²⁸Hazem Beblawi, “The Rentier State in the Arab World,” in *The Arab State*, ed. Giacomo Luciani (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), 85–98; Lisa Anderson, “The State in the Middle East and North Africa,” *Comparative Politics* 20, no. 1 (1997): 1–18; Chaudhry, *The Price of Wealth*; Bellin, “The Politics of Profit in Tunisia,” 427; Gwenn Okruhlik, “Rentier Wealth, Unruly Law, and the Rise of the Opposition: The Political Economy of Rentier States,” *Comparative Politics* 31, no. 3 (1999): 295–315; Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?”; Dirk Vandewalle, *Libya Since Independence: Oil and State-Building* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Giacomo Luciani, “Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework,” in *The Arab State*, ed. Giacomo Luciani (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), 65–84.

REVISITING THE CLASSICAL MODELS: THEORETICAL LIMITATIONS

These two prevailing models, the political and the economic—as appealing and neat as they may be—don’t reflect the empirical realities on the ground in the Arab world. They also contain theoretical limitations, and are based on faulty assumptions. These bottom-up cultural and economic models of political change continue to occupy a significant place in studies of comparative politics and appeal to both policy makers and scholars of democracy. The appeal of these bottom-up models of democracy is a straightforward, accessible mechanism of cause and effect. If key democratic values and higher levels of education,²⁹ strong civic associations,³⁰ and viable economic structures can cause change favorable to democracy, then these changes can induce citizens to make democratic demands of their states. For example, societies might become more democratic through value change in favor of democracy, or a growing middle class could bargain for more democratic space.

Yet this equilibrium between a society and its political institutions relies on a major unexamined premise: existing political institutions derive the foundations of their legitimacy from their own societies. These theoretical approaches assume that states are autonomous, self-contained units legitimated by their societies, and thus likely to reflect the political preferences of their people. Ignoring the position of states in the larger international context, this view sees states as monolithically self-ruling and linked to their societies in a mutually reinforcing process that is shielded from external influence.³¹ But in the real world, weaker states are dependent on more powerful states. Peripheral states not only derive legitimacy from their own people but also rely on winning the approbation of external patrons. Such winning then shapes domestic negotiations about regime type.

NEWER DEMOCRATIZATION DEBATES

Beginning in the first decade of the twenty-first century, a new wave of literature has emerged that examines transitions to democracy as a function of internal, domestic debates about redistribution of wealth and assets. These works focus on the internal negotiations that occur between elites and citizens about whether to expand the franchise, redistribute resources,

²⁹See Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*; Lipset, *Political Man*; Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*.

³⁰Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*.

³¹For a discussion on liberal market reforms in the developing world, see Atul Kohli, “Democracy Amid Economic Orthodoxy: Trends in Developing Countries” *Third World Quarterly* 14, no. 4 (1993): 671.

and allow for mass representation. Carles Boix, as well as Darren Acemoglu and James Robinson, maintain that the balance of economic power between citizens and elites matters for democratic outcomes.³² Levels of income inequality, they maintain, reduce the likelihood of a democratic bargain between society and the elite because the elite fear redistribution pressures. The more equal distribution of income induces democratization because the pressures for redistribution are markedly less. Boix further argues that mobile elite assets also facilitate democratization. When elites can remove their assets, his reasoning goes, they can shield those assets from becoming targets of redistribution.

Like Boix, and Acemoglu and Robinson,³³ and earlier work like Robert Dahl’s *Polyarchy*, I find that democratic outcomes are contingent on internal negotiations between citizens and the elite.³⁴ In the same spirit, I maintain that citizens will continue to support the regime when it is economically beneficial to do so. The choice of political regime is based on an individualized cost-benefit analysis that takes into account the possibilities of the opposition accessing power and influencing policies that may have redistributive effects. When opposition movements seizing or influencing power have significant costs, sectors of the society that benefit from less democracy will be less tolerant of democratization.

Yet, similar to the classical political culture and political economy formulas, these newer models pay inadequate attention to international context. In fact, they treat debates about redistribution as internally confined and state-contained. In several countries, especially those in the Arab world, debates about access to wealth and future economic progress are contingent on access to global markets, external patrons, and international aid. Domestic preferences for democracy are also influenced by the position of “globalization winners” who want to ensure continued access to global markets and guarantee that more democracy won’t jeopardize such access.³⁵

Given the centrality of mobile assets to these theories, we must reexamine our definition of mobile assets. Assets can travel across borders and

³²Carles Boix, *Democracy and Redistribution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Darren Acemoglu and James Robinson, *The Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

³³This is not to say that ideology does not matter. However, as Acemoglu and Robinson, *The Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, 42, maintain, “As long as one accepts the premise that the interests of individuals are partly about economic outcomes, our basic analysis remains unaltered.”

³⁴Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970).

³⁵For a discussion on the ways in which globalization has created and engendered economic opportunities in Arab societies, see Henry Clement and Robert Springborg, *Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Shana Cohen, *Searching for a Different Future: The Rise of a Global Middle Class in Morocco* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004); and Vali Nasr, *Forces of Fortune: The Rise of the New Muslim Middle Class and What It Will Mean for Our World* (New York: Free Press, 2009).

be protected from redistribution pressures insofar as the international order allows for such movement. In other words, if an external patron issues sanctions, freezes assets, or limits the movements of financial flows across borders, then this calls for a reexamination of the conditions under which assets can be considered mobile. Mobile assets are only as mobile as the international order permits them to be. Second, the empirical evidence doesn't line up as neatly against countries in the Middle East with regard to the ways that inequalities may structure domestic negotiations about democracy. For example, Gini coefficients, which measure levels of economic inequality, illustrate that Turkey (47) is worse off than Egypt (32) or Jordan (36), yet there is more democracy in Turkey. This is not to say that models of redistribution do not explain a good portion of variation in democratization outcomes. Rather, when we examine these models against the empirical record of the Middle East, the facts don't line up. The role of the international sphere on domestic political developments is a major omission in the aforementioned approaches.

Trade, Growth, Development, and Democratization

The international political economy (IPE) literature that overlaps with the fields of international relations and comparative politics is divided on whether there are democratization benefits from trade openness. Some scholars argue that trade and globalization enhance democracy in the developing world.³⁶ In fact, a number of studies show that economic globalization can be linked to normatively prized outcomes like human rights benefits in some places and times.³⁷ Ronald Rogowski finds a direct link between trade and democratic regimes in nineteenth-century England and ancient Greece.³⁸ Other scholars are more cautious about these causal claims. Acemoglu and Robinson, for example, argue that trade may enhance democratization but only if resources are distributed equally. Alicia Adserà and Carles Boix also caution that greater trade openness may harm democratic institutions, depending on the segments of society that benefit from

³⁶See, for example, Barry Eichengreen and David Leblang, "Democracy and Globalization" (unpublished manuscript, Department of Political Science, University of Colorado-Boulder, 2007); Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," *American Political Science Review* 53, no. 1 (1959): 69–105; and J. Ernesto López-Córdova and Christopher M. Meissner, "The Globalization of Trade and Democracy" (unpublished manuscript, 2005).

³⁷See, for example, Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, "Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Arrangements Influence Government Repression," *International Organization* 59, no. 3 (2005): 593–629; and David Richards, Ronald Gellenny, and David Sacko, "Money with a Mean Streak? Foreign Economic Penetration and Government Respect for Human Rights in Developing Countries," *International Study Quarterly* 45, no. 2 (2001): 219–39.

³⁸Ronald Rogowski, *Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).

such openness.³⁹ In fact, beneficiaries of trade can be as narrow as specific firms only.⁴⁰ Helen Milner and Bumba Mukherjee find that the link between trade openness and democracy is quite weak,⁴¹ and Atul Kohli echoes this finding.⁴²

Even though the literature underscoring the influence of IPE on democracy yields mixed results, I offer yet two additional—and more serious—criticisms. IPE explanations ignore the ways that security considerations mediate the influence of trade, globalization, and aid on democracy. For example, in many countries in the Arab world, international actors—namely, the United States—are invested in regime stability and cooperative governments over democratization. Trade agreements, access to global markets, and aid are linked to a strategy of regime cooperation and durability and not necessarily transformation.⁴³ Second, scholars have assumed that trade follows a linear path: once countries engage in trade they continue doing so. If access to global markets is conditioned by patron-accommodation, however, then access to global trade, preferential agreements, and membership in trade organizations can be easily reversed. While IPE works on the Cold War have examined the close linkage between international security and international political economy,⁴⁴ newer post-Cold War works have not examined how security considerations condition the influence of trade on democratization. Indeed, trade can also be a security device in sustaining patron-client relations in the world order.

³⁹Alicia Adserà and Carles Boix, "Trade, Democracy, and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness," *International Organization* 56, no. 2 (2002): 229–62.

⁴⁰See, for example, Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner, *Internationalization and Domestic Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), which offers a detailed discussion on internationalization and sectoral gains from trade. Christina Davis, *Why Adjudicate? Enforcing Trade Rules in the WTO* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), also advances an argument about the ways in which certain domestic groups influence World Trade Organization dispute settlements.

⁴¹Helen V. Milner and Bumba Mukherjee, "Democratization and Economic Globalization," *Annual Review of Political Science* 12 (1999): 163–81.

⁴²Atul Kohli, *State-Directed Development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

⁴³Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics* 36, no. 2 (2004): 139–57; Amaney Jamal and Irfan Nooruddin, "The Democratic Utility of Trust: A Cross-National Analysis," *Journal of Politics* 72, no. 1 (2010): 45–59.

⁴⁴See Joanne Gowa, *Allies, Adversaries and International Trade* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Benjamin Cohen, "The Revolution in Atlantic Economic Relations: A Bargain Comes Unstuck," in *The United States and Western Europe: Political, Economic, and Strategic Perspectives*, ed. Wolfram Hanrieder (Cambridge, MA: Winthrop, 1974), 106–33; Robert Gilpin, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation* (New York: Basic Books, 1975); Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., eds., *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972); and Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1977).

Class and Those Who Stand to Benefit from Democracy

The literature underscoring societal pressures toward democratization based on Western experiences contains some conflicting accounts of not only the classes but also the class structure that results in more democratization. In studies of early Western feudal transitions to democracy, for instance, Moore and others emphasize the importance of the bourgeoisie in championing movements toward democratization. Moore's thesis became dominantly cited as the major intellectual work behind studies that advanced the importance of the middle class for democratization. Whether it was because the middle class was more educated and held the values of a democratic, cosmopolitan polity (see Huntington, Inglehart, et al.), whether it was because the middle class could buffer conflict between the poor and rich and keep transitions stable (Boix), or whether it was because the middle class had more to gain from democratization advancements (Moore), the development of an autonomous middle class became crucial—at least in theory—to the development of democracy. Acemoglu and Robinson argue that “almost all revolutionary movements were led by middle class actors and more important a number of challenges to the existing regime; for example the uprisings that helped induce the First Reform Act in Britain or those during the Paris Commune in France or the revolts of the Radical Party in Argentina were largely middle class movements.”⁴⁵

Yet the literature on comparative politics is still divided on the exact role of the middle class in democratization efforts. For example, Eva Bellin and Kellee Tsai, studying the Middle East and China, argue that the middle classes play key roles in sustaining existing authoritarian institutions because they benefit from authoritarian economic policies.⁴⁶ Other scholars of comparative development, like Dietrich Rueschmeyer, Evelyn Huber Stephens, and John Stephens, argue that the middle classes were important for democratic transitions.⁴⁷

Although the literature is divided on the classes that mattered most for democratization and democratic consolidation, the categories of class have been treated in compartmentalized domains. Most of our existing formulations on class in comparative development paradigms rely on Marxist classifications of class that treat class in its relation to the domestic mode of production. Classes are structured more or less between the owners of capital and those

⁴⁵Acemoglu and Robinson, *The Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, 39. See also O'Donnell and Schmitter, “Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies,” 50–52, on the crucial role of the middle class in contemporary democratization.

⁴⁶Bellin, *Stalled Democracy*; Kellee S. Tsai, “Capitalists without a Class: Political Diversity among Private Entrepreneurs,” *Comparative Political Studies* 38, no. 9 (2005): 1130–58.

⁴⁷Dietrich Rueschmeyer, Evelyn Huber Stephens, and John Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

who sell their labor for capital. Yet in a globalized world order, these demarcations of class become more obscure. Today's domestic economies in Arab states rely on a host of factors that no longer neatly conform to simple “modes” of production. Foreign aid, global trade, remittances, labor flows, foreign direct investment, internet networks, and a host of other factors shape the economic standing of individuals within their societies.

As the reach of the global economy has increasingly penetrated domestic economies, classifying class interests becomes more difficult. For example, a poor farmer and a rich investor both might look favorably toward FDI initiatives that make possible more expedient forms of exports. Or a small business owner in a village and a wealthy business entrepreneur in a city might both stand to benefit from a more aggressive tourism program that will attract more annual visits.

Max Weber's formulation of “differentiated markets” is increasingly applicable to the ways that globalization shapes local class dynamics. While Weber is more concerned with introducing concepts like power and status linked to various market sectors, one's market position vis-à-vis globalization matters not only for status and power but also for income.⁴⁸ These status and power configurations can vary within class based on the ways in which members of various classes are linked to global markets.⁴⁹ There are winners

⁴⁸For a discussion on sector-based (rather than income-based) class interests, see Carles Boix, *Democracy and Redistribution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Jeffrey A. Frieden, “Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance,” *International Organization* 45 (1991): 425–51; James E. Alt and Michael Gilligan, “The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems and Domestic Political Institutions,” *Journal of Political Philosophy* 2, no. 2 (1994): 165–92; Michael Hiscox, “Class versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade,” *International Organization* 55 (2001): 1–46; Peter Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Isabela Mares, “Firms and the Welfare State: When, Why and How Does Social Policy Matter to Employers?” in *Varieties of Capitalism*, ed. Peter Hall and David Soskice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 184–212. Sector-based class interests are a better study for considering the ways in which globalization patterns shape various domestic segments of different classes within societies. Yet even sectoral analysis needs to take into account the extent to which various sectors are integrated into the global economy. For example, two similar factories that produce the same exact product may have different interests based on their respective consumer bases (domestic vs. foreign).

⁴⁹Max Weber, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. Hans Heinrich Gerth, trans. Hans Heinrich Gerth and C. Wright Mills (London: Routledge, 2009). Weber does not assume that all actors within a specific class share a common set of interests. He notes, “In our terminology, ‘classes’ are not communities; they merely represent possible, and frequent, bases for communal action. We may speak of a class when (1) a number of people have in common a specific causal component of their life changes, insofar as (2) this component is represented exclusively by economic interests in the possession of goods and opportunities for income, and (3) is represented under the conditions of the commodity of labor markets” (181). These points refer to a class situation that we may describe as the typical chance for a supply of goods, external living conditions, and personal life experiences, insofar as this chance is determined

and losers linked to global economic integration, and our conventional categories of class as a function of the “local” mode of production cannot distinctly capture individual preferences based on these categories alone.⁵⁰

Toward a Model of Democratic Change in the Arab World

To return to the contribution of this book, I introduce the role of the patron, who, I argue, shapes these domestic strategic interactions—and may bolster the regime and ruling elite through rewards of economic assistance and access to global markets. Citizens who believe that the current regime has privileged and important relations with the external patron that help maintain stability and yield economic benefits may come to support a regime even when it is otherwise not in their apparent interest. The patron can also make acts of political contestation more costly by controlling these mechanisms. For example, the patron can sanction a country, denying it access to global markets, if its new regime—even a democratically elected one—does not conform to patron expectations.

Client Arab states that have remained authoritarian share two circumstances. The first is that the external patron, the United States, values friendly and cooperative alliances over democracy. The second is that existing regimes also value staying in power. These two factors at the societal level are constants that will induce change. My model stipulates that pressure to change the authoritarian status quo is facilitated when, all things being equal, antipatron forces grow or shrink and tip the balance closer to or farther from the patron. More specifically, when influential opposition movements become increasingly pro-patron, they reduce the fear that democracy will yield results that harm the patron-client relation. Conversely, when influential opposition movements become increasingly antipatron, they may overthrow the regime and risk hostile relations with the patron. In this latter scenario it is likely the case that the vast majority of citizens do not see themselves as beneficiaries of the patron-client relationship.

This dynamic may very well be one of the reasons why Egyptians decided to unseat Hosni Mubarak. While the demonstrations in Egypt revealed that citizens were willing to protest against Mubarak, the United States demanded that the military not exercise violence against protesters,⁵¹ sending

by the amount and kind of power, or lack of such, to dispose of goods or skills for the sake of income in a given economic order. For a more detailed discussion on market differentiation, see Weber, 182–83.

⁵⁰See Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), on the ways in which transnational linkages shape class organizational capacity and behavior.

⁵¹A Muslim Brotherhood representative indicates that this U.S. signal was crucial for large-scale mobilization of protestors in the immediate days after the revolution began; personal interview with the author, March 2011.

an important signal to demonstrators that they would not be penalized for protesting against Mubarak. Further, the fact that the Egyptian military, a close U.S. ally, was willing to take over perhaps facilitated a more expeditious transition. Hence, it became clear to both Americans and Egyptians that Egypt would not lose ties to the United States as a result of Mubarak's removal.

Nevertheless, the contestation of the status quo in Egypt was a result of a growing segment of the population that found Mubarak's regime inefficient, abusive, and harmful to ordinary citizens. The Mubarak regime became increasingly corrupt, flaunting its corruption unapologetically, while a shrinking segment of the society benefited from the regime's economic policies. As the benefactors of the regime grew fewer, the majority of citizens began to see little utility in Mubarak. Even now, with Mubarak removed from power, a Pew Research Center poll finds that the majority of Egyptians would still like to maintain close ties to the United States.⁵² This desire for close ties will certainly serve as an important dynamic in the future democratic trajectory of Egypt. Two factors will remain especially crucial as Egypt transitions. First, what role will the Egyptian military continue to play in Egypt? Given that the military is now the guarantor of strong ties to the United States, will citizens allow (or encourage) the military to continue to play an influential role to ensure Egypt's strong alliance? And second, what role will the Muslim Brotherhood play, or be allowed to play, in influencing Egypt's foreign relations? How will the fact that Islamists have secured over 65 percent of the vote influence the democratic trajectory in Egypt? If the Muslim Brotherhood is seen as possibly jeopardizing ties to the United States, this then may certainly harm the future of democracy in Egypt.


REVISITING STATE AND SOCIETY RELATIONS IN CLIENTELISTIC SETTINGS: REAL CONGRUENCE VERSUS CONTRIVED CONGRUENCE

In client regimes, as most states in the Arab world are, the fundamental synthesis of state-society relations underlying both classical and newer models of democratization is radically altered (see fig. 1.2).⁵³ The client

⁵²Pew Global Attitudes Project, *U.S. Wins No Friends, End of Treaty with Israel Sought* (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2011.)

⁵³Today, most Arab states in the region can be classified as clients of the United States. Regime clientelism, referring to the relationship that states have with external actors, is based on strategic alliances that mutually bolster the interests of both parties involved. This strategic relationship, however, takes place between strong and weak states. For modern developed countries, differences in state autonomy are used to categorize states as strong or weak. See Peter J. Katzenstein, *Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1977) and John Ikenberry, *Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American Government* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988). Alvin Rubinstein, “Soviet Client States: From Empire to Common Wealth,” *Orbis* 35, no. 1 (1991): 69, defines a client-state as a “regime that is under the protection of another. The rela-

The Mutually Reinforcing Relationship between Society and Political Institutions in Autonomous States



The Disrupted Relationship between Society and Political Institutions in Client States




Figure 1.2. Autonomous states and the relationship of state and society.

relationship diffuses direct accountability mechanisms between states and societies, disrupting the hypothesized mutually reinforcing impact of societies on institutions. States are not solely accountable to their citizens; they are also accountable to the external patron. This reality is not lost on ordinary citizens.

Three implications emerge from this analysis. First, client-patron relations disturb the feedback process between state and society. In client states, institutions are no longer solely expressions of society's preferences; in many cases, institutions reflect the preferences of the external power. As such, society's preferences and orientations in client states matter less for the durability and stability of existing institutions. Congruence between a society and its political institutions need not be the only reason a country shows

relationship is asymmetrical, but each party gains advantages from it; and as long as the benefits outweigh the costs, the relationship will be sustained." In general, however, the client is more "dependent" on the patron than the patron is on the client. Thus, the relationship is constituted by an unequal balance of power between patron and client. The patron has the ability to issue unilateral rewards for compliance and punishments for noncompliance. The dominant state ensures that clients are well protected and guarantees economic rewards and benefits. In return, the patron also secures its larger geostrategic goals. As Osita Afoaku, "U.S. Foreign Policy and Authoritarian Regimes," *Journal of Third World Studies* 17, no. 2 (2000): 59, notes, "While the impetus for international clientelism comes mainly from the foreign policy strategy of the big powers, the patron-client paradigm takes into account the client's needs which may be political, economic, military, or a combination of the above. This is in keeping with the principle of reciprocity that is necessary to sustain patron-client ties." See also Peter Gourevitch, "Squaring the Circle: The Domestic Sources of International Cooperation," *International Organization* 50, no. 2 (1996): 349-73.

remarkable authoritarian stability. Existing political institutions can derive their stability and durability from their patrons.

Second, client-patron relations hamper society's agency. Thus, society's preferences for more democracy need not induce greater demands on the state for political accountability because the state remains accountable to larger outside forces. A diffusion of the rentier effect and the emergence of new economic interests, for instance, need not result in direct contestation of the existing establishment. In societies that are already authoritarian, an increased appreciation of or desire for democracy need not result in democratic demands on the state.

This dynamic introduces a new layer of negotiation for citizens of client states. Democratic elements within a society will not push for more democracy if more democracy will bring to power forces hostile to the external patron. Democracy's potential to jeopardize the base of external support for the regime reduces the likelihood of contestation. Democratic orientations, new economic opportunities, and expanded civic qualities are not sufficient to structure societal demands for more democracy. Citizens must guarantee that their national well-being (the security and resource base of the nation) will not be jeopardized if they choose to exercise their newly acquired democratic civic worldviews.

Third, the durable stability that many Arab countries enjoy today reflects a contrived or manufactured congruence between citizens and their political institutions. In these clientelistic settings, society's preferences toward the status quo are not necessarily influenced by the "true" political orientations of citizens. Rather, citizens accept the status quo even while they recognize that is not necessarily ideal. In places like Jordan, citizens show remarkable levels of support for democracy alongside remarkable levels of support for the existing, nondemocratic political establishment. In clientelistic settings, the actual values of society matter less than the contrived values that are shaped by the status of a country as a client in the international order.

EMPIRICAL REALITIES: JORDAN AND KUWAIT

In the context of the Arab world, greater support for democracy has resulted in more democracy in Kuwait but not in Jordan.⁵⁴ Kuwait, a classic rentier state, has moved in a more solid democratic trajectory than has Jordan in

⁵⁴Support for democracy is an attitudinal predisposition. Some analysts may question the usefulness of such support as a category worthy of scholarly attention. I offer two main reasons why studying support for democracy remains valuable to the field of comparative politics: First, it is important to understand whether members of society are first and foremost committed to the institutions of democracy. Understanding how citizens conceive of democracy and the degree to which they are dedicated to it as a doctrine are important should a political transition occur. Further, support for democracy remains one of the most robust measures of

the last several years, while Jordan since 1993 has witnessed significant democratic reversals. In the last several years, Kuwaiti citizens have increasingly been capable of holding their regime accountable.⁵⁵ This asymmetry offers a useful opportunity for analysis.

Three major accomplishments in the last several years highlight Kuwait's democratic successes. First, in 2005, women gained suffrage after extensive lobbying of their parliamentary representatives. Although a key supporter of such reforms, the regime could not impose its will until the parliament approved the reforms in 2005 with active influence from civil society. Second, when Shaykh Jaber al-Ahmad al-Sabah died in 2006 and it became clear that his successor, Shaykh Sa'ad al-Abdullah al-Salim, was not fit to assume the throne due to illness, Kuwait handled the succession crisis through constitutional channels. The Sabah family did not dictate the successor but instead allowed the head of parliament, as stipulated in the constitution, to begin a constitutional process to designate a successor. Third, in 2006, societal and parliamentary forces aligned with one another to press for significant electoral redistricting reforms that aimed to curb the overrepresentation of tribal and Bedouin forces in parliament.⁵⁶ These changes all occurred with active civil society involvement and parliamentary advocacy, despite Kuwait's position as a rentier state.

While Kuwait made significant advancements along its democratic trajectory, Jordan did not—despite strong notional support for democracy. And, in fact, most of the Arab world mirrors Jordan's "de-democratization" in the last ten to fifteen years. Jordan reversed its electoral law in 1993 to reduce the influence of opposition forces. It limited press freedoms as well as civil and political liberties more generally. And while support for democracy remains high in both polities, Jordanians also give more support to authoritarian practices than do Kuwaitis.

Why such asymmetry? Why would a population that simultaneously supports democracy also support authoritarian tendencies? Why do the citizens of the Arab world still profess support for regimes that have remained

democratic orientations in societies that are not democratic. Second, this then raises the question, what is the relationship between support for democracy and *actual* democracy? Amaney Jamal and Irfan Nooruddin, "The Democratic Utility of Trust: A Cross-National Analysis," *Journal of Politics* 72, no. 1 (2010): 45–59, have found that support for democracy maps onto other pertinent macrolevel democratic indicators across the globe; see figures 5.4 and 5.5 in the present volume. However, that support for democracy has not necessarily resulted in greater democratic gains in some countries is one of the key questions guiding the present study.

⁵⁵According to Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, "Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002," *World Bank Economic Review* 18, no. 2 (2004): 253–87, in 1996 Jordan ranked 36 percent in the world on voice and accountability scores and in 2006 it fell to a rank of 29 percent. In 1996 Kuwait ranked 34 percent; in 2006 it ranked 39 percent.

⁵⁶For a more detailed discussion of these reforms, see chapter 3.

authoritarian? Existing theoretical explanations offer us inadequate leverage to explain these empirical realities on the ground in the Arab world.

The given context of international hierarchy coupled with anti-American Islamist opposition movements has constrained the expression of desires for democracy across the Arab world. Examining Kuwait and Jordan will allow me to demonstrate how concerns about a country's international relations shape state-society relations more broadly.

U.S. DOMINANCE IN THE ARAB WORLD

The modern Arab world has consistently depended on external forces, whether through direct occupation, colonization, or client ties to superpowers. Because of this, according to Stephen Krasner, the Arab world can be classified as a region that is firmly embedded as a subordinate in an international hierarchical relationship.⁵⁷ Krasner elaborates, "Foreign actors . . . can use their material capabilities to dictate or coerce changes in the authority structures of a target; they can violate the . . . rule of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other states."⁵⁸ David Lake captures an extension of this definition when he describes the type of hierarchical relations between the United States and many other countries. Lake writes, "Hierarchy [between one state and another] exists when one actor, the dominant state, possesses authority over another actor, the subordinate state: Authority is never total . . . but varies in extent."⁵⁹ Both direct intervention and invitation can violate autonomy.⁶⁰ Thus, a weaker state, like many of those in the Arab world, can invite the United States to secure their interests, as do many of the states in the Gulf that rely on the United States for military security. In other cases, where countries in the Arab world do not conform to U.S. interests, as was the case under Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the United States has demonstrated the ability to intervene militarily. Economic sanctions are another tool that the United States has used against countries in the region.

⁵⁷Stephen Krasner, *Sovereignty* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 20.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*

⁵⁹David A. Lake, "Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics," *International Security* 2, no.1 (2007): 56.

⁶⁰Hierarchical relationships in the international order have been captured in various studies; see Lake, "Escape from the State of Nature"; Ian Clark, *The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the International Order* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Robert W. Tucker, *The Inequality of Nations* (New York: Basic Books, 1977); Michael W. Doyle, *Empires* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); Craig Calhoun, Frederick Cooper, and Kevin W. Moore, eds., *Lessons of Empire: Imperial Histories and American Power* (New York: New Press, 2006); and Hendrik Spruyt, *Ending Empire: Contested Sovereignty and Territorial Partition* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

Iran, Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinian Hamas-led government have all been on the receiving end of U.S. sanctions.

Over the last two decades, the Arab world has increasingly become a client of the United States, and its strategic utility to the United States continues to grow as well. The United States seeks to maintain regional stability, contain Iran, ensure Islamists do not seize power and terrorism does not spiral out of control, secure its access to oil, and protect the state of Israel. Thus, U.S. ties to existing Arab regimes first and foremost guarantee these strategic priorities for the United States. These objectives are also evident in its relations with Jordan and Kuwait.

A number of indicators substantiate the U.S. dominance of the Arab world. First, overall levels of U.S. official development assistance to all regions in the world from 1991 reveal that the Arab world is the largest recipient of aid from the United States. Even when we correct for Iraq, the Arab world exceeds Africa in its reliance on U.S. aid (see table 1.2). For the years 1991–2009, the Arab world received \$69 billion in aid. Even excluding Iraq, the Arab world received \$39.1 billion, an amount slightly below Africa's \$39.9 billion.⁶¹

Second, Correlates of War data show that from 1990 to 2001 the United States has had more direct involvement in conflicts in the Middle East than any other region (see table 1.3). Because the data are only available to 2001, they exclude three notable things. First, the Iraq war is not captured here since it began in 2003. Second, the standoff with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's Iran is also missing from this analysis. Third, the war in Afghanistan is grouped under Asia and not the Middle East. Had the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the current standoff with Iran been included in these scores, we would see even higher levels of U.S. involvement in conflicts in the Middle East.⁶²

Lake's security and economic hierarchy measures also allow us to gain even more leverage on the extent to which the Arab world is a client of the United States.⁶³ While it is no easy task to measure the extent to which the United States influences another region, Lake skillfully creates two measures to capture the extent to which a hierarchical relationship exists between the United States and other countries. He conceptualizes two dimensions of dependence; one taps into security, and the other the economy. The degree

⁶¹Between 2001 and 2006 the per-capita aid in the Arab world was \$16.41, compared to Africa at \$3.89. It is also important to note here that these aid numbers are not driven by Egypt. For example, between 2001 and 2006 Egypt received close to \$4 billion in U.S. aid while Jordan received close to \$2.5 billion for the same time period. However, Jordan received more than Egypt on a per-capita basis.

⁶²Correlates of War data codes U.S. involvement in conflicts in five different categories: (1) no militarized action; (2) threat to use force; (3) display of use of force; (4) use of force; (5) war.

⁶³Lake, "Escape from the State of Nature."

TABLE 1.2. Total gross official development assistance from the United States across regions (in millions of dollars)

	1991–2009
Arab	\$39,138.02
Iraq	\$30,107.57
Africa	\$39,992.65
Asia	\$34,589.19
Eastern Europe	\$12,410.04
Latin America	\$28,352.34
Other	\$9,506.40
Total	\$194,096.21

Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *OECD International Development Statistics*; accessed December 2011 at <http://lysander.sourceoecd.org/vl=92415576/cl=13/nw=1/rpsv/ij/oecdstats/16081110/v77n1/s4/p1>.

to which a country can secure and economically sustain itself largely determines its levels of sovereignty.⁶⁴ Lake assesses security hierarchy via two measures. The first is the deployment of U.S. military forces from the dominant country into the weaker state. According to Lake, "Military troops enable a dominant state to influence the security policies of its subordinate. The dominant country can embroil the subordinate in foreign conflicts if it chooses; by launching attacks from the subordinate's territory, for instance, the dominant state automatically implicates the other in the conflict and makes it a target for retaliation by its antagonist, as in the case of the United States and Saudi Arabia in the 1990–91 Gulf War."⁶⁵

Lake's second indicator of security hierarchy is the number of independent alliances that the subordinate state possesses. This measure doesn't work in the Arab world because the region's countries have virtually no independent alliances outside of the United States—and even the relations between Arab states and the United States are not structured around alliances

⁶⁴Lake indicates that he follows common practice in international relations to tap into these two dimensions of sovereignty.

⁶⁵Lake, "Escape from the State of Nature," 62. All measures are compiled for the United States and all other countries for which data are available from 1950 to 2000. Overseas troop deployments are reported by the U.S. Department of Defense. The measure is divided by population to adjust for differences in country size. See the data set at: <http://weber.ucsd.edu/~dlake/data.html>.

TABLE 1.3. U.S. conflicts by region, 1990–2001

	Number	Percent
The Americas	9	18.0%
Europe	11	22.0%
Africa	1	2.0%
Middle East	16	32.0%
Asia	13	26.0%
Total	50	100.0%

per se. Most Arab states that align with the United States possess “no other alliances outside the web of alliances held by that great power.”⁶⁶

Lake also captures economic hierarchy with two other measures. The first is the degree to which a country’s monetary policy is autonomous.⁶⁷ The degree to which a country adjusts its exchange rate to that of the dominant country signifies its level of subordination.⁶⁸ The second indicator of economic hierarchy is relative trade dependence. The number of trading partners a country possesses signifies its degree of political autonomy, with more partners illustrating greater independence.⁶⁹ These two measures of security and economic hierarchy are designed to capture “not purely coercive relations between states, but rather, the authority, obligation, and legitimate coercion that are central to hierarchical relationships.”⁷⁰

Using these analytical measurements of the degree of international hierarchy between the United States and the Arab world, I extend Lake’s data from 2000 to 2007.⁷¹ Coinciding with the other tables gauging Arab depen-

⁶⁶Lake, “Escape from the State of Nature,” 63.

⁶⁷This is determined by its exchange rate regime—how its currency is set relative to other currencies. A country can allow its currency to float against other currencies with its exchange rate being determined by financial markets. Second, a country can adjust its exchange rate to a single foreign anchor currency, most commonly the dollar or the Euro. By adjusting its exchange rate to an anchor currency the subordinate state indirectly imports or adopts the monetary policy of the dominant country. Third, a country can adopt the currency of a foreign state as its own—a process known as “dollarization.”

⁶⁸Lake relies on data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). For the coding see Lake, “Escape from the State of Nature.”

⁶⁹Relative trade dependence is measured as each country’s total trade with the United States divided by its own GDP, minus similar ratios for the other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (China, France, Great Britain, and Russia).

⁷⁰Lake, “Escape from the State of Nature,” 68.

⁷¹The population and GDP data used to scale the troop data are from the World Penn Tables; see Alan Heston, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.2, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, September 2006. The trade data are from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Data and




Figure 1.3. Military personnel across time (excluding Iraq and Kuwait).

dence on the United States, figures 1.3 and 1.4 show that the Arab world is highly dependent on the United States for its security. In fact, compared to other regions of the world, the Arab world has the largest percentage of U.S. troop deployments, even when Kuwait and Iraq are excluded. U.S. troops are located across the Arab region, from Qatar to Jordan, and from Egypt to Morocco. These numbers have risen annually since the early 1990s, signifying the strategic importance of the Arab world to the United States and illustrating the Arab world’s dependence on America as well. The Arab world’s economic dependence on the United States has also increased. Only Latin America is more economically dependent on the United States than the Arab world (see fig. 1.5), although Latin America is less dependent on the United States for its security needs (see fig. 1.4).

Three points about the Arab world’s dependence on the United States stand out. First, it is the only region that depends on the United States in terms of both security and economic needs. According to Lake, “When both security and economic hierarchies exist between two polities, the relationship

the exchange rate data are from Kenneth Rogoff, Ethan O. Ilzetzki, and Carmen M. Reinhart, “Exchange Rate Arrangements into the 21st Century: Will the Anchor Currency Hold?” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 119, no. 1 (2004): 1–48; see also http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/rogoff/files/ERA_Background_Material.htm.




Figure 1.4. Military personnel across time (including Iraq and Kuwait).

becomes what is commonly known as either an informal empire or, at an extreme, empire.⁷² Second, the data reveal that these patterns of dependence have been increasing over time; since the early 1990s, the United States has increasingly dominated the Arab world. Third, no other region in the world shows the remarkable levels of hierarchy between the Arab world and the United States in terms of its security and economic needs. In fact, most of the world has decreased its security dependency on the United States, while the Arab world today is more deeply entrenched in a hierarchical relationship with it. Arab “exceptionalism” may not be in its Islamic culture but instead may stem from the Arab world’s subordinate location in the international system.

The given context of international hierarchy coupled with anti-American Islamist opposition movements has constrained the expression of desires for democracy across the Arab world. Examining Kuwait and Jordan—two similar clientelistic states that are both monarchies holding parliamentary elections, with similar levels of support for their Islamist opposition movements (estimates in each country put levels of support between 35 percent

⁷²Lake, “Escape from the State of Nature,” 61. According to Doyle, *Empires*, 12, *empire* means that one entity, “the dominant metropole, exerts political control over the internal and external policy—the effective sovereignty—of the other, the subordinate periphery.” This is not the same as hegemony, where a very powerful state influences others around it but does not directly control others. See Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 135.




Figure 1.5. Economic hierarchy across time.

and 60 percent) but varying in the levels of anti-American sentiment among these Islamist opposition forces (my key explanatory variable)—will allow me to demonstrate how concerns about a country’s international relations shape state-society relations more broadly. Although this book builds its argument by focusing on the cases of Kuwait and Jordan, it also draws on evidence from two other monarchies that have varying degrees of anti-American sentiment among their Islamist opposition: Morocco and Saudi Arabia. Further, the findings will also be extended to Palestine’s democratic experience, which resulted in Hamas’s parliamentary victory of 2006.

ANTI-AMERICANISM AS THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: JORDAN AND KUWAIT

Citizen engagements with their regimes in the context of the Arab world are shaped by a two-level game.⁷³ Citizens take into account the preferences of the external patron in structuring their engagements with their regimes, and their attitudes toward their regimes are determined by international factors. The preferences of the patron matter for how citizens engage their regimes.

⁷³See, for example, Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” *International Organization* 43, no. 2 (1998): 427–60; and Helen V. Milner, *Interests, Institutions, and Information* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987).

Citizens base their intermediary preferences on their futures, assessing their marginal gains and losses based on the ways in which the global patron may respond to changes to the internal state context. Thus, some citizens stand to gain from a continuation of strong ties to the patron. Others have less to lose if ties are broken. According to Robert Putnam, “the two-level approach recognizes the inevitability of domestic conflict about what the ‘national interest’ requires.”⁷⁴ Discussing trade agreements, Helen Milner maintains that because they have “*distributional consequences* . . . [c]ooperative agreements create winners and losers domestically; therefore they generate supporters and opponents.”⁷⁵ Yotam Margalit similarly discusses the ways in which globalization creates winners and losers.⁷⁶ Adopting this logic of winners and losers, my argument posits that in the game of maintaining patron alliances there are indeed winners and there are losers (or those who have little to gain). This tension structures preferences about regime type. It’s not so much that preferences are only about ideational affinities based on democratic or authoritarian preferences or, for that matter, secular and religious attachments. Rather, the regime in power—whether authoritarian or semidemocratic—receives support or opposition because of patron backing.

The theoretical framework I employ here is similar to Peter Gourevitch’s “The Second Image Reversed,”⁷⁷ which draws both on dependency theories and Alexander Gerschenkron’s formulations about the ways that the international system influences domestic politics. I especially draw on Gourevitch’s assessment of regime types and the nature of coalitional partners that emerge from and dominate negotiations about regime outcomes. Gourevitch is correct to point out that “students of comparative politics treat domestic structure too much as an independent variable, underplaying the extent to which it and the international system interact.”⁷⁸ Yet, as several authors point out, when the structure of the international order is systematic—or in the case of the Arab world, where most states are clients of the United States—there must emerge domestic-level factors that explain variations in regime outcomes or the nature of political engagement regarding regime outcomes in these regimes.

This study, therefore, advances that levels of anti-Americanism are a factor that also condition these types of domestic negotiations about regime

⁷⁴Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics,” 460.

⁷⁵Milner, *Interests, Institutions, and Information*, 9; emphasis in the original.

⁷⁶See Yotam Margalit, “Commerce and Oppositions: The Political Responses of Globalization’s Losers” (unpublished manuscript, 2010); and Rogowski, *Commerce and Coalitions*.

⁷⁷Peter Gourevitch, “The Second Image Reversed,” *International Organization* 32, no. 4 (1978): 881–912.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, 900.

outcomes; indeed, anti-Americanism can shape the type of regimes that emerge and endure.⁷⁹ Building on theories of neodependency, it examines the ways that ordinary citizens, and not just the elite, respond to their peripheral location within the international system.⁸⁰ Further, it highlights the interactive effect of domestic and international factors on political development more generally.⁸¹

Specifically, Jordanian sectors invested in economic reform through closer ties to the United States and other Western countries are more likely to be supportive of the existing regime because they value the role the regime plays in securing relations with the United States and worry that a new democratically elected regime may not maintain such close ties with the United States. Strong ties to the United States have enhanced and potentially will continue to enhance Jordan’s trajectory of economic

⁷⁹Ideally, the research design at hand would allow us to look at states that are also not clients of the United States, but because most states in the region are U.S. clients this becomes increasingly more difficult. There are two countries that arguably are not U.S. clients: Syria and Tunisia. In Syria, it has been next to impossible to obtain the data that is needed for this project. Yet, my model will predict that in states that are not clients domestic-level factors will continue to structure debates about regime type. However, if there are growing segments of the opposition that wish to strengthen ties to the patron, then these factors may condition opposition strategies. As Tunisia consolidates its postrevolutionary rule the questions will certainly structure regime and opposition strategies.

⁸⁰See Barbara Stallings, *Economic Dependency in Africa and Latin America* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1972); Peter Evans, *Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State and Local Capital in Brazil* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); Fernando Henrique Cardoso, *Dependency and Development in Latin America* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979); and Barbara Stallings and Robert Kaufman, eds., *Debt and Democracy in Latin America* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989).

⁸¹Several scholars have, however, examined the ways in which external factors like memberships in international and regional organizations and diffusion processes influence countries’ democratic trajectories. See Daniel Brinks and Michael Coppedge, “Diffusion Is No Illusion: Neighbor Emulation in the Third Wave of Democracy,” *Comparative Political Studies* 39, no. 4 (2006): 463–89; and Jon Pevehouse, *Democracy from Above: Regional Organization and Democratization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). On the role of foreign aid and the effects on democratization, see Jon Pevehouse, “Democracy from the Outside In? International Organization and Democratization,” *International Organization* 56, no. 3 (2002): 515–49; and Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, and Peter B. Rosendorff, “Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements,” *International Organization* 56, no. 3 (2002): 477–513. On economic globalization and democratization, see Milner and Mukerjee, “Democratization and Economic Globalization”; Acemoglu and Robinson, *The Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*; Adserà and Boix, “Trade, Democracy, and the Size of the Public Sector”; Boix, *Democracy and Redistribution*; Carles Boix and Luis Garicano, “Democracy, Inequality, and Country-Specific Wealth” (unpublished manuscript, 2002); Eichengreen and Leblang, “Democracy and Globalization”; Nita Rudra, “Globalization and the Strengthening of Democracy in the Developing World,” *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (2005): 704–30; and Keohane and Milner, *Internationalization*.

liberalization.⁸² Further, these stable relations allow Jordan to maintain good ties to other Western countries (e.g., those of the European Union) as well. Those citizens most invested in economic reforms come from three different categories: middle- and upper-class citizens, who stand to gain from better economic conditions; store owners and shopkeepers, who believe that economic liberalization can bolster their standing; and educated younger citizens, who believe that greater economic liberalization will ultimately create more and better jobs. The potential for economic prosperity is, for these citizens, the growing hope that globalization can enhance the standing of the kingdom. For these potential winners of globalization, the eye is on global factors, including the role of the United States, for the dream of a better future.

Jordan also houses opponents to economic reform, although they do not oppose reforms because they believe that they are harmful to the kingdom. In fact, most Jordanians embrace the capitalist ethos of competitive markets. In 2002, 52 percent of Jordanians believed that international trade was good for their country. By 2007, that percentage had jumped to 72 percent. Trade is seen as vital to the kingdom's growth; thus, political stability and maintaining close ties to the United States are very important to realize these ambitions. Those who disagree believe economic reforms and liberalization today are part and parcel of a "Western agenda" that will further render Jordan reliant on external actors. Islamists and their supporters are therefore most skeptical of economic reform packages linked to the West. Globalization, they contend, is another form of neocolonialism.

Aside from Islamist objections to globalization, support for globalization remains significant in Jordan and elsewhere in the Arab and Muslim world. In 2007, positive evaluations of the free market were strong across the region, with 46 percent in Jordan, 65 percent in Kuwait, 66 percent in Palestine, and 66 percent in Morocco agreeing that such markets were good.⁸³

⁸²For a discussion on the economic determinants of regime support, see Susan C. Stokes, "Public Opinion of Market Reforms: A Framework," in *Public Support for Market Reforms in New Democracies*, ed. Susan C. Stokes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1–27.

⁸³The Pew Global Attitudes Project, *World Publics Welcome Global Trade but Not Immigration: 47-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey* (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2007), employs the following question wording:

(1) Please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with the following [statement]: a. Most people are better off in a free market economy, even though some people are rich and some are poor. (2) What do you think about the growing trade and business ties between (survey country) and other countries—do you think it is a very good thing, somewhat good, somewhat bad or a very bad thing for your country? (3) As I read a list of groups and organizations, for each, please tell me what kind of influence the group is having on the way things are going in (survey country). Is the influence of (read name) very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad in (survey country): g. large companies from other countries?

International trade receives support from 72 percent in Jordan, 91 percent in Kuwait, 70 percent in Morocco, and 69 percent in Palestine. Even significant pluralities believed that the foreign companies have a positive impact in each of the countries. In Morocco, 72 percent of those surveyed supported this view, along with 68 percent of Kuwaitis, 59 percent of Jordanians, and 43 percent of Palestinians. These findings are substantiated by another survey conducted by the University of Maryland, which found that majorities in Egypt and the Palestinian Territories supported globalization for its potential positive results.⁸⁴

In Jordan, citizens are cautious about the effects of democracy. Allowing more democracy could also allow anti-American movements like the Islamic Action Front (IAF) to seize greater power in ways that would undermine the patron-client relationship. If the IAF were to emerge triumphant, the United States would likely choose to sever ties with Jordan. Worse, the United States could sanction the state, harming the nation as a whole. Conversely, however, these same supporters of economic reform in Kuwait—those best positioned to benefit from greater economic global integration and advancement—are more likely to be less supportive of the Kuwaiti regime. This marked difference with Jordan is due to the fact that the Islamist opposition in Kuwait, the Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM), is much less anti-American. Kuwaitis do not fear the implications of democracy the way the Jordanians do. In general, Kuwaitis are less anti-American than are Jordanians. These levels of anti-Americanism are exogenously structured, as I will discuss in chapter 3. During the First Gulf War (1990–91), the United States appeared as a liberator.⁸⁵ In Jordan, therefore, the IAF is better positioned to attract anti-American sympathizers to its doctrine (see fig. 1.6). When compared to Kuwaitis, Jordanians are less likely to believe U.S. democracy promotion initiatives are successful, less likely to believe most American are good people, and less likely to believe that U.S. culture has many positive attributes.

These findings are also evident in other client regimes in the Arab world. Moroccan, Palestinian, and Saudi Arabian citizens all balance their desire for democracy against the possible emergence of anti-American Islamist movements that may undermine the client status of their regimes with the United States. These factors are not at play in countries like Kuwait, Turkey, and Indonesia, all of which have more pro-American Islamist groups. This interaction between international structures and domestic conditions has stifled the democratization process in the Arab world. This is the central empirical finding of the book.

⁸⁴See "Muslims Positive about Globalization, Trade," 2008 (accessed at <http://worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafrica/index.php?nid=&id=&lb=brme>).

⁸⁵See Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007).




Figure 1.6. Jordanian and Kuwaiti attitudes toward the United States.

SCOPE CONDITION, CASE-SELECTION STRATEGY, DATA, AND EVIDENCE

While this book relies on the cases of Kuwait and Jordan to advance the microfoundations of its arguments, other cases are crucial for theoretical portability. Some readers will be concerned about the comparability of Kuwait and Jordan as two case studies. Although both states are monarchies, the two countries arguably fall into two different categories because of Kuwait's heavy reliance on oil. After all, Kuwait is an almost pure rentier state. I address this valid concern directly and throughout the book. First, I demonstrate that the rentier model does not explain the divergence in the dependent variable. Second, a similar rentier state—Saudi Arabia—shows almost reverse patterns from those of the Kuwaiti case because of the anti-Americanism of the opposition movements in Saudi Arabia. Third, I compare Jordan to other similar states that are not rentier states but have varying levels of anti-American opposition movements—namely, Morocco, Jordan, Palestine, Turkey, and Indonesia. Throughout the discussion of these case studies, I demonstrate that the chief factors that distinguish the countries of Kuwait and Jordan are not mediating the observed outcomes advanced in this study.

This book relies on multiple sources of information to substantiate the microfoundational claims advanced about citizen engagements and regime type. To substantiate my claims I rely on data from Kuwait, Jordan, and Palestine from surveys conducted in the first wave of the Arab Barometer and a set of 250 open-ended interviews conducted in Jordan, Morocco, and

Kuwait between 2005 and 2007. The open-ended interview material appears throughout the book to establish the causal logics citizens are employing when they discuss regime type and political processes linked to democratization. Although these interviews are not representative samples, they nevertheless examine predominant trends that emerged throughout the course of my research.⁸⁶ They show that winners of globalization are more cautious in pushing for more democracy because they are concerned about anti-patron forces accessing power and disrupting the patron relationship. Thus, in client countries where anti-Americanism is high with organized groups to mobilize anti-American sentiment, debates about democratization will be more intense and constrained by concerns of stability.

Chapter 2 offers a detailed historical analysis of the emergence of regime clientelism in Jordan and Kuwait. Although Arab states have, to a large extent, been client regimes since their inception, their dependency on the United States has increased following the Cold War. Chapter 3 addresses how state and society—particularly Islamist opposition movements—deal with regime clientelism, especially the sources of anti-Americanism in Jordan, and especially among the IAF; I pay particular attention to the ways in which the regime and the United States have come to prioritize stability over democracy. Chapter 3 also examines regime and societal interactions in Kuwait with an emphasis on the recent democratic developments in the oil kingdom. The lack of anti-Americanism among the Kuwaiti opposition, especially among the ICM, has allowed for greater convergence between the democratic preferences of a society and its patron. Both chapters highlight how Arab regimes, Islamist opposition movements, and ordinary citizens continue to interact with one another through the prism of international dependency.

Using survey data from the Arab Barometer project, chapter 4 charts public opinion responses toward democracy and authoritarianism. Taking into account individual-level alternative hypotheses, this chapter illustrates that support for authoritarianism is also mediated by anti-American concerns. Even democratic citizens in Jordan will profess support for the regime in order to guarantee the patron-client relations so fundamental to Jordan's well-being. This delicate well-being could be jeopardized by anti-American elements entering the political process through more democratic means.

Teasing out the causal logics citizens offer for accepting or rejecting existing authoritarian realities, chapter 4 offers a more in-depth qualitative analysis of the impact of regime clientelism on the democratic predispositions and daily political negotiations of ordinary citizens. Relying on close to two hundred open-ended interviews with citizens in Jordan and Kuwait, this chapter also examines macrolevel alternative hypotheses assessing these attitudes and behaviors across both settings.

⁸⁶Throughout the book, I will document the overall trends in percentage breakdowns. All coding was conducted using the qualitative software package NVIVO.

Chapter 5 demonstrates that different patterns of attitudes toward democracy and support for authoritarianism exist in Kuwait. Kuwaitis are far less likely to rationalize authoritarianism as strategically useful. This is because the Islamist opposition is not as anti-American as its counterpart in Jordan. As a result, Kuwait has moved along a more democratic trajectory. Kuwaitis can comfortably espouse democratic ideals and push for democratic reform, because existing opposition on the ground does not threaten its client status with the United States. This chapter further addresses alternative individual-level explanations on support for democracy and authoritarianism in Jordan and Kuwait.

Extending the analysis to Morocco, chapter 6 highlights how citizens across the North African monarchy rationalize authoritarianism through the prism of strategic utility to U.S. (and EU) ties. Chapter 7 extends the argument to Palestine and Saudi Arabia.

Finally, chapter 8 discusses how anti-Americanism continues to thwart the democratization trajectory in the Arab world. Anti-Americanism has often been seen as simply a problem relevant to East-West relations, terrorism, and the clash of civilizations. I maintain, however, that anti-Americanism has also stifled grassroots efforts toward democratization in the Arab world. The sheer dependence of the Arab world on U.S. patronage has meant that Arab citizens take their cues from the United States to secure the status quo. While the preference for democracy exists on the street, it needs to be fully endorsed by the patron. Anti-American forces have dampened U.S. enthusiasm for democracy, which in turn has stifled democratic demands from below. Given the fact that increasing international dependency has resulted in greater anti-Americanism, the democratic option remains all the more elusive today. This book shows that one of the key routes to democracy in the region will be to address the sources of anti-Americanism writ large.

APPENDIX: HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX SCORES AND JORDAN'S GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT GROWTH RATE

TABLE 1.4. Human Development Index scores, 1980–2005

	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005
Jordan	.647	.669	.684	.710	.751	.773
Morocco	.483	.519	.551	.581	.613	.646
Kuwait	.789	.794	—	.826	.855	.891
Saudi Arabia	.666	.684	.717	.748	.788	.812

Source: United Nations Human Development Index 1980–2011; accessed January 2012 at <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-02/human-development-index-trends-1980-2011-table>.

TABLE 1.5. Jordan GDP growth rates

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
GDP growth rates in Jordan	4.2%	8.7%	1.4%	3.3%	4.3%	5.3%	6.4%	11.8%	11.5%	12.2%

Source: World Bank national accounts data and OECD National Accounts data files; accessed January 2012 at <http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/jordan/gdp-growth#NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>.

CHAPTER SIX

Morocco

Support for the Status Quo

ONE OF THE REASONS CITIZENS ACROSS THE ARAB WORLD RATIONALIZE THE NECESSITY of supporting existing regimes (which are semidemocratic at best) is to guarantee U.S. patronage. Examining Morocco, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia provides a broader window into this dynamic. Social scientists may question the justification for comparing two states like Jordan and Kuwait that are institutionally different, especially in terms of their economic structures. This is a valid concern, and it is therefore imperative to extend these arguments to cases that are similar in structure. Thus, the Moroccan case provides an excellent comparison to that of Jordan, and the Saudi Arabian case to that of Kuwait. The inclusion of Saudi Arabia is vital because I am able to demonstrate first that variation does exist between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and second that structural factors like Kuwait's oil rich economy cannot account for the reasons why citizens can afford to leverage more democracy. If oil-rich states are to determine citizen support and activities toward democracy, we would expect citizens of the Gulf region to be demanding democracy at startling rates. I present Saudi Arabia as a case to assess these expectations.

Further, readers may question whether strong pockets of support for the existing regimes, especially among those who should be at the forefront of democratic contestation, is a function of fear of an alternative Islamic authoritarian (nondemocratic) state or whether it is fear of an Islamist opposition movement that will undermine ties to the United States and thereby weaken the state. In chapter 5, I addressed this concern using individual-level data from Jordan; here, I continue to pay attention to this question. Morocco includes one of the most progressive Islamic movements in the region, and citizens, while applauding the movement's moderation, remain wary of its foreign intentions. Enhancing ties with the United States and maintaining ties to Europe were often cited as key reasons why the status quo was preferable to increasing levels of democracy. It became apparent that although the Islamic Party for Justice and Development (PJD) is considered moderate in terms of its internal Islamic agenda (Shari'a-oriented

attitudes), many in the kingdom worried about the party's stance toward the United States. That the PJD, along with other Islamic groups, remains anti-U.S. further confirms the dynamics of state-society relations surrounding the Jordanian case. In chapter 7, I also include the Palestinian case as further evidence of the main argument here. Similar to the Algerian case in 1991, the Palestinian case of 2006 exemplifies the devastating implications of democracy for the lives of citizens when it yields undesirable results.

Moroccans are very much committed to democratic values, but worries about losing U.S. and European patronage loom large in the daily lives of ordinary citizens. Access to European markets is an important concern. In fact, many Moroccans see good ties with the Americans as necessary to ensure continued access to Europe. Like Jordanians, Moroccans also rationalized their support for the regime based on international considerations that would ensure economic progress.

Sixty-two percent of Moroccans report that they would support the government even when they don't agree with its decisions, while 92 percent of Moroccans say that democracy is the best form of government.¹ Moroccans understand that their regime is reliant on external forces for its success. Any alteration of the status quo could empower anti-American Islamists in ways that could undermine Morocco's standing with its international patrons.

MOROCCAN INTERNATIONAL CLIENTELISM

Morocco is heavily reliant on the European Union (EU) and the United States, and these are relationships that include both financial aid and military assistance. An almost equal number of Moroccans (20 percent) believe that the United States and France are Morocco's two most dependable allies.² The EU, especially France, aids Morocco financially, and its markets remain extremely important for Morocco. Seventy-one percent of Morocco's exports head to the EU annually;³ in 2001, that amounted to over €12 billion in trade.⁴ Morocco also receives EU funding under the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership program and since 1997 has received over 1.25 billion dollars in grants. Europe is also significant to Morocco because it is the number one immigration destination of those who leave the country; this European link provides a key source of remittances.

¹ Arab Barometer 2006.

² See Pew Global Attitudes Project, *America's Image in the World* (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2007; accessed at <http://pewglobal.org/commentary/display.php?AnalysisID=1019>).

³ Melanie Claire Cammett, *Globalization and Business Politics in Arab North Africa: A Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

⁴ Marvin Howe, *Morocco: The Islamist Awakening and Other Challenges* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 305.

The United States is also important to Morocco, having given more aid to Morocco than to any other Arab country with the exception of Egypt (and Iraq, before the Second Gulf War). This relationship has intensified in the last two decades, but especially since 9-11. In 2007, the U.S. government-backed Millennium Challenge Corporation approved a five-year, \$697.5 million economic aid package to fight poverty and promote economic growth.⁵ The United States has also increased funding for education, health care, women's rights, job creation, and structural adjustment.⁶ Since 1995 the regime has been trying to improve the economic climate in Morocco by enacting legislation that favors foreign direct investment. Like citizens in Kuwait and Jordan, Moroccans favor greater global integration and those who do so are also more positive toward U.S. antiterrorism policies.⁷

In 2002, U.S. president George W. Bush welcomed Morocco's King Mohammed VI to the White House, emphasizing the special friendship that exists between the two countries. According to Marvin Howe, "This meeting marked a new chapter in Morocco's foreign relations, which had been essentially Eurocentric and geared mainly to its former protectors, France and Spain. There followed flattering statements from Washington exalting the strategic relationship with Morocco."⁸

In 2004, President Bush designated Morocco as a major non-NATO ally, thereby erasing restrictions on arms sales.⁹ That same year the United States adopted a free trade agreement with Morocco; this agreement aims to increase U.S. investment in the North African country. Moroccan businesspeople expressed hope that the new free trade association would contribute to economic improvements. But the agreement would not only help the kingdom economically; it also brought Morocco firmly under U.S. influence. Morocco moved ahead, solidifying its relations with the United States.

U.S. ties to Morocco have historical roots as well. Morocco had been an important historical ally to the United States during the Cold War. The United States came to Morocco's aid in the early 1980s when the Polisario had gained momentum in the disputed Western Sahara with military aid and equipment. In return, King Hassan II provided the United States access

⁵UNHCR, *World Report 2008: Morocco/Western Sahara* (Geneva: UNHCR, 2008; accessed at <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,HRW,,MAR,47a87c0cc,0.html>).

⁶Jeremy M. Sharp, *U.S. Democracy Promotion Policy in the Middle East: The Islamist Dilemma*, Congressional Research Service Report, July 15, 2006 (accessed at <http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/democ%20in%20middle%20east.htm>).

⁷Pew Global Attitudes Project, *America's Image*. The key independent variable that was both positive and significant in explaining support for U.S. antiterrorism policies in Morocco was a question that gauged whether Moroccans had positive or negative assessments of the influence of large external companies in Morocco.

⁸Howe, *Morocco: The Islamist Awakening and Other Challenges*, 301.

⁹"U.S. Rewards Morocco for Terror Aid," BBC News, June 4, 2004 (accessed at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3776413.stm>).

to airbase facilities should the need for rapid American deployment arise. The administration of President Ronald Reagan further assured King Hassan II that the United States was committed to Morocco's Western Sahara claims. But Moroccan ties to the United States have become even stronger since 9-11, as the nation has become crucial in providing the United States with counterterrorism assistance.

Throughout Morocco, citizens voice recognition of this relationship because they realize the future of their country is tied to the maintenance of solid relations with its patrons. Yet this relationship also carries risks, especially when the United States acts aggressively in the region. Moroccan citizens took to the streets to denounce the U.S. war on Iraq, which prevented the Moroccan government from deploying any troops against Saddam Hussein's regime. Further, the government was also concerned that high levels of anti-Americanism would serve the Islamists at the ballot box.¹⁰

ISLAMIST POSITIONS IN MOROCCO

Like many other governments in the Arab World, King Hassan II (r. 1961-99) worked with the Islamists to curtail the influence of leftist movements in the 1970s. The assassination of Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires leader Omar Benjelloun in 1975 by an Islamist group was done with tacit regime knowledge.¹¹ While maintaining a firm authoritarian grip on the kingdom, Hassan II became even less tolerant of the Islamist opposition. By the late 1990s, Hassan II granted the Islamists more room in civil and political society as part of his controlled political liberalization strategies.¹² And with the ascendance of Mohammed VI to the throne, Morocco has witnessed increased liberalization measures. These measures have generally provided the Islamists with more space in civil society. The post 9-11 and 2003 Casablanca attacks, however, would witness further restrictions on their liberties.

Dating back to the 1980s, three trends characterize the political Islamic landscape of Morocco. Led by a mosque preacher in Tangiers, *al-fiqh al-zamzami*, the reformist Sunni trend focused on levels of individual piety and righteousness and was not necessarily political. Another and far more extreme trend was al-Shabiba al-Islamiyya (Islamic Youth), drawn mostly from student and high school movements that were intent on the goal of overthrowing the regime. In 1981, Abdallah Benkirane broke away from

¹⁰Howe, *Morocco: The Islamist Awakening and Other Challenges*, 303.

¹¹Meir Litvak and Maddy Weitzman, "Islamism and the State in North Africa," in *Revolutionaries and Reformers: Contemporary Islamist Movements in the Middle East*, ed. Barry Rubin, 69-90 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003).

¹²*Ibid.*

al-Shabiba, adopted a more reformist stance, and followed a nonconfrontational position against the monarchy. The movement became Harakat Al-Islām wal Tajdid (Movement for Reform and Renewal). By 1990, Benkirane became more involved in the political process, and as a result he adopted a more passive stance toward the regime. The monarchy remained cautious of allowing overtly Islamic party participation in Moroccan elections. Benkirane was ultimately incorporated into the Mouvement Populaire Democratique et Constitutionnel (MPDC), which proceeded to win nine seats (out of 325) in the 1997 elections. By 1999, the movement had become the Parti de la Justice et du Développement (Justice and Development Party, or PJD). A third movement, al-'Adl wal Ihsān (Justice and Charity Organization, or JCO) was led by 'Abdesalam Yassin, a former education ministry school inspector. Yassin's group was more radical than the PJD and still openly challenges the legitimacy of the monarchy. The strength of al-'Adl wal Ihsān was demonstrated during the First Gulf War, during which 30,000 of Yassin's followers took to the street to protest against Morocco's participation in the coalition and America's involvement in the war.¹³ According to Howe, "[both] organizations condemn American [policies]—including the bombardment of Afghanistan and attacks on Iraqis—and unconditional support of Israel in the Palestinian conflict."¹⁴ Although the PJD is Morocco's largest Islamist party represented in the 325-seat house of representatives (the lower chamber of parliament), many Moroccan specialists argue that Yassin's outlawed JCO has wider support than the PJD.¹⁵ The JCO is by far the most influential organization in high schools and universities. Its welfare associations are impressive, and it delivers health care, literacy classes, and poverty amelioration initiatives. When popular events arise, especially those pertaining to Palestine, the JCO is able to turn out large numbers.

ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT

Anti-American sentiment is strong in Morocco, especially among its Islamist groups. In a 2007 Pew survey, only 15 percent of Moroccans had favorable opinions of the United States.¹⁶ In 2002, Moroccans adopted a boycott of U.S. goods to protest the situation in Palestine and the pending war in Iraq. The Moroccan government was ill at ease with the anti-U.S. campaign.

¹³Ibid.; see also Howe, *Morocco: The Islamist Awakening and Other Challenges*.

¹⁴Howe, *Morocco: The Islamist Awakening and Other Challenges*, 128.

¹⁵See Howe, *Morocco: The Islamist Awakening and Other Challenges*; and Alex Glennie and David Mephram, *Reform in Morocco: The Role of Political Islamists* (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 2007; accessed at [http://www.idrc.ca/uploads/user-S/12115496221reform_in_morocco\[1\].pdf](http://www.idrc.ca/uploads/user-S/12115496221reform_in_morocco[1].pdf)).

¹⁶Pew Global Attitudes Project, *America's Image*.

Said a Moroccan government official in 2002, "Such campaigns could cause much harm to the Moroccan economy, especially since Morocco is trying to shift to a higher gear in its economic and commercial ties with the U.S."¹⁷ This is a sentiment captured by many citizens who stand to benefit from greater economic ties across the kingdom.

Of the two main Islamic organizations, the PJD is more moderate. But many Moroccans are not truly sure about its objectives. Citizens worry that the PJD may be trying to sell itself as a moderate group in hopes of continuing its participation in the mainstream formal political process. Others believe that it is a pragmatic organization that must be moderate to ensure its success—and thus, that its moderate stances are indeed genuine. The JCO is quite clear about its objectives—it wants more Islamic rule, does not recognize the legitimacy of the monarchy, and does not support Morocco's ties to the United States, while the PJD has tried to showcase itself as both more progressive and more tolerant of the United States. Statements by the PJD, however, illustrate that the movement is not predisposed to favorable relations with America.

Palestine and Iraq remain two of the most salient issues that have galvanized anti-U.S. sentiment in Morocco. Similar to Islamists in Jordan, the PJD has joined secular coalitions, like the Association of Support to the Struggle of the Palestinian people, to voice its dissatisfaction with U.S. policies. Of more concern for citizens in Morocco are the several hardliners in both the PJD and JCO who oppose strong ties to the United States. Members of both movements are on record stating they oppose close ties to the United States.¹⁸ In response to Bush's 2004 Greater Middle East Initiative, designed to promote more democracy in the Middle East, PJD secretary general Sa'ad al 'Othmani commented, "The current administration in the U.S. is in no position to speak of political reforms, democracy and human rights, while it violates human rights every day in Iraq."¹⁹ In an interview in 2007, al-'Othmani reiterated his disdain for U.S. policies. Discussing the Greater Middle East initiative, he noted that it is "an American project that seeks to reshape the area in a way that would give 'Israel' political, economic and maybe even cultural domination in the whole area. This is a project that serves the interests of the ruling class in the American administration. It is a project that wants to confiscate the independence of political decisions in Middle Eastern countries, consequently dominating its fortunes and enabling the Zionist project. It is then natural that the project utilizes beautiful words like promulgation of democracy, freedom, security and peace, which practically all mean the opposite."

¹⁷"Call to Boycott U.S. Products Gains Momentum," May 30, 2002 (accessed at <http://www.inminds.co.uk/boycott-news-0158.html>).

¹⁸Sharp, *U.S. Democracy Promotion Policy in the Middle East*.

¹⁹Pascale Harter, "Powell's Final Push for Arab Reform," BBC News (accessed at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4085081.stm>, December 2004).

The PJD remains deeply skeptical about the U.S. role in the region. When asked about the ramifications of Iran's nuclear capabilities, al-'Othmani commented, "I'd rather not focus on the positive aspects or drawbacks of nuclear possession, but on the double-standards in fully and unconditionally supporting 'Israel' in possessing nuclear warheads to blackmail the countries of the region, whose intentions are severely prejudged."²⁰

In a series of Institute for Public Policy Research interviews, leaders of the PJD were questioned on their attitudes toward foreign partners like the EU and the United States. The PJD on average had negative opinions about both partners. In general, the report states, the key leaders of the PJD felt that such economic initiatives as the Euro Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy—policies aimed at promoting reform in countries close to Europe—were not useful to Morocco; in fact, they felt that the Europeans were taking advantage of the people of Morocco and North Africa in general.²¹ Sentiments toward the United States were much more negative, however. The PJD elite recognized that the United States wields enormous power and influence, but they were also very critical of U.S. policies in the region, especially on issues relating to Palestine and Iraq. Further, the PJD was not as favorably disposed to the free trade agreement with the United States as the general Moroccan population was; it felt that the terms of the agreement favored the United States. And while the PJD leaders had visited the United States in 2006—after Israel's invasion of Lebanon (which the United States has tacitly supported)—the PJD no longer participates in any U.S.-funded training programs or initiatives.

ISLAMIST POPULARITY AND POSITIONS

A 2007 International Republican Institute poll found that close to 47 percent of Moroccans reported that they would vote for the PJD in the upcoming election. Because the JCO is not a legal party, many of its supporters arguably back the PJD in official electoral politics.²² The PJD has been able to secure its popularity through its moderate positions on key domestic issues. For example, after refusing to endorse the king's Moudawana (Moroccan Family Code) package, the PJD ultimately accepted it in 2003. The new gender policies, which gave women, among other things, the right to divorce and raised the age of marriage to eighteen, contradicted long-held Shari'a views. By endorsing the Moudawana, the PJD demonstrated its moderation. According to Sharp, "The PJD argued that because the family code revision

²⁰"Morocco's AK Party Won't Copy Turkey's," *World Bulletin* September 7, 2007 (accessed at http://www.worldbulletin.net/news_detail.php?id=10284).

²¹Glennie and Mephram, "Reform in Morocco: The Role of Political Islamists."

²²Sharp, "U.S. Democracy Promotion Policy in the Middle East."

was democratically enacted, its members should accept it, since the party is committed to both democratic and Islamic principles."²³

The JCO also professes moderation on issues related to Morocco's internal conditions. Nadia Yassin, the JCO's spokesperson and daughter of Shaykh Yassin, led a campaign against the Moudawana package. She argued that she supported women's rights, but would not support the reforms because they were designed to please foreign donors and did little to improve the situation of women in Morocco. Showing her commitment to women, in a speech at Georgetown University she swore by the Quran that if the JCO ever came to power they would never force women to veil and women would be even more respected under JCO rule. In fact, 30 percent of the JCO's executive body is managed by women, and nearly 15 percent of PJD candidates in the 2007 elections were women. On domestic issues like gender, it appears the JCO and PJD are improving their record.

Yet, while the JCO and PJD represent Morocco's more modern front, there remain radical elements in the kingdom. Islamist radicals have taken advantage of the more liberal environment of the 1990s and have used it to operate against the kingdom. The Casablanca bombings in 2003 and the Madrid bombings in 2004 reminded Moroccans of the harm these fringe groups are capable of. In 2002, the Moroccan security forces discovered an al-Qaeda network operating within the kingdom. These groups were linked to Salafiyya Jihadiyya, a group with close ties to al-Qaeda, and were planning attacks against American naval vessels in the Strait of Gibraltar as well as attacks on Moroccan tourist sites. Although the leaders of the conspiracy were Saudis, their accomplices were all Moroccan.²⁴ In May 2003, fourteen suicide bombers attacked foreign and Jewish targets in Casablanca, killing fourteen people. A year later, the Madrid bombings killed 181 and injured over 1,800. Again, most of the perpetrators were of Moroccan origin.

The coordinated offensive by Islamist extremists illustrated that a sector of the population opposed the regime and its external policies.²⁵ So worried was the Moroccan population that a poll indicated that 40 percent supported the banning of Islamist groups like the PJD after the bombings, while 37 percent refused to support such a ban. With such polarization on central democratic principles like the right for opposition parties to exist, key segments of the Moroccan society have galvanized their efforts behind the heavy-handed tactics of the Moroccan monarchy to counter groups that wish to undermine the interests of the regime.

Even though Mohammad VI responded aggressively to the terrorist attacks, the number of Islamist radicals has continued to surge in the kingdom. Further, with Islamist positions against the United States becoming

²³Ibid.

²⁴Howe, *Morocco: The Islamist Awakening and Other Challenges*, 140.

²⁵Howe, *Morocco: The Islamist Awakening and Other Challenges*.

more intense, Mohammad VI has had to proceed cautiously in his growing relationship with the United States.²⁶ By 2004, it became clear that the moderate Islamist groups were also gaining momentum because of their stances against the United States. In the 2007 elections, the PJD won the most votes of any party and secured the second largest number of seats in the parliament, a pattern that repeated itself in 2011.²⁷ Those who are appalled by the PJD's levels of popularity point out that it continues to reject any form of normalization of relations with Israel. Further, some in the kingdom indicate that the PJD supports Hamas in Palestine and potentially rallies behind Iran. The business and intellectual sectors remain apprehensive of the potential damage the PJD can inflict on Morocco if it continues to gain momentum and popularity.²⁸

VOICES FROM WITHIN: POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT AND THE REGIME IN MOROCCO

Across Morocco, concerns about U.S., and by extension, EU patronage loomed large.²⁹ Citizens expressed support for the regime not because it was meeting high standards but because, given the contextual dynamics of U.S. clientelism, the monarchy had an essential role to play.³⁰ Stronger ties to the United States were important, respondents pointed out, in improving the economic standing of the country. Moroccans, especially those who are or see themselves in the future as part of the global middle class who stand to benefit from greater economic development and globalization, deem such ties to the United States and Europe vital for the regime. Although Moroccan citizens were much more favorably disposed toward Europe, many saw that losing U.S. patronage could have an adverse effect on their European ties. Thus, many Moroccans believed the status quo was preferable to an alternative scenario in which Morocco would become internationally isolated. Moroccans were more predisposed to the Moroccan leadership, be-

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Francis Dubois, "Moroccan Elections Reveal Gulf Between Regime and the Population," November 7, 2007 (accessed at <http://www.wsns.org/articles/2007/nov2007/moro-n07.shtml>).

²⁸Naoufel Daqiqi and Mawassi Lahcen, "Morocco's PJD Confident Despite Detractors," *Magharebia*, August 31, 2007 (accessed at http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/reportage/2007/08/31/reportage-01).

²⁹Note: I cannot replicate the regression tables in chapter 4 because the Interior Ministry of Morocco censored the question on anti-Americanism. In fact, the ministry was also very sensitive about allowing us to tap into anti-American sentiment more broadly. This is telling, and the fact that the question was deleted reinforces the main findings of this manuscript that anti-Americanism is an important variable influencing local political developments.

³⁰Fifty-two interviews were conducted in Morocco in the fall of 2006 and winter of 2007. Alex Kobishyn and Timothy Shriver conducted these interviews. The interview schedule can be found in the appendix to chapter 5.

lieving that the key to their success was the linkage to a larger international global economy. Such support was voiced most strongly among Morocco's middle class, which was more likely to worry about the Islamist doctrine vis-à-vis the West. Those more critical of the monarchy and more supportive of democracy believed the kingdom could do without U.S. patronage.

On the ground, citizens express the possibilities that Islamist movements might jeopardize the ties between Morocco and their external patrons. Ayah, a university student, is a strong supporter of the status quo. She understands that Morocco is very much dependent on the United States. Further, she believes strong U.S. ties will potentially solve these outstanding economic issues: "We have a lot of economic problems and the free trade agreement will help us." This assistance, Ayah rationalizes, is contingent on a compliant monarchy. She understands that Morocco is micromanaged by the United States: "The Moroccan government cannot do anything unless the U.S. agrees." As such, she worries about the Islamists who can jeopardize such important ties. "Islamists in Morocco have close ties to the Islamists in Iraq who are against the U.S." Because of this and other concerns, Ayah believes Morocco should continue moving at a very gradual path toward reform and not push for democracy, which might undermine the entire regime.

Ayah's logic, which reflects the views of so many citizens in Jordan, was found throughout the Moroccan kingdom. One of the more lengthy interviews was with Hayyah, a university graduate living in the small town of Titouan, who believes in democracy but does not believe it is suitable for Morocco. The United States, she says, is only interested in pro-American democracy. Thus there is no need for Morocco to waste its time. Personally, she has no problem with Islamist groups; she believes the secular-Islamic divide is overstated: "I don't think there is anything to be afraid of. I think they are good people and want to do good things." She is not an Islamist supporter, however, but firmly believes in their inclusion. Nonetheless, she worries that their stances against the United States will become problematic: "When I think about democracy, I think about people choosing their government and that government being responsive to the people. But when I listen to the way the U.S. wants it, it seems to me it wants a government that agrees with itself." She goes on to say, "There was real democracy in Algeria in 1991, but the U.S. didn't want that government. . . . So what meaning does democracy have if we know that an elected government that does not agree with America or Israel won't be allowed to function? Do you understand why we can't support democracy? That's why the king is everything to us."

Hayyah understands that the Moroccan-American alliance is vital. "America has a good relationship with Morocco because Morocco does what America wants it to do." Doing "what America wants it to do" is a way to guarantee a peaceful status quo and future prosperity. She believes the United States is not a force of good in the region. She believes that it will comfortably

stand by and watch countries get destroyed. She makes a direct reference to Lebanon: "When it started to recover [from the Civil War] Israel did what it did to make sure Lebanon wouldn't become powerful. It's true! Do you think they did it [bombed Lebanon] for the sake of two kidnapped soldiers? And do you think they were just after Hizbullah? If they were just after Hizbullah then why destroy the economy of the entire country? It makes no sense unless you realize Israel has to keep all its neighbors weak. It keeps the Palestinians in prison. It bombs Lebanon once every ten years or so. And you saw what the U.S. did in Iraq?" That war and devastation loom large in Hayyah's assessment.

Hayyah is fed up with explanations that continue to paint Arab civilization as lacking in democracy. She points out that most societies in the region are democratic—even the Palestinians, who are under occupation, have proved to the world that they are democratic: "The closest thing to a democracy in the Arab world is Palestine, and they don't even have a country! So the question is where do these bad governments in the Arab world come from? From the people! People who are wise and understand Islam know that Islam is not the problem. Our people are poor, desperate, and have lost all hope in life, are angry and strongly feel the sting of injustice and want to do something to fix it." She goes on to explain that "when the U.S. wants real democracy in the Arab world, it will push for real democracy in the Arab world." For the time being, she will support the regime, because that's what the United States wants.

Miles away in another small town sits Mohammad, a nuclear physicist. His interview is also very extensive. He takes the time to explain why he supports the regime and is eager to convince the listener of the soundness of his logic. Like so many other citizens in the Arab world, Mohammad supports democracy but does not feel that it is suitable for Morocco. In fact, he believes that the United States is not justified in pretending that it is a true democracy either. "In America, you have this idea of liberty and democracy. They are just words. First, look at what the U.S. does in the world!" More important, though, Mohammad asks why democracy is more suitable in the United States than in Morocco. In the United States, people are invested in the system, and democracy won't undermine it. In Morocco, people are less invested in the system. In fact, they are invested in Islam, which *would* undermine the entire system. He meticulously tries to explain how this lack of systemic support evolved:

In the U.S., you give freedoms to people who are invested in the system of government, because the system of government works for them. Do you understand? If you gave too many rights and freedoms to people in this area, who knows what would happen? All our political ideolo-

gies have failed after colonialism. We have nationalism and people were told to be very proud of their country, even when it is supported by someone else. So people look for nationalism and in Islam there is something people can understand. That's why Islam is political and since the revolution in Iran all the governments have feared it. Islam is extremely powerful. And if you ask most people here, they will tell you that the U.S. is working with our government to make sure Islam does not come to power. They [the United States and the Moroccan regime] actually try to convince people that Islam is bad, because it is too conservative. This is nonsense. It is harder and harder to keep people uneducated, and it is harder and harder to control populations using the tools that worked just ten or fifteen years ago. People can organize more easily using the Internet, barriers to communication have decreased; there is more information out there. And America is hypocritical when it says it wants democracy *and* it wants to eradicate the Islamic movement. The movement comes from inside the people. Do you want people to be able to express their political will or do you want to suppress an ideology that you feel is a threat to your interests? Because America is now doing both and everyone in the region sees this and it is something that makes America lose credibility.

Mohammad ridicules the way in which the United States wants to promote democracy in Morocco. Leaving the Islamists outside the political game simply won't work. Mohammad does not see Islamist movements as threats internally. He says that their conservative agenda doesn't bother him, although he himself does not support their narrow doctrine: "The Islamist groups that talk about how people should practice their religion . . . well, what of it? Nobody is forcing people to do anything. Either their ideas will be accepted or they won't be accepted, but they have the right to speak no matter what they think." But, he tells us, he also understands that Islamists have a political agenda, and this political agenda could be more harmful: "Of the political groups you will find moderate groups, like 'Adl wa Tanmiyya [the PJD] and you'll find more extreme groups like al-'Adl wal Ihsân [the JCO] and others." Both groups, he maintains, are anti-American. It is this reality that keeps citizens like Mohammad committed to the status quo.

A further illustration of the logic citizens employ for the national well-being of their countries is 'Alam's rationalization. 'Alam, a chemist working for an international firm in Casablanca, explains why he supports the status quo. He wants a democracy in Morocco, but he's very cautious because he believes democracy can only occur when the Islamists become more politically sophisticated. He supports Islamist movements and firmly believes that "this kind of movement is the solution of tomorrow." But this support

for Islamic values and movements does not mean that he is not worried. He would like to see more democracy under certain conditions. He says, "Look at Turkey, where the Islamists work with intelligence. They find ways to succeed. They communicate well with everyone and there are few problems. America deals with the Islamists in Turkey. They have a good relationship with the movement. This needs to happen in Morocco." For 'Alam, democracy is definitely good, but only as long as the Americans are on board and in direct communication with the Islamists.

Finally, Sameh, an English teacher and tutor, is upset because he sees himself as an impotent citizen caught up in U.S. machinations in the region. Sameh has no problem with Islamist movements; he believes they can be even more democratic than non-Islamist movements. He doesn't believe, however, that the United States will allow Islamist movements to rule a country, even if these movements are democratically elected. He says, " Hamas was democratically elected but nobody gave it a chance to rule. That doesn't make sense. The U.S. encourages democracy—the U.S. doesn't like the government that is democratically elected, therefore the U.S. punishes that country for its elections? This makes no sense. So democracy and Islam can coexist only if the United States decides it will let them." Sameh understands, however, that the United States may not be interested in democracy. He argues that America is more invested in preserving the status quo:

The U.S. looks after the interests of the Moroccan government because it wants that government to stay in place. But what the Moroccan government wants isn't good for most Moroccans. . . . The U.S. looks after the interest of stability, stability above everything, above democracy, above human rights, above development, all of those other things are used as an ends to stability—stability of a government which cooperates with the United States. Do you see? So, I say to you that stability of this government isn't in the interest of about 90 percent of the population. But that is what the U.S. guarantees.

Sameh goes on to explain how U.S. hegemony in the region has stifled the potential for democratic advancement. He believes that when the world order was structured by a bipolar distribution of power between the United States and Soviet Union, citizens had the potential to push for change. "It was different in the time of Hassan II," he says.

Then, there was America and there was the Soviet Union, and those who wanted a change in government could find support through one or the other of those two and have a chance to get heard. And actually there were several attempts to change the government at that time, and the Soviet Union and America did send support and money and arms to one side or the other. Now, there is only America, there is nothing

else. So people who want change have no organizing force, no way to get any support or help. Any organized movement will be crushed.

Sameh is quite skeptical of the baby-step reforms that the kingdom has adopted since Mohammad VI came to power. "What does it help, for example, that people can now complain about the government in the press, or now have the right to speak about politics more freely? Nothing will come of it, it is just meaningless talk. . . . Do you see what I'm trying to say?" He goes on to say that he understands that the U.S. push for democracy and economic development are ways to improve the lives of citizens, especially the global middle class linked to such developments. But all of these reforms, he maintains, are designed with the goal of "keeping this system in power."

In fact, Sameh argues that although Moroccans enjoy more political freedoms today, it is because most Moroccans have acquiesced to a status quo dictated by the United States with the end result of keeping the Moroccan regime in power. Today, the citizens of Morocco are more dominated by the realities of U.S. hegemony in the region. Citizens know they can't contest the status quo, or they will suffer. Carefully examine his next statement: "The existing reforms [of Mohammad VI] do not matter," he says. "They are put into place when it is guaranteed not to matter." In a defeatist tone, he argues that he understands the United States will settle for nothing less than the status quo. As a result, most citizens will support the regime—thus reforms will not bring about democracy. Sameh believes if the regime were feeling threatened by society, it—along with the United States—would not allow even these little reforms. He tells us that society was more empowered when Hassan II was in power because of the bipolar world order. He says, "In the time of Hassan II, not only did the system not work in the interests of most people, but people were organized and armed and willing to do something about it, which is why you saw the abuses and why people were harshly brutalized. The more threat there is to the system, the more brutal the system will be." Thus, reforms are not reassuring; rather, for Sameh, they prove that the United States has emerged victorious in subduing Arab societies.

Sameh does not oppose ties to Western countries to further advance the interests of Morocco; he has a kinder perception of Europe. "Our dealings with the Europeans have more to do with our shared interests." He appreciates the role France and Spain play in developing Morocco's economy: "This is real politics—politics of shared interests and cooperation." This mutually beneficial relationship is not what Morocco has with the United States: "What America does is different. America adopts the politics of empire—no more and no less. It is obvious to everyone." Sameh, like so many citizens in Morocco, understands the sheer dominance of the United States in the region. While most Moroccans try to rationalize their support

for the status quo as a means of improving the national well-being of their countries, Sameh's support for the status quo is more a conviction about being a conquered subject of an American empire writ large.

In contrast to these supporters of the regime, opponents of the regime take direct issue with Morocco's patron-client relationship with the United States. Such opposition is commonly found among supporters of the Islamist movements. Ahmad tells us he is a strong supporter of the JCO. Notably, however, Ahmad—like many other Moroccans who oppose their country's U.S. client status—seldom criticizes Morocco's ties to western Europe. Rather, the focus remains on the United States.

Ahmad has an engineering degree, but is unemployed and is thinking about moving to Casablanca to look for work. He is very dissatisfied with the status quo. At twenty-seven, he is not married and would very much like to be able to afford to get married. Ahmad strongly believes that an Islamic democracy is superior to American democracy. He understands that the United States is important for Morocco, but believes it only serves U.S. interests, and this disappoints him. Ahmad rejects the monarchy because of U.S. support of its authoritarian tendencies; he believes the United States is invested in destroying the lives of ordinary Muslims and set on dominating the entire region: "Iraq has now become America's new colony. America wants to control the region, the energy and oil and guarantee its place in the world. . . . There could have been more politically smart [ways to accomplish this], with less killing, murdering and destruction." As such, Ahmad is not a regime supporter. A strong advocate of democracy, he believes the route to democracy is through distancing Morocco from the United States.

Faez, who has an undergraduate degree and is working in an internet café, also supports a democratic state. But he only supports one set of politics. "The politics of the Quran is the only thing that matters," he says. Strong ties to the United States are not possible, nor is a democratic system mirrored after the United States necessary: "America ruined Iraq. They are acting like Iraq is their country. America needs to leave Iraq and the entire region." What is most upsetting to Faez is that the United States took over Iraq under the pretext of engendering democracy.

Houdaifa, a contract painter, also dislikes the United States. He is a strong supporter and member of the PJD. Houdaifa wants more democracy, opposes the regime, and believes the existing leadership "only represents the interests of the U.S." If there was more democracy, he says, they could rid Morocco of external dominance. He believes the PJD is the perfect illustration that "democracy and Islam are compatible." He argues that a real democratic government is one that "serves the needs of the people . . . not like the government we have now. We don't have democracy. This is why we need Shari'a." Houdaifa believes the United States controls Morocco's strategic standing in the world, arguing that the United States continues to

meddle in the affairs of the Sahara so that Morocco will continue to rely on the United States. Further, he would love to get rid of Morocco's current leaders, "criminals who are thieves and pretend that they are democratic." He believes this status quo has been allowed to persist because the United States wants it be so.

Sana, a twenty-seven-year-old public utilities employee, joins others in her strong sentiments against the regime, attributing such disdain to U.S. patronage. With outright anger, she says, "Look at what the U.S. has done in Iraq and in Palestine!" Angered by the association the United States makes between Muslims and extremist terrorists, she says, "Ruining country after country seems more extreme to me than one or two people who blow themselves up!!" Sana is a firm supporter of Islamism, and blames the ills of Morocco on the United States. She even believes the United States and the regime orchestrated the Casablanca bombings so that both could further clamp down on the Moroccan people and convince them they aren't ready for democracy. An Islamist government, obedient to the laws of Islam, she says, "would represent the citizens of the country, help create jobs, educate the people, guard cultural values, and defend its citizens." She doesn't want American democracy or anything to do with America: "The way American democracy works is that they tell other countries how to work, imposing their will." She goes on to ask, "Why does America talk about democracy anyway? They are a dictatorship. They rule the world and attack other countries that did nothing bad to them." She believes the current government in Morocco is "worthless" and the only political party that matters is the al-'Adl wal Ihsan (JCO). "Al-'Adl wal Ihsan has some good ideas. The West will never see it that way because the West has decided that Islam is the enemy. But al-'Adl wal Ihsan wants good for the people, and wants a society in which people recognize the value of religion and are guided by the principles set out in the Quran. There is nothing wrong with that." She goes on to say that the current regime is "ruled by America and not by the people." An Islamic government, she maintains, will not be subservient to the United States.

Moroccans, like their Kuwaiti and Jordanian counterparts, understand their relationship with their regime through the lens of U.S. patronage. The suitability of democracy—indeed, the alteration of the status quo—is assessed for its strategic practicality given the international order. For its part, the United States has attempted a new model of engagement to further its interests in Morocco. Rather than declare all Islamic movements in the country as hostile to the United States, the Americans have tried to win over segments of the PJD, attempting to foment strong ties with the opposition. This would further U.S. strategic interests and the ability to promote democracy. Clearly, a pro-American opposition is important, if not a prerequisite, for further democratization.

U.S. RESPONSES TO THE ISLAMISTS IN MOROCCO

The United States has attempted to embrace the PJD in Morocco in hopes of winning it over to its side. For its part, the PJD would like stronger ties with the United States, as it understands that such relations are vital to the economic trajectory of the kingdom. Many speculate these engagements are modeled after the Turkey-U.S. relationship, where Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Islamic Justice and Development Party has maintained close ties to the United States. Sa'ad al-'Othmani, the PJD's general secretary, has been invited to the United States on low-level visits. The PJD believes that stimulating such ties is extremely important for the future economic progress of Morocco. According to Lahcen Daoudi, a leading member of the PJD in 2006, "It is in the interest of Morocco that the world community knows the PJD. I don't want investors to flee because of us."³¹

The United States has also allowed the JCO access to its shores. In 2005 and 2006, Nadia Yassin made several visits to America to speak on college campuses. U.S. engagement with the PJD demonstrates two important strategies. First, Islamists, whether the more moderate PJD or more conservative JCO, are willing to engage the United States in meaningful and constructive dialogue; there is nothing inherent about these Islamic movements that bars their engagement with America. Second, and more important, it appears that no amount of grooming and access can overcome the result of U.S. policies in the region, which are seen as directly undermining the Arab and Muslim nation. Absent a change of U.S. policies in the region, the United States will continue to experiment with formulas to deal with the Islamist problem and not address outstanding grievances. That the PJD has recently declared it would like to limit ties to the United States signals that open engagement will not suffice to overcome the damage of existing U.S. policies in the region.³²

³¹Roula Khalaf, "Morocco Sees the Rise of an 'Acceptable' Islamist Party," *Financial Times of Morocco*, May 23, 2006 (accessed at <http://www.iri.org/newsarchive/2006/2006-05-23-News-FinancialTimes-Morocco.asp>).

³²Judy Barsalou, *Islamists at the Ballot Box: Findings from Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, and Turkey*. United States Institute of Peace Special Report no. 144 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2005; accessed at <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr144.html>).

CHAPTER SEVEN

Palestine and Saudi Arabia and the Limits of Democracy

THE ROAD MAP FOR PEACE, ADOPTED IN 2002 BY THE QUARTET OF THE EUROPEAN Union (EU), the United States, Russia, and the United Nations, called for the necessity of Palestinian reforms in moving the peace process forward. The United States became vocal about the need for the Palestinians to reform their system of government and pushed for Palestinian elections in the early years of the new millennium. However, the United States was hoping that a pro-Fatah alliance would emerge and neglected to state publicly that it would nullify any outcome that was not favorable to its own interests. The Palestinians learned the hard way that the United States would indeed punish the entire population for exercising democracy the wrong way.

Here we have the case of the United States overturning a true democratic experiment.¹ By all accounts, the Palestinian elections were the most democratic the Arab world had ever seen. In fact, the election marks the first democratic regime change in the Arab region since World War II. After urging the Palestinians to be more democratic, a prerequisite to continue peace negotiations, the United States and the international community negated the election's outcome, declared Hamas an enemy, and then proceeded to penalize the entire Palestinian population for its democratic experiment. Economic sanctions were placed on the Palestinian government, now led by Hamas. While the aid-dependent Palestinian Authority (PA) struggled to locate alternative sources of funds, the harsh economic blockade further debilitated the Palestinian economy. Salaries could not be paid, food rotted at borders, and movement within the West Bank was further hampered. The international community didn't seem to care that the Palestinian vote was indeed a vote against a corrupt Fatah government that proved to be unable to deliver economically or on the peace front.²

¹The other notable experiment that was overturned with tacit U.S. approval was that of Algeria in 1991.

²Amaney Jamal, "Security Vulnerabilities in Jordan," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2007.