

**Making Democracy Safe:
Explaining the Causes, Rise, and Decline of
Coercive Campaigning and Election Violence
in Old and New Democracies¹**

Megan Reif
PhD Candidate, University of Michigan Ann Arbor

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A Theory and Typology

ABSTRACT: Ethnic grievances, socio-economic cleavages, past conflicts, and other macro-level factors associated frequently with political violence cannot explain subnational and cross-national variation in geographic and temporal patterns of coercive campaigning and post-election violence. Why do so many democracies—old and new, diverse and homogenous—experience election violence, often long after founding elections? Why does it occur in some electoral districts and not others? I develop a common set of explanations for this unique form of political violence, proposing why, where, how, and when parties and candidates risk reprisals, punishment, and reputational costs to influence elections through “undue influence.” Considering the array of available non-coercive strategies, such as negative campaigning, vote buying, and boycotting available to politicians, to name a few, the choice to use violence or to allow supporters to do so is a rare and, often, conscious choice. I aim to expand understanding of this phenomenon. First, drawing on historical case studies of particularly acute eruptions of election violence, I describe the enigmatic historical and contemporary patterns of election violence that contemporary explanations, which focus primarily on recent episodes, tend to overlook. It is study of these cases, as well as preliminary, theory-building research trips to observe both rounds of Indonesia’s 2004 presidential elections, on which I base my theory, while the collection of data and tests of this theory will be carried out independently and separately from this presentation of theory, hypotheses, and empirical expectations to minimize bias and report transparently and honestly when the empirical results are inconsistent with my initial propositions. While the theory shaped the research design and data collection, no data has been analyzed before full articulation of the theory.

I begin by developing a typology of election violence—an undertaking that responds to one of the first studies in political science to call attention to the topic (Rapoport & Weinberg, 2001b, p. 35). I follow by presenting a theory to explain the probability, spatial diffusion, typological variation, lethality, and long-term rise and fall of election violence in the electoral histories of many polities.

¹ Draft first presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Toronto, Canada, September 3-6, 2009. Earlier iterations of the theory were presented in the Global Transformations Seminar at the University of Michigan in April 2004, the International Institute for Mediation and Conflict Resolution in Nicosia, Cyprus in July 2005, the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) in Washington, DC in September 2005, and the Political Science Department Comparative Politics Internal Research Seminar, March 2006. I am particularly grateful to comments from faculty, fellow students, practitioners, and others at these events.

In the first of four propositions, I contend that parties and candidates are most likely to initiate or tolerate election violence when both uncertainty and incentives to cultivate a personal vote are high. Electoral uncertainty arises from exogenous sources of competitiveness. Institutional uncertainty arises following pro-democratic electoral reforms or tougher monitoring and enforcement of electoral corruption laws, increasing the costs of *nonviolent* fraud relative to violence. Personal vote incentives (a) minimize party desire and ability to control candidate campaign behavior and (b) maximize the number of actors willing to provide violence when faced with the imminent gain or loss of the private benefits that particular candidates target to loyal supporters.

Second, I argue that the timing, targets, perpetrators, number of people involved, and other components of the typology vary across electoral system families and regime type. At one extreme, in Closed List Proportional Representation Systems (CLPR), violence occurs primarily during the *intra-party, pre-campaign and/or coalition-formation stages* of competition and involves candidate sponsorship of violence against one another. At the other extreme, violence in First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) electoral systems occurs primarily during the *inter-party campaign and Election Day phases, targeting voters and supporters*. Following the posting of results, post-election violence tends to occur when the national distribution of competitive constituencies is such that at least one party and its supporters estimated *apriori* equal probabilities of winning or losing the ability to govern alone at the national level, a situation that can occur in both CLPR and FPTP systems. This and other types of violence tend to occur at adolescent stages of democratization, rather than primarily during founding elections.

Third, I suggest that ethnic grievances, socio-economic cleavages, past conflicts, and other correlates of deaths common in the broader political violence literature cannot predict when and where election violence occurs. I hypothesize instead that these predisposing factors determine the severity and lethality to which coercive campaigning and election violence escalate in particular countries and constituencies.

Fourth, I propose that election violence is endogenous to democratization. Cleaning up elections can, in the short term, increase incentives for competitors to engage in coercive campaigning and election violence. In turn, eruptions of election coercion can disrupt path-dependent, institutionalized electoral bias and fraud more by generating mass awareness of and demand for pro-democratic electoral reforms than can nonviolent election fraud alone.

The theory's subnational and cross-national empirical expectations will be evaluated using three original datasets, informed by qualitative fieldwork in Algeria, Newark, and Pakistan. The Election Violence Incidents Database (EVID) includes narratives and micro-level coding of the features of election-related incidents reported in major national newspapers four months before and one month after elections in Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Newark, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Variables include dates, geographic location (latitude-longitude), perpetrator and victim affiliations, and positions, the *tactics used by each actor in each event* (from vandalism to bombings), deaths, injuries, property damage, and electoral consequences, as well as an index of report reliability indicators. EVID encompasses elections since the 1960s, but initial analysis will include only two elections for each case.

The cross-national analysis employs the Global Violent Elections Database (GVED), which indicates whether each national election worldwide between 1890 and 2005 included violence, fraud, or both, along with number of injuries and deaths (for 1945-2005). I combine this data with that compiled by

other scholars for uncertainty, ICPV, electoral systems, degree of democracy, electoral reform, and control variables such as ethno-linguistic diversity and poverty. Due to the lack of literature and measurement of causes of electoral reform, it is difficult to implement a dynamic model that addresses the mutually causal relationship between election violence and electoral reform. For a tentative test of the endogeneity hypothesis, I will use data on the timing of major electoral reforms and constitutional changes in neighboring countries during the previous five years as an instrument for electoral reform in a structural equation model. I created the Election Laws on Election Crimes (ELECD) database, which codes national election crimes laws current as of 2005 (if specified in the constitution or electoral law and amendments) for nearly all countries in the world. I model the content, complexity, and levels of fines, penalties, electoral remedies for violent and nonviolent electoral crimes as a function of a country's past experience with election violence.

In describing and explaining election violence and its institutional consequences, I contribute to research on micro-level variations in violence, the role of violence as a mechanism of institutional change, and the incremental process by which even flawed elections further democratization. My findings should interest practitioners involved in election observation, reform, administration, and security, as well as those involved in designing institutions in new democracies.

Motivation

Since 2007, when post-election violence in Kenya shocked global audiences, followed by election-related strife in Iran, Honduras, the Philippines, Côte d'Ivoire, and Nigeria, international headlines feature election violence with increasing regularity. In light of the flagrancy and scale of violence in these cases, it is not surprising that many people associate the problem with sham autocratic polls, early stages of democratization, post-conflict elections, poverty, or features of polities that are antecedent to electoral democracy, such as primordial hatreds, "uncivic" cultures, parties of former rebels, and anti-democratic, extremist actors. Yet such factors cannot explain why Kenya's 2007 election violence, which killed approximately 1200, injured 3600, and displaced more than 500,000 Kenyans, far surpassed 1992's election violence, or why the country's 1997 and 2002 polls were relatively peaceful. After 2002, students of African politics described Kenya as a regional exemplar of good governance and democracy, while political scientists rated the country an "8" (on a -10 to 10 scale) in the well-known autocracy-democracy index, Polity. Devastated by the apparent 2007 setback, Kenyan bloggers wondered if former French president, Jacques Chirac, was right when he said that "Africa is not ready for democracy" (Appelbaum, 2007). As election violence becomes more common, should political scientists and the democracy-promotion industry share this skepticism? Should political scientists and practitioners revisit scholarly literatures identifying preconditions for democracy, such as political order, before promoting democratic elections and reforms?² I present a theoretical logic and empirical evidence suggesting that the answer to this question should be a resounding "no!"

The unsettling upward trend in election violence in contemporary democratizations resembles the experience of earlier regime transitions in now-established democracies. Neither war, ethno-religious divides, weak institutions, socio-economic cleavages, resource conflicts, nor do other correlates of political violence fully explain past or current spatio-temporal patterns. This paper seeks to build a theory to explain why candidates and parties in both electoral autocracies and democracies risk reprisals and reputational costs to use coercion as an electoral strategy. Why do politicians and their supporters use violence when nonviolent methods, such as vote buying, negative campaigning, or

² Several scholars have made arguments along these lines and express skepticism, implicitly or explicitly, for democracy promotion, at least without proper "sequencing", suggesting that stability, civil culture, civil society, and other factors should precede introduction of mass suffrage institutions and elections (Chua, 2003; Huntington, 1968; Snyder, 2000; Zakaria, 1997). For a summary and critique of these arguments, see Carothers (2007).

hacking voting machines are available and can alter outcomes (Di Franco, Petro, Shear, & Vladimirov, 2004)? Why do ordinary individuals risk retaliation and punishment—even death—on behalf of parties and candidates?

What is Election Violence?

Although people tend to think of coercion as just another form of election fraud, election violence is a separate category of electoral misconduct that itself includes a diverse range of specific strategies proscribed by most of the world’s electoral laws as forms of “undue influence.”³ Based on analysis of these laws and a general definition that guides the Election Violence Education and Resolution program (EVER) at the International Foundation for Election Violence (IFES) (Fischer, 2002), I have developed a working definition of election violence. Coercive campaigning and election violence are *any spontaneous or organized actions by candidates, party supporters, election authorities, voters, civil society, or other political actors that employ physical harm, intimidation, blackmail, verbal abuse, violent demonstrations, psychological manipulation, or other forms of coercion (or the threat thereof) aimed at disrupting, determining, hastening, delaying, reversing, or otherwise influencing an election and its outcome.*

There is more than meets the eye to election violence. The eruption of physical election violence is the result of sequences of events and constellations of factors that affect actors’ decisions to choose one strategy over another from the “menu of manipulation” (Andreas Schedler, 2002a), which, in addition to fraud, includes what I call “quiet” (non-physical and often unobservable) and “noisy” (physical and observable) coercion. My focus on a discrete event—an election—during which the press and civil society are more likely to record covert, or quiet, and overt, or noisy, forms of coercion, from threats to mass murder, helps me measure some of these nuances and develop a theory that explains:

- why actors decide to use coercion over other, nonviolent tactics;
- how they choose the timing, targets, and locations for initial acts of violence;

³ See my dataset on electoral crimes laws, which identifies approximately 20 non-violent categories of election fraud and about 30 types of undue influence common to most electoral laws around the world. See Reif, Megan. "Election Laws on Election Crimes Database (ELECD)." Ann Arbor, MI, 2011.

- the rate at which initial coercive tactics (a) become lethal, (b) diffuse across space and time, and (c) engage additional participants beyond those involved in precipitating incidents.

This approach draws on micro –level, incident-centered studies in criminology and the sociology of crime (e.g., Cooney & Phillips, 2002; Flewelling, 1999; Kubrin, 2003; K. F. Parker, McCall, & Land, 1999; Tita, 2005), as well as two research programs in political science that disaggregate measurement and explanations of tactics included under broad categories of **political violence** (e.g., Brauer, Gómez-Sorzano, & Sethuraman, 2004; Cederman & Gleditsch, 2009; Kalyvas, 2006; C. King, 2004; Schutte & Weidmann, 2011; Verwimp, Justino, & Brück, 2009; Weinstein, 2007) and **election fraud** (M. L. Anderson, 2000; Elklit & Reynolds, 2002; F. Lehoucq, 2003; F. E. Lehoucq & Molina, 2002; Posada-Carbó, 2000; Andreas Schedler, 2002a).

A Theory of Making Democracy Safe

I offer four propositions about the causes, costs, and potential institutional consequences of election violence that make up a dynamic causal story:

1. Two conditions--**Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote (ICPV)** and **uncertainty**—interact to explain **WHY** parties tolerate or use violence in some countries and elections but avoid it in others. Vote-maximizing candidates with high personal vote incentives are not only less likely to worry about costs to the party's reputation and chances of governing; they enjoy support from larger numbers of constituents to whom they provide private benefits. Beneficiaries are willing to supply violence when threatened with the loss of those benefits. At the cross-national level, then the probability that at least one incident of election violence will occur is greater in candidate-centered political systems. Election violence is also more likely when recent changes in electoral law, administrative structures, or procedures because they can make nonviolent forms of manipulation more risky and costly. This **institutional uncertainty** contributes to fluctuations in election violence in a single country over time, while robust competition in some constituencies, or **electoral uncertainty**, explains much variation in the geographic patterns of election violence in a single country from one election to the next. Personal versus party vote

incentives are associated with different spatial⁴ patterns of election violence between countries. Violence risk is highest if **ICPV and uncertainty** combine and recipients or aspirants to private benefits willingly use force to defend or acquire them.

2. The **type of the electoral system** and **degree of democracy** influences **WHO** deploys **WHAT** types of tactics **WHEN** and against **WHOM**. Specifically, **modal incident characteristics** are different under plurality and proportional seat allocation rules. Pre-election, intra-party violence is more likely in closed-list, proportional representation systems, for example, while election day, inter-party violence is more likely in first-past-the-post systems.
3. Coercion often begins with relatively minor election crimes, including vandalism, theft of campaign material, verbal harassment, and threats, but escalates to physical violence. When one or more political actors uses coercion—either strategically or spontaneously—the **SEVERITY** or **LEVEL** of election violence that ultimately occurs depends on **exogenous factors more commonly associated with political violence**, such as access to weapons, unemployed youth populations, high baseline rates of other forms of violence, ethnic tension, economic inequality, natural resources, unemployment, and additional socio-economic and demographic factors.
4. The greater the scale and scope of violence in one election compared to the last, the more likely it is to generate internal and external pressure for reform. If it is significant enough to create the political will for massive, once-and-for-all reform without igniting war or justifying total reversal of democracy, election violence can generate momentum for laws and procedures that minimize election fraud and violence in subsequent elections. **Election violence can lead to further democratic consolidation**, because, despite the fact that it is a relatively rare as a form of both political violence and electoral misconduct, it can interrupt the path-dependence of institutions and practices in ways fraud and corruption scandals do not.

The fourth proposition and supporting evidence contribute to literatures on the role of violence in institutional change (North, Wallis, & Weingast, 2009) and “democratization by elections” (Bunce & Wolchik, 2006; Hadenius & Teorell, 2006; Howard & Roessler, 2006; Staffan I Lindberg, 2006; S.I. Lindberg, 2009a; Andreas Schedler, 2002b). I argue that election violence, which is more visible than fraud, generates awareness of and mass demand for electoral reforms. As Lindberg writes: “The use of

⁴ In this paper, all references to space and use of the term spatial refer to geographic space.

violence, exclusionary tactics, and obviously flawed electoral processes...have in many cases stimulated increased vigilance and unity among reformers, as well as increased determination by international actors to have an impact on the nature of the regime” (2009b 331). This argument motivates me in referring collectively to the four propositions as “A Theory of Making Democracy Safe.”

Enigmas of Election Violence

The goal of this paper and the broader Making Democracy Safe Project is to explain an array of seemingly incompatible empirical patterns in election-related conflict, such as why election violence:

- Erupted between **ethnically homogenous elites** even before universal suffrage, as early as 400 BC (Bauerle, 1990; Sherwin-White, 1956; Troxler, 2008);
- **Persisted for so long in the United States** and still erupts today in “authoritarian enclaves” or in particularly close races (Campbell, 2005; DeArment, 2006; Larsen & Hulston, 1997; Mickey, 2005; Ortiz, 2005; Rehnquist, 2004; Scher, 2010; Umfleet, 2006; Zvesper, 2005);
- **Intensified during the adolescence of older democracies but eventually became an extremely rare and unthinkable option in most of them**, regardless of the polity’s institutional incentives, electoral system, and sociological features (F. E. Lehoucq & Molina, 2002; O’Gorman, 1996; Posada-Carbó, 1996; Rapoport & Weinberg, 2001b; Wasserman & Jaggard, 2007);
- **Persists in some relatively mature democracies** with long electoral histories, such as Jamaica, India, and the Philippines (Arguillas et al., 2011; Sives, 2010; Wilkinson, 2004);
- Is often **surprisingly low in founding, landmark, or post-conflict elections** (see, e.g., Charney, 2004; Conze, 2006; Cruz, 2001; Demeke, 2003; Drogan, 1994; Garcia, 2004; Kaplow, 2005; Rosenberg, 2002; Suryanarayana, 2007; The Carter Center, 2002; Thibodeaux, 2002) **but erupts after these initially promising signs of democratic transition** (e.g., compare previous with Dawisha & Diamond, 2006; Klopp & Kamungi, 2008; Motsamai, 2010; C. Smith, 2008).
- **Occurs between ethno-religious groups and parties** in some places, **but within groups and parties** in other places.
- **Plagues local but not national elections** in some countries but only national elections in other countries;

- **Erupts before elections** in some times and places, **on election day** in others, and only **after elections** in other places; and
- **Involves primarily candidates and officials, parties and party workers, or ordinary people**, as participants, perpetrators, or targets in different contexts.
- Is, despite recent events and infamous histories, a **rare phenomenon**.

Overview

First, I describe goals and objectives that motivate politicians' use of nonviolent and violent **electoral biasing** strategies. I identify eight dimensions along which violent election tactics vary (e.g., timing, target size, tactic lethality, geographic scope) and combine them with biasing goals to develop a **typology of modal incident characteristics of election violence**. Second, I elaborate each of the four propositions along with my expectations for empirical cross-national and/or subnational variation in typology that follow from their logic. Third, I present chapter summaries, describing methodology and the role of each empirical analysis in testing the theory's expectations. I use a multi-method research approach that draws on qualitative archival and field research in Algeria, Newark, and Pakistan; quantitative analysis of subnational constituency-level incident databases for these countries as well as Egypt, Ghana, and Sri Lanka; and event history analysis of cross-national variation in violent elections and numbers of deaths and injuries for all countries since 1945.⁵

A Typology of Election Coercion and Violence

In addition to adopting policy positions that appeal to as many voters as possible, campaigning to make voters aware of those positions, and legal get-out-the-vote (GOTV) strategies, parties and candidates have many ways to enhance their chances of winning. Many candidates possess or cultivate "valence," which includes non-policy factors (e.g., candidate charisma and quality, issue specialization, and incumbency) that augment electoral competitors' legal campaign activities and platforms. A subject of substantial research (see, e.g., Ansolabehere & Snyder, 2000; Ashworth & Bueno de Mesquita, 2009; Bruter, Erikson, & Strauss, 2010; Dewan & Shepsle, 2011; Enelow & Hinich, 1982;

⁵ The Election Violence Incidents Database (EVID) quantifies election coercion and violence reported during five-month periods surrounding each election since the 1960s in Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Newark, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Initially, only data for one or two elections in each country will be analyzed, while the book version will include all years.

Groseclose, 2001; Hummel, 2010; Krasa & Polborn, 2010; Schofield, 2003; Stokes, 1992), valence improves a candidate's chances of winning and reduces her uncertainty by creating blocs of reliable voters. High-valence candidates have more flexibility to depart from party and median voter policy preferences. Not unlike valence, **electoral biasing** strategies include illicit strategies and some that are legal but of questionable morality and fairness. Vote-buying, gerrymandering, incumbent use of state resources to campaign, slandering opponents, doctoring vote counts, challenging eligibility of groups of voters as they arrive at polling stations, and filing frivolous election complaints are all forms of electoral biasing. Coercive biasing strategies are equally diverse, ranging from the use of religious authorities to invoke divine displeasure with particular vote choices to murdering candidates from opposing parties. Candidates with valence or means to bias elections can avoid committing to clear platforms, use legislative influence to target benefits to supporters, and minimize accountability for implementing (or not) policies designed to benefit society.

In contrast to valence, however, because of greater real and reputational costs, **electoral biasing** occurs only when candidates *can no longer change positions, voter preferences, or sources of valence credibly or reliably*. The objectives of electoral biasing include cycle-biasing (hastening or postponing the timing of elections to opponents' disadvantage), turnout-biasing (inflating turnout among supporters or suppressing opponents' voters), choice-biasing (manipulating the menu of parties, policies, and candidates from which voters can choose), and result-biasing (delaying or changing results). Competitors pursue biasing objectives with violent and nonviolent strategies.

I focus on the circumstances under which politicians supplement or substitute nonviolent with coercive electoral biasing. Shifting policy positions, conveying issue-expertise, polishing candidate image, varying campaign messages, and expanding turnout operations diminish in marginal returns, credibility, and/or effectiveness as Election Day approaches. Fraud, used as insurance against unexpected uncertainty, also requires advanced planning. Inflating turnout artificially, for example, entails padding registration lists. Stuffing ballot boxes involves identifying key precincts and ensuring cooperation from election workers, while vote buying necessitates generating money off-the-books, to name a few fraud tactics. Fraud and corruption are favored over violence under uncertainty because politicians care about their reputations. Politicians know that all but the most blatant ethical violations

and self-enrichment will be undetected by voters (G. R. Parker, 2004), let alone linked definitively to parties or candidates.

Actors plan some election violence, but they only deploy it when other methods fail, because it is more likely than fraud to

- result in detection and punishment, either through either retaliation or legal prosecution;
- inadvertently affect groups, organizations, and people not targeted by the violence;
- alienate and suppress turnout among undecided voters and supporters;
- invite direct retaliation against supporters, staff, and property;
- generate negative publicity that alienates both the party faithful and undecided voters in current and/or future elections;
- impose direct economic and human costs on society as a whole;
- attract external condemnation and intervention;
- decrease public support for democracy as a system of government;
- require payoffs, quid-pro-quo, and promises of future leniency to suppliers of violence; and
- undermine the credibility of campaign promises that a party or candidate can control crime or is even capable of governing.

In sum, coercion and violence are usually more detectable, unpredictable, unreliable, imprecise, and costly to reputation than election fraud. In a given election, then, coercion—particularly physical violence—represents a last resort.

However, this does not mean that all election violence seeks to achieve strategic, instrumental goals. First, like crime, election violence can be expressive in nature (Cooney & Phillips, 2002). I argue that **expressive election violence varies systematically with the same factors that explain instrumental election violence—ICPV and uncertainty**. For example, some expressive election violence erupts from situational circumstances. Voters waiting in long lines and congregating in public places, for example, may respond with physical violence to innocent pushing and shoving, heated discussion, or cajoling. It can also erupt between individuals and groups participating in rallies and celebrating or mourning wins and losses. Competitive elections are associated with higher turnout and

larger public gatherings, so situational-expressive violence will rise along with instrumental violence. Similarly, with personal vote incentives, the number of beneficiaries willing to participate in rallies or marches is larger, creating opportunities for charged exchanges that escalate to violence.

Second, justice-seeking election violence, also associated with ICPV and electoral uncertainty, occurs in response to harassment and violence or actual and perceived acts of unfairness. Post-election agitation calling for new elections or recounts is a form of justice-seeking violence, not unlike sports spectators' violent responses to results of close matches they perceive as unfair (Braun & Vliegenthart, 2009; Spaaij, 2006). Because it is *moralistic* in nature (Cooney & Phillips, 2002; Jacobs, 2004), justice-seeking may be associated with lower reputational costs for challengers, particularly if electoral reforms they hoped would even the playing field turn out to be purely cosmetic. In the Philippines, for example, increasing election commission authority just prior to elections in 1998 created high expectations for a free and fair election. When they saw election workers stuffing ballot boxes and other forms of fraud (Linantud, 1998), voters and opposition groups responded violently. Justice-seeking election violence, then, is more likely to occur after pro-democratic electoral reforms as challengers enjoy greater justification and legitimacy in using force. Violent justice-seekers may also fear repression less after liberalizations because regimes that adopt reforms for cosmetic reasons nevertheless worry about the internal and external reputational costs of punishing justice-seekers who are demanding that the regime uphold sham reforms.

In contrast, a third category consists of predatory or rent-seeking election violence. Criminals and non-electoral actors try to take advantage of diversion of police, local government, and other rule of law resources to commit acts of looting, theft, and other crimes. Predatory violence should not be related in predictable ways to my theoretical propositions. In my empirical econometric and spatial analysis, I argue that if election violence is primarily of this type, it should have spatial patterns that are distributed randomly in space with respect to the primary explanatory variables. In effect, the pattern we might expect from purely predatory election violence constitutes the *null hypothesis*.

Table 1 lists types and illustrative examples of nonviolent and violent biasing strategies according to electoral goals and objectives and categorizes them as proactive or reactive. Based on goals that violence and coercion might seek to achieve, such as getting candidates to withdraw from the race (choice-biasing), the timing of strategies occur before or after an election or on election day.

Similarly, the **targets, geographic scope, and initial level of violence** needed to achieve each objective differ. The **electoral system (my second proposition)** shapes the extent to which actors favor or have access to biasing goals, such as turnout inflating, over another, such as reducing the number of competitors (choice-biasing). **Only incumbents have access to some strategies, and pay different costs than oppositions for both fraud and violence**, conjectures to which I return in my discussion of proposition two.

The illustrative coercive strategies in **Table 1** can be disaggregated systematically if one imagines how a candidate's strategists might contemplate violence: Will we have to recruit and pay a large number of thugs to intimidate masses of voters, or can we stage fights outside polling stations with a few people? As one Newark ward captain told me before election day in May 2006, "People don't think they sit around and plan these things, but they do," referring to staged fights between hired muscle wearing the t-shirts of opposing candidates and pretending to shout and fight.

Where will we get people to carry out violence on the candidate's behalf? In Newark's hotly contested 2002 mayoral election, incumbent Sharpe James reportedly released gang members from jail before Election Day on the condition they drag voters to the polls and stand outside of key polling stations. During the 2006 election, I spoke to a few muscled men who were distributing ballot cards for different candidates in an intimidating manner. They turned out to be friends--house painters from Jersey City--bused into Newark for \$100 each to provide "street presence" outside of polling stations.

Organizers of violence think about potential retaliation, the most important locations to carry out violence, who or what to target, and what type or minimum level of violence is necessary to achieve an objective. A scuffle outside of a polling station might be enough to suppress turnout in one opponent precinct, but large-scale rioting or bombing might be necessary to have an electorate-wide effect. Expressive violence may erupt spontaneously with exchange of words and escalate to a fistfight, while planned violence is more likely to begin with a single, strategic use of force. These variations are not random and can be categorized along dimensions criminologists use to analyze violent crime.

I identify eight dimensions along which violent election tactics vary and make predictions about how they combine together, forming **modal incident characteristics** based on variance in the different

goals and objectives of electoral biasing. I use these expected patterns to develop testable empirical implications of my theory. These eight dimensions, some more observable than others, are:

1. **Spatial scope and pattern:** Is violence distributed randomly or clustered in geographic space?
2. **Tactic timing:** Does election violence occur before, after elections, or on Election Day?
3. **Directionality and symmetry:** Are acts one-sided, committed only by a single individual or group perpetrator, or do they involve multiple participants in violence?
4. **Sponsorship:** Did actors other than the perpetrator sponsor or organize the incident?
5. **Actor officiality:** Are perpetrators and targets formal affiliates of parties, candidates, security forces or other identifiable, state-sponsored agencies and groups, or, conversely, are they ordinary people, party supporters, and non-state organizations?
6. **Actor size:** Do perpetrators and targets consist of individuals or groups?
7. **Intentionality:** Does the incident begin with spontaneous or planned actions?
8. **Tactic lethality:** What is the intended severity of harm that the initial act of violence implies (e.g., does it begin with intimidation, physical abuse, use of deadly weapons with intent to kill, or acts of mass violence such as bombings or incitement of deadly mass riots)?


Figure 1 elucidates the way in which I expect the constellations of the eight dimensions of election coercion and violence to correspond to different biasing strategies. The diagram is designed to assist my readers and me in comparing the theory's predictions.

Table 1: Electoral Biasing Goals, Objectives, and Alternative Strategies

Strategy Type and Biasing Goal	Objective	Illustrative Strategies	
		Fraudulent Biasing or Nonviolent Expression	Coercive Biasing or Violent Expression
Predatory	Material Gain (No electoral objective)	None	Armed robbery, criminal score-settling
Instrumental Proactive			
<i>Cycle-biasing</i>	Induce election	Verbal critique, non-violent marches, petition courts, call for no confidence vote	Violence to discredit incumbent ability to govern, provoke no confidence votes
	Postpone election	Court petitions, election complaints, nonviolent strikes, media strategy	Violence to discredit incumbent ability to administer election
<i>Turnout-biasing</i>	Inflate turnout	Buy turnout, disenfranchise groups, challenge voters, personation, close polling stations, create long lines	Force or use bloc voting, intimidate voters, create chaos or rumors of violence
	Suppress turnout		
<i>Choice-biasing</i>	Enhance own image Detract opponent image	Intensively campaign, use slander and libel, accuse opponent of fraud, file election complaints	Display toughness, fighting spirit, orchestrate violence attributable to opponent, bait opponent
	Signal support	Rallies, literature, posters Use state resources and property for campaign	Force state employees to enlarge crowds, show street presence with thugs
	Deter opponent entry	Ban parties, impose candidacy rules, pay opponents to stay out	Threats, direct or indirect intimidation, assassination, kidnapping
	Influence party/candidate choices & coalitions	Ban parties, gerrymander, non-competition pact	Threats, intimidation, assassination, kidnapping
	Limit opponent campaign	Refuse permits, block media access	Block or disrupt rallies, threaten candidate or supporters
<i>Result-biasing</i>	Enable/protect fraud Delay or alter results	Hide fraud, falsify counts, stuff ballots, hack machines, falsify absentee ballots, buy votes	Harass or block election monitors, intimidate election workers, steal & replace ballot boxes

<i>System-altering</i>	Return to dictatorship, war	Delay or prevent government formation	Attack opponent, create chaos to justify reversal
<i>Justice-seeking</i>	Deter fraud Retaliate for biasing tactics	File election complaints, deploy domestic monitors, Report to media	Attack election workers, groups, parties perceived to be using fraud, violence
<i>Expressive Reactive</i>	Celebrate, mourn outcome	Dancing, processions, drinking, demonstrations	Usually escalates from verbal altercation but
	Navigate lines, crowds	Verbal requests	tactics include burning tires, vandalism, etc.
<i>Moralistic</i>			
<i>Justice-Seeking</i>	Redress insult, restore honor Self-defense	Marches, verbal response, media response Call law enforcement, electoral tribunal or commission	Fight, riot, vandalize, protest, harass, threaten

Figure 1: A Typology of Election Violence



Elaboration of Theoretical Propositions and Empirical Expectations

Proposition One: Uncertainty, the personal vote, and the probability and spatial diffusion of violence

Parties, motivated by a desire to implement policy and the chance of governing in the future, seek to obtain the largest share of the vote (in proportional systems) or to win as many constituencies as possible (in majoritarian systems). In parliamentary systems, this means becoming the largest party in parliament (alone or in coalition) and choosing the prime minister, while in presidential systems it may mean capturing the executive and a strong legislative position (Allen Hicken, 2009). Office-seeking candidates, on the other hand, are inclined to employ strategies to maximize the immediate chance of winning, which may conflict with party goals (Ansolabehere, Leblanc, & Snyder, 2005, pp. 125-135; Cox & McCubbins, 1993).

Candidates' personal votes make candidates less dependent on parties, allowing them to take stances at odds with party platforms (Ansolabehere & Snyder, 2000; Aragonés & Palfrey, 2002, 2005; Austen-Smith, 1984; Groseclose, 2001; Hollard & Rossignol, 2008) and engage in campaign behavior, including violence, that can dilute, muddle, or otherwise damage party reputations (Aranson, Hinich, & Ordeshook, 1974). Parties prefer to avoid immediate and long-term costs of election violence to their reputations. They may try to restrain candidate and supporter violence, but their ability to do so depends on the extent to which they control their rank-and-file. While control can include factors unique to internal party organization, such as promotion to party and legislative positions (if the party wins) (Cox & McCubbins, 1993), distribution of campaign funds, and other sources of party-level leverage, features of electoral systems largely shape party ability to discipline candidates (Ansolabehere et al., 2005). Four system-level factors--party discretion over who can be a candidate, whether surplus votes beyond what a party's candidate needs to win a seat transfer to the next-highest vote getter from the same party, whether voters choose primarily parties or candidates on ballots, and the number of representatives elected from each constituency⁶ make up an index that

⁶ The last factor is referred to commonly as "district magnitude", but I use the term "constituency" rather than "electoral district" because, in many countries, "district" refers to administrative units above or distinct from election boundaries. Furthermore, titles associated with electoral administration, such as "District Returning Officer" often refer to units of administration above the constituency. Constituency boundaries may differ from one election to the next and between levels of government. They are usually distinct from other political and administrative boundaries in a country. A constituency, then, refers to one of the geographic subdivisions of the total electorate that sends representatives to local, regional, national or other levels of government.

measures the extent to which institutions enable candidate independence from parties, known as “incentives to cultivate a personal vote” (ICPV) (Carey & Shugart, 1995; Johnson & Wallack, 2007).

Vote-maximizing candidates and their supporters turn to violence more readily when personal vote incentives are high, especially when the margin separating expected vote counts for competitors is so narrow that a shift in just a few votes means the difference between winning and losing. Personal vote incentives encourage elected incumbents ensure reelection by targeting distribution of government resources, jobs, public sector patronage, constituency-specific pork, rents from organized crime and corruption, clientelistic constituency service, and other benefits to a minimum winning coalition of supporters rather the public as a whole (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2002; Eric C.C. Chang, 2005; Golden, 1996; Allen Hicken, 2007; A. Hicken & Simmons, 2008; Myerson, 1993; M. M. Singer, 2005). As a result, ICPV creates beneficiaries who face the promise of material gain or the threat of loss when an election seems likely to put a new representative in office. When incumbents offer what I call Black Market Rents, or private benefits based on allowing crime to operate, criminal elements to keep order and help mobilize votes. Rather than providing a public good fewer criminals, politicians look the other way with respect to import and distribution of prohibited substances or underground activities, such as gambling and prostitution (Larsen & Hulston, 1997, p. 5). Black market elements often stand to lose the most from a change in power, particularly when challengers either promise to eliminate them or have their own, competing criminal beneficiaries. Such supporters have networks of people and the means to employ violence. In assessing the likelihood of fraud and intimidation in U.S. elections, for example, retired Election Crimes Division Director at the Department of Justice, Craig Donsanto, reported looking at close elections in areas known for protection and extortion rackets for further investigation (Donsanto, 2005).⁷

When a second condition—*uncertainty*—is present, these beneficiaries become willing suppliers of violence on behalf of candidates to protect their benefit stream. Even if supporters do not engage in violence themselves, the candidate maintains strong ties to them through material benefits. As a result, they are unlikely to punish him or her directly in the voting booth for campaign behavior. In a close election, candidates who rely on a personal vote are more inclined to risk reputational and actual costs of intimidation against opposition, those undecided and even their own voters because

⁷ Studies of election violence in a variety of contexts make the same connection between crime, politicians, and election violence (Callahan, 2005; Cook, 2011; Dimova, 2010; Dinnen, 2001; Hansen & Steffen, 2011; Kössler, 2008; Larsen & Hulston, 1997; Pearce, McGee, & Wheeler, 2011; Reno, 2007).

they can overcome the negative stigma of using violence by credibly promising and eventually delivering material rewards—benefits, jobs, development projects, etc.

Uncertainty takes two forms: (1) **Electoral uncertainty** arises when exogenous factors, such as entry of viable challengers and shifts in population or public opinion, change the distribution of voters who are “up for grabs” in one or more constituencies, producing intense competition and races that are “too-close-to-call.” As the retired Director of the Election Crimes Branch at the U.S. Department of Justice said, “The primary motive [for fraud and violence] is the perception of a close contest for an office that matters” (Donsanto, 2005);⁸ (2) **Institutional uncertainty**⁹ occurs when new electoral laws, administrative structures, and procedures are introduced to constrain nonviolent options for influencing electoral outcomes. The more recent the changes, the less knowledge competitors have about the degree to which they will be monitored and enforced. While reforms can alter the rules of the game in ways actors cannot foresee, they are also associated with uncertainty about whether the new rules will be enforced or implemented in ways that advantage some parties and candidates over others. For example, legislation that increases election commission independence or judicial discretion over election complaints may be implemented only partially, if at all. Multi-party competition can be watered down with prohibitive candidate eligibility requirements. New election crimes penalties do not mean violations will be monitored and prosecuted in a transparent, unbiased way.

Institutional uncertainty is generated by **increasing the costs of or decreasing access to legal campaign strategies** (e.g., banning parties, media access, campaign finance) or **means of nonviolent election fraud** (e.g., improving direct penalties and electoral remedies for fraud, uneven enforcement of some types of fraud for some actors and not others, improving detection and punishment of types of fraud used more by one party than another). **Improvement in the speed, impartiality, access, transparency, and/or enforceability of the procedures and decisions of bodies that administer elections,¹⁰ receive, and adjudicate electoral disputes** increases institutional uncertainty. Before

⁸ Scholar research also has made a connection between closeness and electoral manipulation (F. Lehoucq, 2003).

⁹ This is one component of what Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, in their work about institutional design of international agreements, call uncertainty about the state of the world which refers to actors’ “knowledge about the consequences of their own actions, the actions of other states, or the actions of...institutions” (Koremenos, Lipson, & Snidal, 2001).

¹⁰ Such bodies in non-democratic regimes are typically centralized and located in the Ministry of Interior or appointed by the Executive. Creation of new, more independent bodies is a source of uncertainty even when regime manipulation continues. Dispute adjudication can be handled by special election committees, election tribunals under judicial supervision, normal branches of the judiciary, constitutional courts, and so on (Autheman, 2004; Orozco-Henríquez, 2010). Electoral administration may include one or more separate agencies, such as census agencies (voter registration, identification, and electoral constituency boundaries), electoral boundaries commissions, stand-alone election

Egypt's 1995 election, for example, which was characterized by unprecedented violence—50 deaths and 900 injuries (Negus, 1997)—the regime improved media access and gave the judiciary more oversight of election procedures (Moustafa, 2003). Expectations of fairness, combined with the unexpected courage of the judiciary in enforcing election law, contributed to the violence (Ibrahim, 1996).

Unless a third party, such as the United Nations, administers an election, incumbents have more information about enforcement than challengers do. However, incumbents still face uncertainty, even following reforms they initiated, because they may suffer reputational costs, external sanctions, and opposition violence should they fail to implement pro-democratic reforms in accordance with expectations. In their study of electoral rule design, Andrews and Jackman note that "...political elites often made serious miscalculations of the effect of particular electoral rules on their own future success" (2005, p. 65). Similarly, Imperial Germany's introduction of universal suffrage for election to the federal parliament, designed to shore up support for the empire, eventually corroded authoritarianism (M. L. Anderson, 2000; Ritter, 1990).

Even much more incremental and cosmetic reforms increase uncertainty and risk for incumbents and can have consequences as profound as major reforms, particularly in transitional democracies (Benoit, 2007). The introduction of transparent ballot boxes in Pakistan's 2008 elections and election commission independence in the 1998 Philippines election contributed to both instrumental and justice-seeking violence, for example. Pressure from civil society, branches of government, the media, and the international community can lead to unexpected monitoring and enforcement of cosmetic reforms. The deployment of over 16,000 domestic election monitors for the entire election day in over 7,000, randomly selected polling stations in Pakistan, for example, sparked last-minute intimidation and violence against polling station workers, voters, and monitors. Unfulfilled or partial reforms can also lead to justice-seeking violence related to election boycotts, election-day protests of electoral law violations, and post-election protest. Such protest and violence threaten a

commissions, and/or other local, regional, and national bodies, known as electoral management bodies. The nature of appointments to positions in this system, centralization, time for filing complaints, statutes of limitations on prosecution, and other factors all contribute to the ability of political actors to manipulate elections. The complex institutional arrangements of these bodies and small changes thereto can increase uncertainty and problems with detection and enforcement of election law. In the United States, for example, prosecutors will not prosecute election crimes unless the results have been certified, but if contestants have filed for election dispute adjudication, the results cannot be certified, making penalties and remedies for certain classes of election crime only theoretical possibilities in most cases (Donsanto, 2005).

regime's internal and external legitimacy, as well as the probability that groups who feel cheated will demand accountability and severe punishment for those near the top of the incumbent regime's hierarchy. Following pro-democratic reforms, challengers feel safer and more justified in using public protest and violence to respond to unrealized promises of free and fair elections.

Convergence of electoral and institutional uncertainty with high personal vote incentives creates conditions most likely to ignite election violence. I expect cross-national patterns of election violence, then, to vary according to the following expectations:

Expectation 1.1 (Electoral Uncertainty): The more competitive the current election is compared to the last, the higher the probability that violence will occur.

Expectation 1.2 (Institutional Uncertainty): The more recent and sweeping the last electoral reform, the higher the probability that violence will occur in the current election.

Expectation 1.3 (ICPV*Uncertainty): The greater the incentives to cultivate a personal vote, the higher the risk that electoral and/or institutional uncertainty will spark violence.

At the subnational level, electoral and party system characteristics and associated incentives to cultivate a personal versus party vote are, theoretically, uniform, at least for a single election, as is the probability that candidate's use of violence will be detected and punished by parties and higher authorities.¹¹ Research on patterns of turnout in the United States has established that parties and candidates target their limited resources for legal campaign and voter mobilization efforts strategically to constituencies where they expect close races (Aldrich, 1993; Cox & Munger, 1989). It follows then that these same politicians, when *they lack resources, access to certain strategies (e.g., equal media exposure (Chan & Suen, 2009), campaign venues), or time for providing more private benefits to supporters, altering policy positions, establishing valence, intensifying campaign messages, or orchestrating fraud, would target violence to the most uncertain races if they chose to use it at all.* In contrast to decisions about strategic campaigning and fraud, however, parties and candidates **who consider coercive campaigning must also consider its effects *outside* of the targeted constituency.**

Violence is unique among electoral strategies in that it can be contagious, not only over time, as actors engage in tit-for-tat escalation after a precipitating incident, but also over geographic space.

¹¹ Individual parties have different degrees of internal governance or cohesion, a nuance that is beyond the scope of this study. It would be possible also to measure cross- and subnational variation in the number of beneficiaries likely to supply violence with data on public payrolls, state health or welfare benefits, residency in state housing, but consistent data on these variables are difficult to obtain. Future research will explore propositions along these lines.

After violence erupts, affected populations and perpetrators migrate, new actors get involved, and fearful voters stay home, undermining the credibility of the entire election. I argue that a party's decision about whether or not to organize or tolerate violence in a *specific* constituency depends on three criteria:

1. whether a *given constituency is pivotal* (in majoritarian systems) for reaching the minimum seats required to govern nationally or whether *a constituency contains the pivotal voter* (in proportional systems) to receive a plurality of seats necessary to form a government in coalition or as a single party (**Pivotal Constituency**)¹²;
2. the likely *geographic scope of any contemporaneous spillover effects—or negative externalities* (Morenoff, 2003)¹³—of violence, such as reduction in turnout of the party's own supporters in nearby constituencies (**Spillover Effects**); and
3. the likely temporal and spatial acceleration of *diffusion effects* from violence in one or more constituencies, whereby supporters of opposing parties in *other* constituencies not involved in the initial incident retaliate against the party, leading to subsequent contagion of violence to new locations (**Diffusion Effects**).¹⁴

I expect election violence to vary in the typology's first dimension—**spatial scope and pattern**--across political systems because it is more contagious and has more negative externalities in strong party systems than in systems with high personal vote incentives.

¹² These distinctions are discussed in other studies (Buchler, 2007; Neugart, 2005) using the term "pivotal district."

¹³ Spillover effects are the result of mere spatial proximity, or *exposure*, to violence in neighboring areas (Morenoff, Sampson, & Raudenbush, 2001). Spillover is virtually contemporaneous with the initial event. Spillovers of election violence on behalf of a candidate in one constituency can include reduced turnout among the party's supporters in neighboring constituencies who live close to the boundary; unexpected, immediate effects of inaccurate reports and rumors about locations and scale of violence; immediate vote switching by those who want to punish coercive campaigning; immediate economic costs like treating injuries, road and business closures, and paying for added security; and physical and mental health costs of hearing about or witnessing proximate violence.

¹⁴ Diffusion of violence occurs as a result of social interaction, such as mobility of victims and perpetrators displaced by violence across spatial units. In contrast, spillover or exposure effects, diffusion is a consequence of precipitating incidents as they play out over time and space. Diffusion involves involvement of additional actors and locations in violence *over time* and represents a pattern of spatial dependence, rather than just spatial correlation (see Cohen & Tita, 1999; W. R. Smith, Frazee, & Davison, 2000). As Morenoff and his coauthors write, "Acts of violence may instigate a sequence of events that leads to further violence in a spatially channeled way. For example, many homicides...are retaliatory in nature...Thus, a homicide in one neighborhood may provide the spark that eventually leads to a retaliatory killing in a nearby neighborhood" (2001, p. 6). Social networks and socio-economic and demographic variables are often linked by "geographical vectors" (Morenoff et al., 2001, p. 7), increasing the likelihood of that violence in a single constituency will provoke "retaliation by proxy" from opponents or pre-emptive police repression against a party's candidates and supporters *in other constituencies*, creating conditions for yet more cycles of violence.

This may seem counterintuitive in light of my argument that election violence is *more common* in high-ICPV systems. **Somewhat paradoxically, election violence is more common when there are high personal vote incentives in part *because that violence is more contained* within neighborhoods, polling stations, and constituencies.** As the number of close constituencies increases, violence in polities with high ICPV may have widespread violence, but the individual incidents will have distinct and separate perpetrators, targets, and precipitating tactics that originate at the constituency level. The number and spatial distribution of close constituency races is more likely than other factors, such as strength of security forces, ethnic divisions, economic inequality, or histories of violence unrelated to elections, to predict the spatial pattern of violence where there are high personal vote incentives. Violence in strong party systems, though less likely in the first place, spills over and diffuses from single incidents more readily from constituency in which it originates. This contagious violence is more unpredictable and less likely to correspond to constituency-level competitiveness. **Two main factors explain why election violence in party vote systems exhibit more extensive geographic spillover and spatio-temporal diffusion patterns than election violence in personal vote systems: cross-constituency attribution and partisan identification.**

First, parties in personal vote systems can deny links to perpetrators of violence more plausibly than can parties in strong, centralized party systems. They pay fewer reputational costs for coercion. Strong parties choose or rank candidates, so candidate quality and behavior reflect directly on the party. Voters know that strong parties control nomination to cabinet posts and staff positions based on service to the party and thus have greater leverage over supporter behavior than do personal vote candidates. With more permissive entry requirements for candidacy, fewer representatives per constituency, and decentralized sources of campaign finance, voters under ICPV attribute violence to a central party apparatus. Since supporters of candidates in personal vote systems are also willing to use violence when their benefactors might lose, voters are less likely to assume that the candidate or party is responsible for organizing the violence. *In sum, when an individual with ties to a party commits an act of violence, voters in strong party systems are more likely than those in high ICPV systems to exhibit cross-constituency attribution for violence. They are therefore more likely to abstain from voting or to switch their votes to candidates representing a better-behaved party--regardless of the constituency in which violence occurred. That is, violence is more likely to have spillover effects in strong party systems because voters hold national parties responsible for local acts of violence.*

Second, in strong party systems, campaigning is a coordinated, national-level affair, designed to convince voters to choose a party agenda rather than specific candidates. Strong parties enforce candidate adherence to platforms during campaigns and while governing. Because strong parties provide public goods (A. Hicken & Simmons, 2008) and constituency service (Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina, 1987) to broader populations than parties in candidate-centered systems, voters pay more attention to party policy packages and the ideologies that signal the content of those packages. Strong parties centralize campaign resource allocation, delivery of message content, and design of campaign material, such as advertisements, theme colors, and music. Voters are less aware of the identities of their incumbent representatives and challengers when they vote primarily for a party list. In multi-member constituencies—one of the features of low personal vote incentives—violence by a candidate may be blamed collectively on all of the party’s candidates in the constituency or indistinguishable from violence in a neighboring constituency.¹⁵

In contrast, voters in personal vote constituencies have a vested interest in knowing who the incumbents and challengers are and what respective supporters of each will gain or lose from the outcome, paying more attention to news and campaign information about the race in their own constituency than to general, national messages about the party as a whole. Voters in personal vote systems receive less information about violence in other constituencies. When voters in personal vote systems hear about violence in other parts of the country, they are less likely to factor it into their voting decision for their constituency’s candidate than are voters in strong party systems.

For example, in places like Pakistan, which has high incentives to cultivate a personal vote, a party’s candidates, supporters, and voters feel less threatened by violence against their party comrades in other constituencies. As my colleagues at the Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN) said frequently of Pakistan’s 2008 National Assembly election, “there are 272 separate elections and electorates rather than a nationwide contest in Pakistan.” Even after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, violence by PPP supporters in protest of her death concentrated in the PPP’s home

¹⁵ Based on anecdotal knowledge of specific incidents reported in the press for the six cases for which I have collected data, reports of violence in strong party systems seem vaguer with respect to location and specification of perpetrators, referring more generally to regions. In a report on election violence in Ghana in 2000, for example, *The Independent (Accra)*, writes: “The Ashanti Regional Police Command has noted with grate [sic] concern certain negative practices on the part of some supporters of some political parties which...include the booing of party leaders and activists and the raining of insults on them. Tearing of notices and flags of opposing parties also forms part [sic]. This...was obviously in connection to an uncalled for behavior put up [sic] by opposition party supporters in some parts of Kumasi during the recent visit of the Ashanti Region by the Vice President J.E.A. Mills....” (2000). News about violence in Ghana tends to focus on regions or large administrative districts, rather than constituencies.

constituencies in Sindh, despite alarmist, sensational predictions of nationwide bloodletting. Much of the post-Bhutto assassination violence occurred where PPP candidates faced competition from the MQM, a party that represents long-standing tensions over control of Karachi and urban-rural ethno-linguistic divisions in Sindh. The scope and duration of spillover and diffusion of violence following Bhutto's death was much less than most people anticipated. With the exception of the PPP-MQM rivalry, in which ethnic identity may intensify personal loyalties to the party as a whole, most Pakistanis have stronger ties to particular politicians than to parties. **In high-ICPV systems, then, defensive, pre-emptive, or retaliatory violence is less likely to occur outside of the constituency in which an incident initially occurs.**

Although voters in strong party systems have less personal interest in the outcome of a constituency race, they have substantial interest in having one party (or a specific coalition) win at the national level to achieve the distribution of public goods implied by their preferred ideological preference for a given party.¹⁶ Strong party systems cultivate individual loyalties to parties more than personal vote systems do. Strong parties cultivate individual loyalties to and identification with the party. As a result, party supporters will defend violent threats to the party, wherever they might occur. Such party identification increase expressive motives for violence, such as upholding the party's honor, and instrumental motives, such as punishing and deterring violence that suppresses the party's voters, harms the party's candidates, or limits the party's ability to campaign. Diffusion effects, such as retaliation by proxy, are thus more likely in strong party systems.

Ghana's experience is illustrative. Although some personal vote incentives exist, there is a much higher degree of party control over candidate nomination to seats and voter identification with parties rather than candidates. If the NDP attacks the NPP in one constituency, some supporters in other corners of the country will retaliate in kind when they hear about an incident. Precipitating incidents are relatively minor in strong party systems, often beginning with poster vandalism or disruption of rallies, but involvement of new actors in retaliation-by-proxy can escalate beyond a single constituency because voters and parties have stronger ties than do voters and candidates. **Therefore, although candidates and supporters initiate violence less often in strong party systems, when they do so, spillover and diffusion effects beyond each constituency are more likely.**

¹⁶ Later, under proposition three, I discuss the implications of polarization along cleavage lines in strong party systems, whereby voters do not receive constituency-level private benefits but may be systematically excluded based on ethnicity, religion, ideology, etc. if one party wins.

I summarize the foregoing reasoning in the following empirical expectations. *Ceteris paribus*, the **spatial scope and pattern** (Dimension 1) of election violence varies in personal versus party vote systems, *given that competitiveness has heightened the probability that one or more candidates are inclined to use at least one coercive tactic in a constituency*:

Expectation 1.4 (Spatial Independence of Violence and ICPV): While election violence is likely to be higher when incentives to cultivate a personal vote are greater, **geographic patterns under high ICPV exhibit *less spatial dependence* than under low ICPV**.

Specifically, in a model of the counts of violent incidents in each constituency with a set of independent variables that includes spatial lag terms for its neighbors of the second-, third-, and fourth- and subsequent-order neighbors, there should be no systematic increase or decrease in the magnitude of the spatial lag terms over distance. Even violence in the first-order neighbors of a constituency should not be less correlated in high ICPV systems than in low ICPV systems (unless the underlying characteristics of their electorates--employment rates, development, ethno-linguistic divisions, poverty, land-ownership, etc.--produce extremely similar cleavages and candidates, which manifests as spatial correlation, but not dependence).

Expectation 1.5 (Violence Spillover and Strong Parties): While systems with strong parties vis-à-vis candidates (low ICPV) have fewer violent incidents than high ICPV systems, any violence that does occur is more likely to have some immediate effect on neighboring constituencies. Deployment of security forces, displacement of perpetrators and victims, and other spillover effects imply that there will be a higher degree of correlation between a constituency and its first-order neighbors with respect to both to the number of incidents of violence and voter turnout.

Expectation 1.6 (Violence Diffusion and Strong Parties): In addition to first-order spatial correlation due to spillover effects, the geographic distribution of election violence in strong party systems is likely to exhibit spatio-temporal dependence, with violence in one constituency influencing subsequent violence in neighboring constituencies.¹⁷

¹⁷ The extent to which spatial dependence diminishes over space may be modified by levels of party nationalization, heterogeneity of constituencies, and other country-specific factors, which are discussed in more detail along with the empirical analysis.

Proposition Two: Electoral systems, the degree of democracy, and modal incident characteristics

Under the conditions outlined in the foregoing proposition—uncertainty and incentives to cultivate a personal vote—parties, candidates, and their beneficiaries are tempted to employ coercion or violence as a strategy, but *why do some target election day while others focus on the pre-election phase? Why do some candidates target other candidates while others target voters? Why do challengers risk using election violence while incumbents show restraint in some countries and elections, while incumbents are the primary perpetrators in other elections? Why do some political actors use “unobservable” or non-physical forms of coercion while others use visible violence?*

To answer these questions, I explore how institutional factors structure the perpetrators, targets, timing, and types of electoral violence. I argue that the modal incident characteristics with respect to Dimensions 2-7 in the election violence typology differ depending on:

- the **electoral system**, which determines the timing of the *moment of selection*, or the phase of the election processes at which competitiveness is greatest, and
- the **degree of democracy**, which affects the balance of *incumbent and challenger costs of, and access to, nonviolent legal campaign strategies and/or opportunities for fraud* at each phase of the election process (the **marginal rates of technical substitution** between fraudulent and coercive strategies for each party and between quiet and noisy coercion).

2.1 Discussion: How electoral systems affect the timing and nature of election coercion and violence

Electoral systems differ according to how they combine three factors: the way in which the distribution of votes cast for candidates and parties are translated into seats in representative bodies (*electoral formula*), the number of seats per district (*district magnitude*), and how voters mark their ballots (*ballot structure*) (Blais & Massicotte, 1996). Although there are diverse types of electoral systems, most fall into three broad families: plurality/majoritarian systems that typically have single-member constituencies where candidates win if they get more votes than any others, known as First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) systems,¹⁸ and two kinds of proportional representation systems: closed-list (CLPR) and open-list (OLPR) (International IDEA, 2005). In CLPR systems, voters mark only their party preference on the ballot. The party chooses and ranks the candidates; then allocates seats in that order according to the proportion of the total vote it receives in a constituency. OLPR systems allow

¹⁸ Of the 90 countries (42.3%) that use plurality/majority systems out of a total of 213, 47 (52%) use FPTP. When two-round run-off systems that use FPTP in the first round are counted, the percentage is higher (International IDEA, 2005).

voters to choose candidates after designating their party preference, but evidence that voters actually exercise that choice is limited. OLPR often resembles CLPR in practice (International IDEA, 2005).

Several studies examine the link between these features of electoral systems and campaign finance disclosure laws (Johnson, 2008), levels of electoral fraud and/or corruption (S. Birch, 2003; Sarah Birch, 2007, 2008; Callahan, 2005; Eric C.C. Chang, 2005; Eric C C Chang & Golden, 2003; Allen Hicken, 2007; Kunicová & Rose-Ackerman, 2005; Myerson, 1991), and election violence (Chiroro, 2008). In her study of Southern Africa, Chiroro finds that PR systems are less prone to violence than are FPTP systems. I subject this finding to further empirical testing. However, it is possible that the timing, types of tactics, and nature and size of perpetrators and targets is such that coercive campaigning under PR is less *observable* than under FPTP, but not necessarily less common.

Electoral systems differ with respect to the *phase* of competition at which aspiring candidates face the most competition and enjoy the most influence over their own fate relative to the party and voters. I call this the *moment of selection*, which can last from a few days to months, depending on when and how candidates enter electoral competition and the length of the legal campaign period.

Under CLPR, parties control nomination and placement of candidates on party lists, a process that occurs long before Election Day. Selection of candidates for inclusion on party lists occurs during the intra-party, pre-campaign phase of electoral competition, through party member votes, party primaries in constituencies, central committee appointment, and other mechanisms that differ by party. Although Election Day determines the total number of seats a party receives nationwide, the candidates depend on internal party processes for their rankings on constituency lists. Once his ranking is set, a candidate depends more on overall party performance in a constituency to win a seat. With multiple seats at stake, and, often, more than two parties competing, it is difficult for a candidate in a competitive CLPR constituency to know how many ballots to stuff or how much to inflate or suppress turnout to obtain a seat. The candidate does not know how many extra votes he might get for each unit of illegal effort, or whether the extra votes will translate into a seat. Inflating or suppressing turnout is imprecise and might cost votes or generate votes for other parties inadvertently. For example, it is also unlikely that candidates who depend on parties for nomination, polling data, and campaign finance have the kind of constituency-level relationships to organize election-day fraud or violence without assistance from a central party apparatus.

In contrast, under FPTP, the candidate who has the most votes wins (or competes in a run-off). It is conceivable in FPTP systems that a candidate can win with just two votes, as long as all of the other candidates receive only one vote each. If there are three candidates polling about 33 percent support each in a constituency, if one can get just a few more votes than the other two, she wins. This is a strong incentive to reach as many voters as possible with campaign messages and efforts to ensure they go to polling stations on Election Day. In close elections, parties invest a great deal in saturating constituencies with campaign material, knocking on doors to establish personal commitments to vote, and arranging for transportation to polling stations. In FPTP, every vote counts. Even if it is inefficient, if investing one unit of effort in illegal electoral manipulation can produce even one vote more than the opponent can, it is worth it to the candidate.

It follows, then, that office-seeking candidates under CLPR would first choose to affiliate with the party likely to win a majority and to target any fraud or violence to improve their personal chances of election during the *intra-party, pre-campaign* phase of competition. In CLPR systems, candidates who want to be at the top of party lists can sometimes pay to be placed at the top, but they can also threaten or attack party leaders, candidates, and/or their families to change the party list or get competitors to withdraw “voluntarily” while the list is being made. Once the list is set, lower-ranked candidates can assassinate or kidnap those listed higher than they are. These tactics represent *choice-biasing* goals, whereby competitors seek to bias the menu of candidates from which party members, and then, voters, choose.

In general, tactics needed to influence outcomes in intra-party competition are less visible because they require smaller-scale acts rather than mass violence. Parties are also unlikely to report this kind of infighting, particularly if they are incumbents in single-party dominant or authoritarian regimes. For example, one kidnapping or assassination of a candidate’s family member may be enough to force him to withdraw and would make threats of such violence against other candidates credible in subsequent elections. Coercion is relatively “quiet” but powerful just the same.

In summary, internal party violence designed to eliminate competitors under CLPR is more likely to originate directly with an aspiring candidate who wants a spot on the list; the tactics are more likely to be planned, one-sided, and time-limited incidents with clear ties between aspiring candidates and the actual perpetrators. Candidates even may be involved directly in violence if they cannot send thugs who target other “official” people—party leaders, other candidates, party members. Parties worry less

about the reputational costs of targeted violence that involves only a few individuals at internal party events rather than indiscriminant violence that targets the public. Pre-election violence at the nomination stage and early in the campaign is less likely to draw attention of individual voters, particularly undecided voters, since they follow the political process less attentively during this phase. Intra-party violence is less visible than inter-party violence.

In Algeria, I interviewed several former *Front Liberation National* (FLN) members who said that post-independence elections, beginning with communal elections in 1967, were hard-fought, despite the fact that the FLN ruled as a single party until the first multiparty elections of 1990. Intimidation and violence occurred *within* the FLN at the Kasma level (FLN term for local party organizations).¹⁹ Subnational FLN meetings occurred, literally, behind locked doors, and the FLN controlled the media and major newspaper, *El-Moudjahid*. Such competition within single-party states and authoritarian regimes and associated coercion cannot be quantified easily, but it is meaningful. Forty years later, in a freer media environment with genuine multi-party competition at the municipal level, Algeria's 2007 communal elections resembled those of 1967: violence erupted in party meetings long before Election Day when parties announced candidate rankings. Aspiring candidates not listed or ranked high enough to have a chance at a seat protested along with their supporters. This time, incidents made it into the press (Reif, 2005-2011), suggesting that earlier patterns of intra-party competition and violence under single-party rule may have been similar. However, all but a few Algerians who read the newspapers would be largely unaware of this intra-party infighting.

CLPR systems also may be vulnerable to post-election violence related to *coalition-biasing* goals. It can take months and even more than a year, as recent events in Belgium illustrate, to form coalition governments following elections in which no party wins a clear majority. This is a second important *moment of selection* vulnerable to manipulation and violence. I expect, however, that coalition-biasing violence would resemble pre-election violence under CLPR in that it would involve threats and violence against party leaders and candidates, involving fewer people and less widespread and visible tactics than election violence under FPTP.

¹⁹ June 2007 interviews with former FLN revolutionaries and aspiring candidates to 1967 elections for the *Assemblées Populaires Communales* who were member of MDS party at the time of the interview in 2007. For a description of FLN party organization, allusion to some of the intra-party tensions, and subsequent internal party organization reforms, see Remili (Remili, 1968).

A final reason that election violence may be limited in scope and scale in PR systems is that losing parties often share some degree of power at the national level. PR does not always mean that the winner takes all with respect to policy and benefits of office. Coalition partners often receive cabinet posts and policy portfolios, so losers may stand to lose less than their counterparts do in winner-take-all systems. Parties and candidates in CLPR have greater incentive to behave peacefully during elections since losing could still mean becoming a kingmaker in a coalition and demonstrating the attractiveness of the party as a future coalition member. Similarly, in plurality system, any private benefits are more likely to accrue only to the winner and his or her supporters; if an incumbent loses, these shift entirely from the incumbent to the challenger. Under CLPR, the party may retain a seat even if it experiences a relative loss, and thus hold onto some ability to enjoy personal corruption rents, distribute private goods to supporters, and/or legislate on policies that provide public goods to entire constituencies.

In FPTP systems, on the other hand, where voters determine outcomes on Election Day, a small shift in votes can mean the difference between winning and losing. All other things equal, violence in FPTP systems tends to occur during the *inter-party, pre-election and Election Day phase of competition*. Election Day electoral biasing, such as stuffing ballot boxes, may be optimal in First-Past-the-Post electoral systems, since the moment of selection occurs on Election Day itself. Even a minor electoral reform, such as new transparent ballot boxes introduced before Pakistan's 2008 legislative election, may induce actors to use coercive result biasing strategies. In Pakistan, hired thugs, and sometimes, candidates themselves, used force to take over polling booths and demand that election workers stamp ballots for voters. The older, nonviolent tactics included switching out the (opaque) ballot boxes for boxes filled with false ballots between the end of polling and the beginning of the count. These types of manipulation are *result-biasing behaviors*.

Another form of violence likely to be more common under FPTP than CLPR is *campaign-biasing* coercion aimed at limiting an opponent's ability to reach voters by disrupting rallies, media appearances, travel, and other campaign activity with threats and physical coercion. Because larger numbers of supporters and volunteers campaign and engage in get-out-the-vote activities at the constituency level in FPTP systems, there are also more people competing for voter time and loyalty. Limiting an opponent's activities under FPTP requires more organized, widespread coercion directed at

larger numbers of ordinary people working throughout the constituency than the type of targeted, intra-party pre-election violence that occurs under CLPR.

Similarly, since election day coincides with the moment of selection under FPTP, turnout is of critical importance. When counting fraud is not possible, some other forms of fraud are relatively easy. Vote buying or turnout-buying is often a tool of choice among candidates seeking to *bias voter choice and turnout*. If vote buying becomes difficult, candidates under FPTP often resort to turnout-inflating or turnout-suppressing coercion, which can take on spiritual, economic, and physical forms. In fact, another term for voter intimidation is “reverse vote buying” (Donsanto, 2005). Prior to the 1888 introduction of the secret ballot in Louisville, Kentucky, for example, the Democratic political machine controlled elections by paying clerks to bias results by marking blank ballots and buying votes. After ballot secrecy procedures were in place, the machine resorted to “newer and more flagrant means of disfranchising thousands of voters” (Campbell, 2003, pp. 270-271), coercing city employees economically by threatening their jobs, using control of the police to suppress turnout from African-American wards, which were largely Republican, and blatantly moving polling stations on election day when large lines of voters formed (Campbell, 2003, pp. 275-276). Faced with real competition from a bipartisan reformist party, the *Fusionists*, in 1905, the machine further escalated its use of police to intimidate election workers and voters. A court later concluded that the sum of tactics in 1905 disfranchised 6,296 voters (Campbell, 2003, p. 288).

Altering votes and turnout behavior of thousands of voters requires bolder, more visible tactics against larger numbers of people. Turnout-biasing tactics must occur close to or on Election Day, in contrast with efforts to bias the menu of candidates from which voters choose. When electoral laws, monitoring, and enforcement constrain nonviolent turnout-biasing strategies, such as registration fraud, multiple voting, ballot stuffing, and count falsification, large-scale coercive turnout-biasing involves more blatant measures. As a result, media and interested parties are more likely to notice and report coercion and violence in FPTP systems. Turnout-biasing and fraud-protecting violence in a competitive election engages more perpetrators in threatening or engaging in actual physical abuse. Politicians cannot monitor every action by their “ward heelers,” a term used for local people who perform various legal and illicit tasks and favors for candidates in U.S. politics. Because they do not communicate with them constantly, politicians give political operatives resources and weapons. Operatives have such resources at their disposal when deciding to use coercion in a given situation,

creating more opportunities for physical violence to occur. Based on how events unfold during Election Day, intimidation and violence may be deployed at levels politicians initially hoped to avoid.

Unexpected turnout in a precinct known for supporting the challenger, for example, may result in deployment of thugs outside polling stations late on Election Day. Targets of intimidation and fraud can respond in unexpected ways that risk further incidents of violence.

Finally, in FPTP systems, challengers and voters who witness or suspect election-day fraud and violence often protest as results are counted and released. When numbers that contradict pre-election expectations of vote totals for each candidate, supporters may resort to what they see as justice-seeking violence. They may base their expectations of the outcome on polling data, intimate knowledge of the constituency, and/or informal self-reporting of voters. If filing petitions and complaints through formal adjudication mechanisms is difficult, or penalties and electoral remedies are too weak, parties, candidates, and voters may participate in post-election, justice-seeking violence aimed at voiding the result and calling for a new election or system change. Because their own supporters are likely to see post-election protest as legitimate when evidence of fraud is clear, losing parties, candidates, and supporters pay fewer reputational costs for violence.²⁰

Tables 2 and 3 summarize the empirical expectations for the modal incident characteristics and the timing of election violence across countries based on variation in basic electoral system features.

Table 2: Empirical Expectations 2.1 for Electoral Systems and Election Violence Characteristics

Electoral System	Modal Characteristics of Incidents (Perpetrator/Target)					Public Visibility
	Directionality	Sponsorship	Actor officiality	Actor size	Intentionality	
CLPR	One-sided	Clear	Official/Official	Individual / Small	Planned	Low
FPTP	Multi-Actor	Unclear	Unofficial/Unofficial	Group / Group	Planned / Spontaneous	High

²⁰ Some losers may also cry foul after a fair election they expected to win. In fact, it has become routine for candidates to file petitions in any close election in the United States, even when evidence for fraud is slim (Donsanto, 2005). Post-election protest, however, is unlikely to be sustained by mass participation unless enough people feel genuinely cheated based on their first-hand experience. I argue that post-election violence is more common under FPTP, but that its scale and duration are a function of the degree of democracy in a country, all other things being equal. The role of socio-economic variables on levels and duration of violence is addressed in Proposition Three.

Table 3: Empirical Expectations 2.2 for Electoral Systems and Election Violence Timing

Electoral System	Likelihood of Violence Occurring over Electoral Phases by Election System, <i>ceterus paribus</i>						Incident Count
	Registration →	Nomination →	Campaign →	Election Day →	Results →	Form Govt	
CLPR		At internal phase	If candidates not selected can run as independents			More likely	Low
FPTP	More likely	Likely if competitive primary	More likely	More likely	Depends on competitiveness & perceived fairness		High

The timing and targets of election violence in open-list PR and mixed systems or FPTP systems that have strong parties and high party discipline may fall between the two extremes of FPTP and CLPR. My theory does not imply explicit empirical implications for these systems, which may have more fine-grained variation across the dimensions of the election violence typology. I do not address such variation until interpreting the research findings, but the case of Ghana in 2004 is illustrative of how specific electoral and party system features can create hybrid patterns of violence that do not fall neatly into these expectations.

Ghana uses FPTP, but parties have substantial control over whether candidates can run under the party banner and often circumvent local wishes in nominating candidates for each constituency (Ninsin, 2006). While the outcome was uncertain and inter-party violence more common in the country's 2000 election, the incumbent New Patriotic Party (NPP) of John Kufuor was the favorite to win a majority in parliament in 2004. Competition to be the NPP candidate in internal party elections for each constituency was fierce. Candidates who were not selected for the NPP protested at the national headquarters in Accra, and many defected to become independent candidates. Much of the violence involved some direct physical attacks by these independents against their former fellow NPP members and candidates, as well as violence between their supporters. Election Day itself was relatively peaceful; scuffles occurred primarily in the lead-up to the election when independents' and NPP rallies crossed paths. A number of these scuffles began with direct attacks on the candidates themselves, but some potential incidents of this kind of *campaign-biasing* violence never occurred at all because neutral law enforcement authorities responded to rumors that violence would be used to disrupt rallies and worked with candidates to change the times and/or venues. While there were many independent candidates, only a single constituency elected one to parliament. The party labels are

meaningful to both parties and candidates, so that even with permissive candidate entry under independent affiliation, the real competition was within the incumbent party. The combination of FPTP with unusual party discipline in the 2004 election illustrates how interaction of the variables can create different patterns of violence that nonetheless follow a pattern consistent with the theory.

Post-election violence following posting of election results tends to occur when the national distribution of competitive constituencies is such that at least one party and its supporters estimated *a priori* equal probabilities of winning or losing the ability to govern alone at the national level, a situation that can occur in both CLPR and FPTP systems. This and other types of violence tend to occur at adolescent stages of democratization, rather than primarily during founding elections.

2.2 Discussion: The degree of democracy, substitution, and “democratization of coercion and violence”

It is not surprising that the international community, political scientists, and citizens living in authoritarian regimes alike view elections in these settings as non-events. Researchers rarely include elections in quantitative analysis of electoral behavior because the turnout figures and winners’ margins of victory are so implausible.²¹ If violence occurs in these authoritarian elections, outsiders rarely learn of it. Sometimes, as the previous Algerian example illustrates, this is because any real competition is located *within* ruling parties or regimes.

If we think of electoral autocracy as a point on a continuum from dictatorship to democracy, rather than *a type* of regime, we can conceptualize it as an extreme form of incumbency bias, in which the incumbent has unlimited means at his or her disposal to bias both institutions and elections. Incumbents, particularly in authoritarian regimes, enjoy more power to alter laws and procedures or to control personnel. Similarly, in new democracies, institutions are still weak and in flux, giving incumbents more opportunities not only to bias elections through fraud, but also to create institutionalized electoral bias. There is no need for fraud and coercion when an incumbent can manipulate electoral rules, electoral boundaries, and other institutional arrangements to eliminate any real competition. Such measures include restricting opposition access to the media, banning parties, establishing minimum qualifications for candidacy that eliminate opponents from competition, and

²¹ There is growing scholarly interest, however, in elections under authoritarianism with the recognition that they can be meaningful in generating incremental, and sometimes, profound change (see, e.g. M. L. Anderson, 2000; Chen & Zhong, 2002; Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009; Geddes, 2005; Landry, Davis, & Wang, 2010; Lust-Okar, 2009; Andreas Schedler, 2002b; A Schedler, 2009).

appointing and controlling members of electoral management bodies and the judiciary, to name a few. With so many tools at their disposal for biasing elections, it is not surprising, then, that early democratic elections and elections in authoritarian regimes are often violence-free. Institutional bias and election fraud are such that electoral outcomes are rarely uncertain and opposition parties do not compete with any real hope of winning. In fact, Simpser argues persuasively that implausibly high margins and massive election rigging are designed to deter potential competitors from entering politics in the first place (Simpser, 2008).

There is no need for fraud at polling stations when an incumbent can simply falsify the count. In Algeria's May 2007 parliamentary election, for example, polling stations were largely empty, except those staged for exposure to the media. Citing low rates of turnout in advanced democracies, the real power--*le pouvoir*—behind Algeria's elected leaders, reported turnout at about 25 percent. Based on the turnout levels I observed in Algiers neighborhoods and conversations with Algerians, the rate was probably about 12 percent. None of this mattered, since elites generate results behind closed doors according to pre-arranged deals with some of the real and *faux* parties, created by the regime in the tradition of pre-independence French colonial elections, to split the opposition vote.²² Reporting a low turnout rate helped the results appear more plausible, and by all appearances, Election Day was problem free and electoral procedures “by the book.”

There is no need for physical violence when quiet coercion suffices. The expression of physical violence on the part of the powerful is actually the sign of a breakdown in a system of coercion—a shift from implicit to explicit violence whereby threats are no longer credible unless accompanied with actual acts of violence. This is a sign that the reputation for providing protection of property from predation and security for the population—the most primitive authoritarian state functions—are under threat (C. A. Anderson & Bandiera; McGuire & Olson, 1996). While opposition protest, particularly demanding public goods the regime cannot afford to provide, has prompted many authoritarian regimes to liberalize and hold elections (a decision I treat as exogenous to this theory), creating some uncertainty and risk (Hyde & Marinov, 2009), there are many reasons why election violence, like war, is a suboptimal strategy in a political contest (see p. 4).

²² Simulated, hypothetical election result tables and letter from Prefecture de Tiaret, 1ere Division, 3eme Bureau, no 60-40/1/3 to Le Prefet du Departement de Tiaret. July 20, 1960. *Wilaya de Tiaret 119 (323) Élections Cantonales 1960 [Box Number]*. Archives Nationales de l'Algérie.

Once an incumbent resorts to physical violence, it is a sign that implicit threats no longer work to achieve his ends. Incumbents often have access to more covert means of coercion, such as control of state jobs, zoning enforcement, and law enforcement. In Newark, for example, former city workers and union members told me they were fired or demoted when they refused to pay for the fundraising event tickets that incumbent Sharpe James included twice annually with their paychecks, expecting each employee to write a check for the ticket. One of the mayor's 1998 challengers said she pulled out of the race when police started following her family members. Volunteers for any opposing candidate over the years reported that the police placed hundreds of parking violation notices on their cars and those of family members. It was only when Cory Booker, a challenger with considerable outside financial and volunteer support and without family in the city (and therefore with more resources to engage in legal, nonviolent campaign activity), that Sharpe James resorted to more overt methods (Curry, 2005; Shoves, 2007; Wasow, 2007). However, James and his supporters still used tactics that drew little attention outside of the area and stopped far short of the type of election violence that characterized recent elections in Nigeria and the Ivory Coast.

In addition to having numerous means of legal and illegal, nonviolent electoral tactics at their disposal, incumbents also face higher reputational, if not actual, costs, of overt election violence. While incumbents have access to security forces, prisons, arms, and other resources useful to organizing violence, they pay higher reputational costs because they are responsible for security and protection of private property and must also consider external disapproval and sanctions from higher levels of government (Trounstine, 2008) or the international community (Hyde, 2011). Conventional wisdom means that domestic and international audiences will associate state violence, instability, and/or repression with a flawed election. Flawed elections are costly to regimes that want to signal their commitment to democracy to qualify for international benefits (Hyde, 2006). It is thus in the interest of an incumbent to limit visible violence by state security, her own supporters and candidates, and any challengers. Incumbents, therefore, will resort to covert means of coercion, especially those that create fear and compliance on the part of victims. It is difficult to prove and measure such covert tactics in the aggregate. For example, citizens who accept money for voting rarely know how much others have been paid and face a stigma and possible punishment for participating in the exchange. Similarly, those who are intimidated often fear reporting their experience or worry what others will think when they learn that a voter did not exercise a democratic right as the result of a threat. Placing

uniformed officers near polling stations in minority neighborhoods or distributing flyers suggesting that welfare benefits will be taken away if a person attempts to vote are two forms of intimidation that are both easy to deny and stigmatizing so that targeted individuals are less likely to discuss their common experiences and to report them to election authorities.

Because many incumbents enjoy more numerous legal and illicit ways to bias elections beyond ordinary incumbency advantage, challengers, who lack many means of influencing elections, may have a “first-mover advantage” in the use of election violence. Both uncommitted voters and their supporters view challenger violence more charitably than incumbent violence, particularly if it is a justice-seeking, moralistic response to unfair electoral biasing strategies or is framed as such. Greater scrutiny of incumbents during elections also increases their costs of responding with violence, which can bolster the nerve of challengers who would otherwise fear reprisals. While violence is suboptimal, challengers may deploy it earlier, at lower cost, particularly if the incumbent reveals some tangible evidence of electoral bias. In fact, many challengers make accusations of incumbent bias well in advance of violent acts as a way to increase their legitimacy. If electoral biasing favors the incumbent, the less credible are incumbent accusations of challenger fraud. In a less authoritarian setting in which all parties have some opportunities for legal campaign activity as well as fraud, the more credible justice-seeking violence will be in response to alleged fraud.

In the language of economics, the number of votes needed to win represents a production possibilities frontier for parties and candidates. As elections approach, the only options to influence the outcome are a combination of nonviolent legal and illegal campaigning, get-out-the-vote operations, fraud, and coercion. The incumbent and opponent face different marginal rates of technical substitution (MRTS) for nonviolent versus coercive inputs. The more authoritarian the polity in which the incumbent operates, the greater incumbency bias and the higher the MRTS for fraud compared to violence. Challengers, on the other hand, have more constraints and costs for using nonviolent means when incumbency bias is high. Their reputational costs of violence, however, are relatively lower than for the incumbent. Given that an election is taking place, the risk of repression or reprisals are also lower than they would be during a non-electoral period.

There may be threshold levels of violence each side would never surpass that are akin to budget constraints in economic models. In purely authoritarian elections with no competition, challengers are highly constrained in using violence, since the punishment is more likely and severe in

authoritarian regimes (Sung, 2006). This constraint will rise with democratization as the costs to incumbents for repression increase and the costs of protest and violence to challengers decrease. Previous research on violence supports this proposition, finding that polities are more vulnerable at middling levels of democracy (Goldsmith, 2010; Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch, 2001; P. Regan & Bell, 2009; P. M. Regan & Henderson, 2002). This project contributes to our understanding of why this is the case. Each pro-democratic institutional or regulatory change that evens the playing field to even a small degree, such as media access, independence of the judiciary and/or electoral management bodies, transparent ballot boxes, campaign finance reform, etc., shifts the MRTS for incumbents, challengers, or both, while neither knows precisely the degree to which the other's MRTS has shifted. During the adolescent stages of democratization, with each pro-democratic reform, the more similar the MRTS for nonviolent and violent campaigning becomes for all parties and candidates, creating risks and opportunities for election manipulation and violence. Electoral violence, then, can be a temporary by-product of efforts to "clean up" elections, as nonviolent means of influencing outcomes become more and more difficult.

During the adolescent stage of democracy, then, access to fraud and violence is likely to be more even for incumbents and challengers. In fact, international observers of Pakistan's 2008 elections used the term "equal opportunity fraud and violence" informally while discussing their assessment of the election as largely free and fair. No party was able to claim innocence in the use of a particular tactic at the aggregate level, though constituencies varied widely in the types, degree, and perpetrators of nonviolent electoral bias, intimidation, and physical violence. In Ghana's 2008 election, each party initiated approximately the same numbers of incidents, and most incidents were spontaneous events involving supporters of the various candidates. Prior to events in Kenya in 2007, the largest number of election-related deaths (800) in any country occurred during the 1980 election in Jamaica—rated as democratic by political scientists--and involved all competitors. India's elections are notoriously violent, but involve different constituencies, parties, and levels of government from one year to the next. In the United States during the past 30 years, when they use illicit means to manipulate elections, Democrats tend to have greater access to local political machines that deliver votes through fraud, vote buying, and turnout inflation. These measures can go beyond GOTV to become coercive "reverse vote-buying." Republicans, on the other hand, tend to turn to voter suppression and intimidation when facing close contests, putting individuals in fake police uniforms in

front of polling stations, for example, or sending party agents to challenge voters in democratic precincts (Donsanto, 2005). This is not unlike earlier periods of American history, though it seems to occur at a much smaller scale (Campbell, 2005). Unfortunately, then, a symptom of adolescent democracy at one or more levels of government can be first a “democratization of election fraud,” followed by a “democratization of election coercion and violence” as electoral reforms make nonviolent fraud more difficult.

I summarize the main empirical expectations for cross-national and subnational variation in election violence that follow from this reasoning below.

Empirical Expectation 2.3: At the cross-national level, the probability of election violence occurring in a given country and election will exhibit a curvilinear relationship with the degree of democracy. The probability of election violence is low in autocratic regimes but increases as a polity enters the adolescent stage of democratic transition, falling again with consolidation of democracy.

Empirical Expectation 2.4: At the national and subnational level, when incumbents use coercion, they use covert tactics more often than do challengers. In polities halfway between dictatorship and consolidated democracy, coercive campaigning and election violence are more common and balanced between incumbents and challengers.²³

Empirical Expectation 2.5: At the national and subnational level in young democratic polities, challengers are more likely to initiate violence than are incumbents, particularly of the justice-seeking variety. Accusations of fraud will precede the use of violence in adolescent democracies more often than in authoritarian or fully democratic contexts. This type of violence is most likely to occur spontaneously on Election Day or during the post-election phase of the election process.

Empirical Expectation 2.6: Constituency-level incumbents and challengers who are affiliated with the governing party at the next level of government (e.g., county, provincial, national) use overt violence less frequently than those who are members of an opposition party.

²³ This study examines authoritarian enclaves (Mickey, 2005) within democratic regimes and democratic enclaves (Gilley, 2010) within authoritarian regimes, so I refer to polities rather than countries unless discussing cross-national variation.

Empirical Expectation 2.7: If election violence occurs in a polity that is at the midpoint between dictatorship and full democracy, greater the diversity in the range of tactics and types of participants involved than in completely authoritarian or fully democratic contexts.

Empirical Expectation 2.8: The more democratic a polity, the greater the variance in timing, locations, levels of government, participants, and tactics involved in any election violence that occurs. Competitiveness of elections and constituencies, rather than locations of authoritarian or democratic enclaves, sites of socio-economic or ethnic conflict, and other “hotspots” of non-electoral violence, will better predict locations of election violence.

Proposition Three: Why does election violence become lethal in some places but not others?

Since 2007, inspired by international events, new research on election violence has focused, for the most part, on its large-scale manifestations in fragile democracies. These studies offer explanations similar to those common in the literature on political violence more generally, attributing it to macro-level variables such as economic contractions, socio-economic inequality, regime type, natural resources, ethno-religious cleavages, histories of violence, the presence of large, unemployed youth populations or other groups of potentially violent actors (see, e.g., Collier, 2009; Higashijima & Toyoda, 2011; Sharma & Kammerud, 2010; Straus & Taylor, 2009). Although extreme in severity and magnitude, however, recent episodes of election violence are not as new and unusual as we think, nor do they correspond predictably to linear changes in variables such as ethno-religious heterogeneity, inequality, tribal or kinship networks, or other factors frequently associated with developing countries. As Burnell writes in reference to this line of argument,

It is a curious but not often remarked fact that very much less attention is given in this specialized literature to explaining why some countries that share many of the same predisposing conditions (great and growing poverty; increasing inequality correlated with differential access to and misuse of high public office; and so on) have managed to avoid significant violent civil conflict (and electoral violence specifically). Zambia offers one such case.

There are many case studies, a few of which I reference on page four, that support Burnell's argument. In fact, many advanced democracies have experienced some election violence, often at a point in their histories when those competing and voting were from an homogenous, aristocratic class (Posada-Carbó, 1996; Rapoport & Weinberg, 2001b). Intimidation, coercion, and violence occurred--not just as democracy emerged, but throughout all phases of the process and within groups--persisting, in some cases, across a long series of elections.²⁴ On the other hand, while more recent, high-profile election violence occurs in polities with weak or developing electoral institutions, many poor, emerging democracies hold surprisingly peaceful elections despite deep cleavages and even otherwise active, ongoing conflicts.

²⁴ I distinguish between democracies and non-democracies with respect to the perpetrators, targets, and types of tactics used, but existing research indicates that the propensity for electoral manipulation exists in non-democracies and democracies alike (Christensen & Colvin, 2007; Donno & Roussias, 2009; Karahan, Coats, & Shughart, 2006).

Sri Lanka and Newark are societies divided geographically, economically, and linguistically--Sri Lanka, between Tamil and Sinhalese speakers, and Newark, between African-American, Latino (Portuguese, Brazilian, Puerto Rican, Ecuadoran, and others). Tamils and Sinhalese have engaged in active intra-ethnic warfare, while such differences in Newark are less overtly divisive. Just prior to the 2002 election, lawyers for both the Cory Booker and Sharpe James campaigns approached the U.S. Department of Justice, arguing that they expected inter-ethnic intimidation, which would justify application of the 1965 Voting Rights Act and relief in the form of unprecedented federal observation of a local election north of the Mason-Dixon line. However, upon inspection of the patterns of variation in election violence in both polities according to my typology, election violence occurs *within, not between* ethnic groups. In Newark, although both candidates were African-American, Cory Booker enjoyed support from Latino voters. The James campaign viewed these voters as more natural Booker supporters and did not even campaign as heavily in Latino areas, because it concluded that they would overwhelmingly support Spanish-speaking Booker. The real contest was for any undecided voters who resided in African-American neighborhoods. James resorted to a strange form of racial politics, arguing that Cory was not "Black Enough" to represent Newark and plastering signs all over these neighborhoods imploring voters to "Vote Black." Not surprisingly, most intimidation occurred in African-American precincts and consisted of turnout-inflating and suppressing activities.

Similarly, in Sri Lanka, despite a long history of political violence between Tamil and Sinhalese speakers, during elections, nearly all of the violence occurs between the two Sinhalese parties. The Sinhalese parties know that the Tamils will vote for Tamil parties and that the real competition for power is for the undecided or median Sinhalese voter. In fact, in a comparison of the main Tamil and English-language newspapers for several randomly selected two-week periods before two different elections, the English-language press reported numerous incidents involving the two main Sinhalese parties. The Tamil paper mentioned none of the same incidents. In fact, a reader of the Tamil press would barely detect that an election was underway because the Tamil vote was uncontested.²⁵ I expect that constituency-level competitiveness will explain the specific locations of violence within the Sinhalese areas from one election to the next. While inter-ethnic conflict is severe in Sri Lanka, election-related conflict is decidedly intra-ethnic in nature. A cross-national study with aggregate data would find an association between ethnic divisions and election violence, and Sri Lanka, summarized at

²⁵ I am grateful to my former Tamil-speaking Research Assistant, Vikram Sridhar, for conducting this research for his poster presentation for the University of Michigan Undergraduate Research Opportunity Program (UROP).

the national level, would look consistent with that finding. This is a stark example of ecological fallacy--possible errors in causal inference that stem from drawing conclusions about individual- and group-level behavior from statistics aggregated at higher units of analysis, either spatial or temporal.²⁶

India provides an example of inter-ethnic episodes of violence that nonetheless originate in intra-ethnic electoral competition. In one of the first systematic studies of the role of electoral processes in igniting conflict in locations with latent Hindu-Muslim cleavages, Wilkinson (2004) finds that ethnic riots in India are not uniformly related to geographic patterns of religious diversity and economic grievances. Instead, Hindu parties in constituencies where the Hindu vote is divided actively incite violence between Hindus and Muslims to unite the diverse Hindu vote. During public religious ceremonies and processions, for example, these Hindu groups provoke Muslim violence intentionally. Hindu nationalist groups fuel Hindu fears of the “other” to drive more voters toward identity-based, Hindu-nationalist parties. The scale and lethality of violence that erupt from these provocations are devastating, drawing international concern, but India also experiences less severe election violence at all levels of government that involves parties that differ on ideological and policy matters, not religion.

As the Newark, Sri Lanka, and India anecdotes illustrate, there are several ways in which ethnicity and other “predisposing” variables may have played a role in the dynamics of election coercion. All three polities have unusually high levels of social violence, supplies of arms, some degree of inter-ethnic tension, populations of unemployed youth, and economic inequality. While the Sinhalese parties do differ in their approach to the broader inter-ethnic conflict with the Tamils, that tension alone does not explain election violence, which has fluctuated since the 1960s across different constituencies and during time periods when the ethnic divide was less salient. While my future research will evaluate these factors at the subnational level using census data for units at or below that of the electoral constituency,²⁷ I am reluctant to venture empirical expectations about relationships between them given the large number of single-country case studies that point to complex interactions that the three foregoing anecdotes illustrate.

²⁶ Social science literature is replete with references to the potential problems in using associations found in aggregate data to make inferences about individual or group behavior at units of analysis lower than the level at which the data has been measured, with differing opinions about the extent to which it invalidates or calls into question causal inferences based on such data. Several studies discuss the specific problems of ecological fallacy with respect to data on violence and crime (Bernasco & Elffers, 2010; Groff, 2007; David Weisburd, Bernasco, & Bruinsma, 2009; D Weisburd, Bruinsma, & Bernasco, 2009; Zhukov, 2010).

²⁷ I have census data for Algeria (commune), Egypt (smallest administrative unit), Newark (census block), and Sri Lanka (polling division), but am still in the process of formatting all of the data and acquiring data for Ghana and Pakistan.

Instead, I view these variables as potential alternative explanations and develop geostatistical prediction models (kriging) derived from my theory as well as models implied by common demographic and socio-economic explanations for political conflict. I will evaluate the competing models by comparing them to the actual patterns of election violence I observe after mapping the incidents of violence in an election. Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis (Bailey & Gatrell, 1995; Caliber Associates & Virginia Department of Juvenile Justice, 2002) using census data may point to more explicit causal theory that helps us understand the mechanisms that connect these kinds of variables to individual acts of violence.

Insufficient to ignite election violence at particular times and places, social cleavages, economic inequality, prior violent conflict, ethnic and religious tensions, demographics, grievances, and other “usual suspects” in explaining violence are only part of the story. These factors do not explain how, when, where, and why parties, candidates, and their supporters initiate acts of election violence and coercion in the first place, but instead interact with proximate, election-specific circumstances and electoral institutions in ways that generate opportunities and risks for those who choose to turn to coercion as an electoral strategy. The state of knowledge on these interactions is too limited at this point to suggest more than one clear empirical expectation.

In my cross-national analysis, I use an original dataset of all election dates by country since 1945 with indicators of whether violence occurred or not, and if so, the number of injuries and deaths involved (Global Violent Elections Database, or GVED). I treat aggregate country-year measures of these predisposing factors as control variables. I model the *probability of coercive campaigning and election violence* as a function of my theoretical variables and then its *lethality and severity*, measured by deaths and injuries, are a function of common determinants of violence in the broader literature. This approach is consistent with studies of political violence that use the number of deaths as the dependent variable, but argues that precipitating incidents of violence and their eventual lethality should be modeled separately.²⁸

It is reasonable to expect positive relationships between election-related deaths and injuries and background factors. Past conflict and criminal violence may increase social tolerance for violence, requiring similarly high levels of election violence to influence behavior. Large populations of unemployed people, especially youth, accept payment to perpetrate violence more willingly and with

²⁸ Of course, I also evaluate my own and other alternative explanations for robustness to other model specifications.

less discretion than would educated people with families and jobs. Economic inequality and ethnic conflict, when accompanied by imminent probability of losing or gaining private benefits, may spark groups to use violence if the incumbent currently excludes one of them from benefits. Availability of arms and armed groups provide opportunities for politicians to find partners to carry out violence. Corruption rents or access to natural resources available only to the winner may make increase the benefits of winning at all costs and outweigh any reputational or direct costs of violence to economy and society. High corruption rents, in general, provide financing for illegal election activities, including violence.

All of these factors may create social tensions that contribute to escalation of violence in ways that are unrelated to the election through acts based on score-settling, predatory advantage of disorder, and misperceptions about the causes of election violence that attribute it to personal and group identity conflict, and class resentments, even when the motives are unrelated to such cleavages. Violent environments are often noisy with respect to dissecting the causes of violence at the aggregate level. Only an incident-based approach makes it possible to identify whether a series of violent events are ethnic, terrorist, secessionist, political, or criminal in nature. Nevertheless, I attempt to explore the extent to which these factors are associated with lethality of election violence at an aggregate level. I expect the cross-national data to exhibit the following correlations:

Empirical Expectation 3.0: Given that some form of election violence has occurred, the number of deaths and injuries will be higher in polities where

- 3.1** past conflict is recent and severe,
- 3.2** there is a history of identity conflict,
- 3.3** homicide rates are high,
- 3.4** arms per capita are numerous,
- 3.5** unemployment is high,
- 3.6** the under 25 age-group represents a disproportionate percentage of the population,
- 3.7** economic inequality is high, and
- 3.8** perceived corruption is high.

Proposition Four: Election Violence and Democratization

Election violence does not diminish in a linear fashion with the advent of free and fair elections and gradual consolidation of democracy but rather intensifies and peaks with procedural refinements of the electoral process and reforms of democratic institutions that make elections more resistant to manipulation and fraud. In fact, I argue that “arcs of election violence” help explain why democracies are most unstable, violent, and vulnerable to failure not at birth, but as they enter an adolescent stage of maturity (Fein, 1995; Hegre et al., 2001; Henderson & Singer, 2000; J. King, 1998; Krain & Myers, 1997; Muller & Weede, 1990; P. M. Regan & Henderson, 2002).

Elections can be precarious moments in transitional and even relatively established democracies, and election violence can make them even more dangerous. Ruling elites can use election violence as an excuse to rollback previous democratic reforms or slow the pace of transition by arguing that parties and candidates, based on their undemocratic, violent behavior, are not ready for democracy. When ruling elites that control government and security are nondemocratic and unaffiliated with political parties and reformers, they can blame parties and candidates for election violence and use it to justify democratic reversals. Citizens may more readily accept such reversals of democratization after observing that elections can threaten basic stability and personal security.

Experience with election coercion and violence can contribute to public disillusionment with democracy as a system of government (Jakarta Post, 2010; Mlobeli, 2011). As a commentator on elections in Uganda writes, “no democratic election will go by without sending chills down one’s spine! It comes seasoned with tension, fear, speculation and a lot of suspicion” (Chelimo, 2011). A Nairobi housewife in Kenya stated to a reporter, “It seems every time we vote, we bring a bloodbath upon ourselves. Why would we want another election” (Reuters, 2008)?

Scholars and practitioners also reconsider conventional wisdom that elections can be a solution to conflict and an important first step on the path to consolidated democracy when episodes of election violence erupt. Although election violence has at times escalated to the point where it causes or justifies temporary reversals of democratization and/or (re)ignites civil war, I argue that in the long term, election violence, on average, is one mechanism that helps explain democratic consolidation. Severe election violence, even that of the recent episodes of post-election violence in Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire, is often a sign that democratic institutions are, in fact, more robust than in the past, making it more difficult for incumbents or any other party to bias elections in their favor using manipulation of

institutions, electoral administration, procedures, or voters. When competition is fierce for an office that matters and quiet cheating is difficult, violence can be an unfortunate by-product of progress toward cleaning up elections.

Available historical evidence suggests that most established democracies experienced violence during the phases of democratization that are similar to those unfolding in today's emerging democracies. Violence and coercion flared, for example, during suffrage expansion, introduction of the secret ballot, creation of independent election authorities, enforcement of laws against bribery, and improvement of election dispute adjudication. Election violence seems to rise with democratization, punctuated at these moments of uncertainty in which the game becomes just a bit fairer, only to fall as competitors adjust strategies to fit the new rules and increase again later with the next reform. In the first scholarly effort within political science to address the subject as a systematic phenomenon rooted in democratization and election processes, Rapoport and Weinberg (2001b) cite several cases in which election violence prompted reforms aimed at reducing fraud more generally (pp. 28-31).

Incumbents in new democracies do not enjoy the luxury having had incremental suffrage changes over half a century (or more) or experimenting with public voice votes, public paper ballots, and enforced ballot secrecy. As a result, even the most committed authoritarians who choose to hold elections must accept minimum standards to have any credibility, including the presence of outside observers who evaluate the election against a crystallizing set of norms. What was, in the past, a more subtle and gradual process, has become condensed for young democracies. In Nigeria's April 2011 elections, for example, the zealous director of a more independent election commission introduced a robust, electronic system for verifying registration lists, making multiple voting more difficult, a measure associated with serious election-day violence. Uncertainty and unexpected electoral outcomes occur more often and in more countries than in the past, so it is not surprising that election violence of all kinds, particularly the severe post-election variety, is rising.

If my findings corroborate my expectation that violence tends to peak late in a democratization process, the recent spate of violent elections should, paradoxically, be read as a positive sign for the health of democratic institutions, if not individuals and economies. How these adolescent democracies, their citizens, and the international community interpret and respond to election violence, then, that can help make the difference between reversal and democratic consolidation. Perhaps better knowledge of how election violence starts and diffuses over time and space can lead to design of

institutions and electoral rules, procedures, and administrative processes that minimize election violence, fraud, and electoral bias, while also ensuring that dispute processes can resolve disagreements over the legitimate winner in the close elections that are likely to follow such reforms.

Major conflict followed Costa Rica's 1945 adoption of its still-current electoral law, Algeria's first (and only) competitive, multi-party legislative election in 1991; Wilmington, North Carolina's competitive election in which African-Americans won a majority but were then forced to leave the city (never to return); the hard-fought 1920 election in Florida; many elections to determine county seats in Kansas; and the unexpected results of Pakistan's 1970 election, all with devastating direct costs. Contemporary election violence that resembles examples like these should not justify delay of electoral democracy. In fact, reforms introduced and enacted in response to massive election violence in today's new democracies may be sweeping and comprehensive enough to hasten and avoid future long and painful episodes of flawed elections and conflict that have plagued the world's older democracies.

In the short term, unexpected electoral outcomes—one of the basic indicators of democracy—have sparked war and displacement, and, in some cases, reversal of democracy. Where reversals occurred, incremental reforms continued, perhaps as elites found new ways to re-establish electoral bias and reduce uncertainty in subsequent, semi-democratic elections, only to generate justice-seeking responses—violent and nonviolent. Such interventions included introduction of Jim Crow in the United States, banning parties and changing the electoral system in Algeria, and disqualifying candidates based on education in Pakistan, but eventually, further democratization becomes unavoidable, especially with advent of international norms, such as the secret ballot and election observation, and an international community that generally supports them.

Even in nondemocratic regimes, the introduction and repetition of *de jure* competitive elections generates momentum for democratization through this kind of iterative, often cumulative process of incremental institutional liberalization. Flawed elections stimulate mobilization for reform that leads to positive, if gradual, change (M. L. Anderson, 2000; S.I. Lindberg, 2009a 6-7). Each successive, slightly less flawed election, then, creates greater relative competition and uncertainty, altering incentives for violence and fraud so that actors resort to increasingly blatant forms of manipulation. Lindberg notes that blatantly unfair elections "...naturally may stimulate activism in society even more than free elections do" (2009b 328). As electoral reform expert Alan Renwick writes, "Electoral reform requires

real anger” (Renwick, 2010). For example, it was not until the most flagrant electoral misconduct drew outside media and federal attention to Kansas City and the Pendergast machine that reform began. Violence increased over time in subsequent elections as the machine tried to hold on to power, but it eventually declined. Incidentally, Kansas City was also the most homogenous American city at the time, with an African-American population of 9 percent and an immigrant population of 11 percent (Larsen & Hulston, 1997). Similarly, episodes of election violence prompted reform of police administration in Cincinnati and election reform in Louisville (Campbell, 2003).

Naturally, it would be ideal to achieve democratic consolidation without election violence, but the more severe contemporary episodes do appear to generate more sweeping reforms than did the decades-long processes in the now-advanced democracies. Because many interpret election violence as an indicator of a larger problem of election fraud, it can lead to broader, deeper reforms of campaign behavior than would fraudulent elections alone. The greater the severity of election violence, the more it motivates outraged citizens, the media, civil society, and/or affected segments of the private and security sectors to understand the effects of electoral law, management, and procedures, attracting disapproval and pressure from independent election authorities (if they exist), upper tiers of government, and, increasingly, the international community. This legitimizes and emboldens movements for democratization of electoral institutions and increases the costs to incumbents of repressing opposition and rigging elections with either fraud or violence. Following violent elections, winners may respond to vociferous demands by denouncing violence and implementing reforms, constraining future behavior. Following Costa Rica’s 1945 civil war, for example, election violence and fraud waned and the electoral code that was responsible, in part, for the uncertainty that led to war, became the accepted set of rules for future elections.

Unlike the private, stigmatized transactions involved in vote buying and other fraudulent tactics that occur for many years without detection, proof, or public outcry, physical election violence makes the issue of electoral reform immediately salient. I argue that, all other things being equal, the occurrence of election violence increases the likelihood of reform of *electoral institutions and systems of detecting and punishing election crimes*. When election violence is especially lethal, it is likely to provoke an extended conflict. Where it does not provoke more ongoing conflict, however, election violence is more likely to push the polity over what Davenport and Armstrong call “some threshold of domestic democratic peace” (2004, p. 539). I argue that survival and consolidation is more likely the

greater the experience with both noncompetitive and competitive elections in a country, since voters, candidates, and parties will have had more opportunities to adjust to uncertainties along the way and to otherwise practice participation, even in flawed elections, which may enhance knowledge of how the process *should* work. The more experience a polity has with democracy, the less likely the voters, candidates, and parties will see election violence as a reason to reject it as a form of government, but the more likely they will be to demand sweeping reform to make the system as free and fair as possible.

Empirical Expectation 4.1: The probability of pro-democratic electoral reform of all types will increase following episodes of election violence.

Empirical Expectation 4.2: The more severe the election violence that a polity has experienced, the greater will be the fines, prison terms, and the more extensive will be electoral remedies for violations of election crimes laws for *both nonviolent election fraud and undue influence*.

Empirical Expectation 4.3: The more diverse the types of coercive campaigning and election violence that a polity has experienced, the more complex and sweeping will be the types of fraud and undue influence prohibited in its current laws governing elections.

Methodology

I focus on a distinct political event as the unit of analysis around which all varieties of violence can occur. Political actors during election periods employ a range of violent and non-violent tactics, from vandalism to mass protest to bombing, which represent foci around which to feasibly measure and better understand the types of actors that participate in violence and variation, substitution, escalation, and de-escalation of tactics. I hope that this project strengthens and expands these “disaggregating” research agendas by demonstrating that, despite devastating consequences for individuals and the picture of senselessness and chaos that political violence paints, we can distinguish and measure its distinct forms, including terrorism, ethnic riots, civil war violence, and state repression, even if they occur simultaneously, and thus differentiate between explanations.

My substantive interests in Islam, political violence, and democracy in the Muslim world and my experience in South Asia and North Africa motivated my selection of cases for qualitative research and creation of the EVID database (Algeria, Pakistan, and Egypt). I conducted research in Algeria and Pakistan. Initially, I expected to focus only on election violence in these contexts and to analyze violence perpetrated by and against Islamist parties. With the addition of Egypt, I hoped to include

three Muslim majority countries with different colonial histories, ethno-linguistic cleavages, and resource endowments. However, as soon as I started conducting exploratory interviews with The Carter Center's Democracy Program staff and observed both rounds of Indonesia's presidential election in two islands prone to Hindu-Muslim violence 2004, I discovered that all types of parties--secular, religious, class-based, leftist, rightist, extremist--are involved in election intimidation and violence in the Islamic world and beyond. Anyone from or familiar with almost any country recommended that I include that country as a case. Suggestions in this early phase of my research included polities as diverse as Brazil, Nicaragua, Guyana, Colombia, Newark, East Saint Louis, East Chicago, Honduras, Peru, Guatemala, Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Nigeria, and South Africa. Together, the over 1000 case studies from various countries in the form of practitioner reports, books, book chapters, journal articles from a variety of disciplines, scholarly conference papers, and extended investigative journalistic reports together indicate that at least 198 countries, over 22 U.S. states, and many U.S. municipalities have experienced election violence at some point during their electoral histories.

The three cases that I include from the Muslim then, were included in the study without prior knowledge of their characteristics with respect to the dependent and independent variables. I then sought to add three additional cases in polities without Muslim majorities (Ghana, Sri Lanka, and Newark, New Jersey). While working with the staff of the Election Violence Education and Resolution (EVER) Program at the International Foundation for Election Systems, I had access to election violence data for Iraq and Ghana from the then fledgling EVER program. IFES selected Ghana's 2004 election as the first pilot-test of its election violence monitoring strategy because of the timing of the IFES election observation agenda and Ghana's willingness to allow violence observers, not because the country has levels of election violence more substantial than other countries. In contrast, because Sri Lanka is home to the world's first organization dedicated to collecting data on the topic, the Center for Monitoring Election Violence (CMEV), which began its work in 1997, IFES conducted an exploratory assessment of Sri Lanka when it first launched the EVER program. CMEV has considerable quantitative data on election violence in the country over several elections. Because the country has experienced great deal of election violence, the availability of monitoring data for Sri Lanka to compare with newspaper data represented an opportunity for me to assess the extent to which the media may overlook or exaggerate the extent of violence and to evaluate the external validity of my coding

methods and modeling strategies with additional data. The high levels of ethnic conflict and civil war violence during some years in which elections were also held allow me to distinguish between election-related and other forms of political violence and demonstrate that their characteristics and causes are distinct. I also chose Sri Lanka for its location in South Asia with a similar colonial history to that of Pakistan but with different religious and linguistic cleavages and electoral institutions. Finally, I decided to study Newark based on some knowledge that politicians there had used intimidation and violence over the city's electoral history. I mentioned my research to an acquaintance who worked in the Newark school system. She recommended that I conduct research there and helped me develop contacts. In comparison with other cities with histories of election violence, including Jersey City (Fisher, 2010), however, Newark has experienced considerably less, so I do not expect the case to bias my findings in my theory's favor.

I will employ exploratory spatial data analysis and visualization using a geographic information systems platform to analyze the original datasets of the features of violent, election-related incidents reported in major national newspapers four months before and one month after each of *at least two* elections in Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Newark, New Jersey. Where secondary census, election results, and other measures of relevant variables are available at the subnational level, I also employ geostatistics and spatially weighted regression, implemented in ArcGIS 10.0 and Geoda. The analysis of reported incidents is combined with constituency-level election results and possible determinants of incident lethality, such as ethnic diversity, economic inequality, and terrain. The Election Violence Incidents Database (EVID) includes narratives and micro-level coding of event dates, geographic locations, perpetrator and victim affiliations and positions, the *tactics used by each actor in each event* (from vandalism to bombings), deaths, injuries, property damage, and electoral consequences, as well as an index of report reliability indicators. EVID encompasses all elections since the 1960s for all six cases, the full analysis of which will be included in the book version of this project. Expansion of the dataset to additional countries and elections is the next step in a broader research agenda. Qualitative archival research, participant observation, and interviews conducted in Algeria, Pakistan, and Newark give context to the data. Independent election violence monitoring data enable model testing with "out-of-sample" datasets on the dependent variables for three of the six cases (Egypt, Ghana, Sri Lanka).

For all of the cases, election violence varies substantially over space and time and between local and national, legislative and executive elections. Until analysis is complete, it is impossible to know whether spatio-temporal patterns of violence and the disaggregated types of violence will be consistent with the theory, despite case selection strategy. Furthermore, I developed my theory and research design through a reading of general literatures in political science, my observation experience in Indonesia, Rapoport and Weinberg's seminal study of the topic in political science (2001a), and Lehoucq and Molina's careful longitudinal study of the content of election complaints in Costa Rica (F. E. Lehoucq & Molina, 2002). I also read a limited number of case studies from practitioners and other social science disciplines, such as criminology, sociology, history, and anthropology, to build the theory. Therefore, tests of the theory are carried out for cases other than those used to build the theory, which gives me additional confidence that inferences from the six cases will not bias my findings in favor of my hypotheses.

Table 4 summarizes variation on the theoretical and dependent variable for the six cases for the most recent election or date of data availability.

Table 4: Cases for EVID Incident and Qualitative Analysis

	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Algeria	Ghana	Egypt	Newark
Personal Vote Incentives (Lower House) (2007)²⁹						
<i>Ballot</i>	1	0.87	1 (1991) / 0 (2002-)	1	1	NA (USA: 2)
<i>Pool</i>	2	0	2 (1991) / 0 (2002-)	2	1	NA (USA: 1)
<i>Vote</i>	2	1.74	1 (1991) / 0 (2002-)	2	0	NA (USA: 2)
<i>BPV Index [(B+P+V)/3]</i>	1.7	0.87	1.3 (1991) / 0 (2002-)	1.7	0.67	NA (USA: 1.7)
Electoral System	FPTP	Open List PR	88-90: 2-Rnd Majoritarian SMD 96-Present: Closed List PR MMD	FPTP	2-round Majoritarian 2MD	2-round Majoritarian SMD plus 4 at-large
Current Polity Score (2010)	6	4	2	8	-3	NA (USA: 10)
Approximate number of incidents reported in the press during a 5-month period surrounding most-recent election for which data are clean	700 (2008)	500 (2004)	40 (2007 municipal)	50 (2008)	40 (2008)	40 (2002)

My research design also includes cross-national analysis of three original datasets. The Global Violent Elections Database (GVED) indicates whether each national election worldwide between 1945 and 2005 included violence, fraud, or both, along with number of injuries and deaths, if any, combined with electoral system and competitiveness data. The Global Election Dates Dataset includes dates of changes in voting age, the secret ballot, changes in suffrage rules, major electoral reforms, constitutional changes, referenda, and other measures of institutional change. The Election Laws on Election Crimes (ELECD) database, which includes disaggregated information on the most recent electoral legislation in either constitutions, electoral laws, or their amendments, for over 180 countries. Each law was coded for information on the independence of electoral management bodies, the presence or absence of laws on numerous nonviolent and coercive election crimes, the fines, prison terms, and electoral remedies for each, if they exist, and the nature of the dispute adjudication process should contenders allege that election crimes have been committed. To assess the role of election violence in contributing to “democratization by elections” thesis, the cross-national statistical analysis

²⁹ I use the measures and data created by Johnson and Wallack (2007), which builds upon the landmark study by Carey and Shugart (1995).

uses ELECD indicators as dependent variables, modeling the severity and complexity of current national election crimes laws as a function of a country's past experience with election fraud and violence. Descriptions of the datasets are included in the Appendix to this document. These original data are combined with data created by other scholars on incentives to cultivate a personal vote, degree of democracy, and control variables such as ethno-linguistic diversity and poverty to model the hypothesized relationships between the probability of violence, its lethality, and its endogenous effect on electoral reform.

Appendix: Description of Datasets

1. Election Violence Incidents Database (EVID) (1954-2008, 6 cases/countries): Daily event data for 5-month windows in up to 16 elections in Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Newark, NJ, Pakistan, & Sri Lanka

The Election Violence Incidents Database (EVID) is a daily event dataset that quantifies incidents of election coercion and violence, as defined in the election laws of most countries (see ELECD). The first version of EVID includes data for elections beginning as early as 1954 in six cases (Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Newark, New Jersey). Research assistants read all stories on politics, elections, and violence in the most independent, longest-published European-language newspaper during a five-month “electoral window” surrounding each national executive or legislative election, identifying incidents of election-related coercion. Each incident falling under the legal category of “undue influence” was hand-coded with indicators as to (a) whether it was **isolated, planned, part of a campaign of intimidation, or spontaneous**; (b) whether and how many **people were injured, killed, detained, or kidnapped**; (c) the nature and extent of any **property damage**; (d) geographic **location (latitude and longitude of street address or centroid of smallest identifiable administrative unit)**; and (e) involvement of **up to five actors with up to four actions each**. Each actor or property is coded for (1) **type** (e.g., state, civilian, business, ethnic group, etc.) and affiliation (e.g., party, election official, etc.); (2) **size**; (3) **gender**; and (4) whether it is involved as **perpetrator, participant, or victim** in the incident. The actors are associated with all of the acts they perpetrated in the incident among **64 types of undue influence**, such as barricades to block voters, verbal harassment, curses or other forms of spiritual coercion, vandalism, and physical or deadly force. This **micro-level disaggregation of actions** enables secondary coding of incidents.

For example, summarizing action and actor characteristics allows me to differentiate between actions that **escalated from minor to major violence** and those that began with a single deadly act, **intra- versus inter-party violence**, and **directionality and intentionality** of violence. Also included are **21 indicators of report quality**, such as the presence of neutral witnesses and whether the identity of the perpetrator was disputed. I developed and pilot-tested the incident identification and coding strategies in consultation with the International Foundation for Election Systems Election Violence Education and Resolution (EVER) program and teams of research assistants at the University of Michigan and Pakistan’s Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN).

EVID currently includes the elections listed below for each case, the most recent two of which will be analyzed initially. The remaining data will be analyzed for a book on the topic. There are a few elections in each case for which data is missing due to problems accessing microfilm (indicated below). Pending funding, I will continue updating the database for these cases for more recent elections and expand the historical EVID database to include additional countries. I plan to seek funding to implement a publicly available, internet-based, real-time automated system to code a simpler set of EVID variables for contemporary national elections around the world using online newspapers.

- **Algeria (19 elections):** *El-Moudjahid*, 1967-1990, *El-Watan*, 1991, 1998, 2007, but missing two elections in the 1990s and two in the early 2000s (Very few incidents were reported before 1990, when competition and malfeasance occurred at the ruling FLN party meetings, which were largely secret. Supplements to the *El-Moudjahid* data are planned using *Revue de Presse Mensuelle*, which has been published since 1969 by the Catholic Diocese and describes incidents at FLN meetings.)
- **Egypt (3 elections):** *Al-Ahram*, 2005, 2008, 2010 (2010 data from Ushahidi network)

- **Ghana (9 elections):** *Daily Graphic*, 1960-2008; except 1969, 1992, and 2000; *Ghanaian Chronicle* and *IFES monitoring data*, 2004, 2008
- **Newark (13 elections):** *Star-Ledger*, 1954-2006; except 1978, 1982
- **Pakistan (10 elections):** *Dawn*, 1970-2008, including 2005 local government elections. For the 2008 elections, incidents in all of the major English and Urdu-language newspapers (*Dawn*, *Nation*, *News*, *Jang*, *Khabrain*) and in reports from approximately 7,000 polling stations observed by FAFEN were coded. This data permits comparison between observer reports and two types of newspapers.
- **Sri Lanka (14 elections):** *Daily Times*, 1952-2008, except 1977 and 2000

2. Election Laws on Election Crimes Database (ELECD) (180 countries): *Electoral crimes (fraud and undue influence) legislation in force as of 2005*

The Election Laws on Election Crimes Database (ELECD) includes variables for **individual laws** containing legislation on election crimes for approximately 180 countries. In its present form, ELECD includes only the most recent electoral law or constitutional provisions still in force as of 2005. Where there are multiple laws per country, the observations can be combined to create country-level variables. The variables indicate whether the law prohibits **18 non-violent election crimes**, such as vote buying, bribery, and economic coercion, and **39 crimes of undue influence** (intimidation and coercion). If the crime is proscribed, the variables include the **minimum and maximum prison terms**, **finest in local currency**, and **years of electoral ineligibility**. Where penalties for election crimes are governed by a country's penal code, only an indicator that the crime invokes the penal code is provided due to the challenges of obtaining complex penal codes for each country. In general, across different countries, invocation of the penal code is more severe than any penalty specified only in electoral legislation (Interview with Craig Donsanto, U.S. Department of Justice Election Crimes Branch, Public Integrity Section, September 2005). Finally, the database also includes the types of **actors empowered to file complaints**, the **number of days** they have to do so, the deadline for a decision by the electoral authority, **what entities incur filing fees**, and whether and under what circumstances **electoral remedies can be applied**.

The database does not include executive orders and administrative regulations. When the electoral laws and constitutional provisions define the **nature and independence of electoral management bodies** (e.g., election commissions, Ministries of Interior), the database includes variables indicating the rank of various agencies, the **number of members**, **term of office**, **nature of nomination and appointment**, **jurisdiction**, and their **areas of responsibility** (e.g., boundary delimitation, dispute resolution, security). Pending funding, I plan to expand this dataset to include all electoral legislation and regulations for a country. For the above six EVID cases, examination of the legislation over time suggests, however, that the definitions of and penalties for election crimes remain relatively static over time, so that adjusting fines for inflation can be used to approximate penalty severity across multiple years.

3. Global Violent Elections Dataset (GVED) (1945-2005, 207 countries): *Indicators of election fraud and violence and deaths, if any, in national legislative and executive elections*

The Global Violent Elections Dataset (GVED) (1945-2005) is based on the printed version of *Keesing's Record of World Events/Keesing's Contemporary Archive* and the EDATES dataset described below, supplemented by additional sources when appropriate. It provides indicators that identify whether each national-level election between 1945 and 2005 was accompanied by **protest, intimidation, violence, and/or fraud**; the modal **timing** of violence (pre-election, election day, post-election); whether **oppositions and/or regimes** perpetrated fraud and violence; approximation of the number of **deaths, injuries, riot participants, forces deployed, and detentions** associated with this violence; and the **effect of violence and/or fraud on the election's outcome**. Pending funding, updating and refinement of this dataset will be ongoing.

4. Global Election Dates Dataset (EDATES) (1890-2005, 207 countries): *Dates (month, day, and year) for all national elections with suffrage type, voting age, ballot secrecy, and other general variables*

The Global Election Dates Dataset (EDATES) (1890-2005) provides the month, day, and year for all national elections (legislative, executive, referenda, constitutive assembly elections, by-elections for national office, and data for some municipal and regional elections when simultaneous with national elections). The period covered for each country begins with either (a) the date of universal male suffrage; or (b) independence, with the exception of Russia, China, and Eastern Europe *for all (207) countries in the world*. Countries not listed with country codes in the now-standard Correlates of War dataset (Gibler & Sarkees, 2002; J. D. Singer, 1990) because of their small size or disappearance from the state system *were included if they were found to have a national election during the time period of the database*. The earliest date included in the dataset is 1789, the average date of entry into the dataset is 1904, with a complete dataset of national elections from **1890-2005**. The dataset also includes variables indicating which of **ten types of elections** (lower-/upper-house, indirect elections, partial legislative, bye-elections, etc.) was contested, which **round of the election** occurred on that date, whether **multiple parties** contested, **who was given suffrage rights** (white male taxpayers, workers, universal, etc.), the **voting age** in place at the time of election, the **number of consecutive days of polling** if elections lasted more than one day, whether voting was **compulsory**, and whether the **secret ballot** was *de jure*. Pending funding, updating and refinement of this dataset will be ongoing. I hope to expand it to include dates for municipal and regional elections, as well as colonial elections (dates for Algeria already completed).

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