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More than Just the Final Straw

Stolen Elections as Revolutionary Triggers

Philipp Kuntz and Mark R. Thompson

Disillusionment with the failings of post-cold war democratization has grown steadily over the last decade. Many countries are no longer going through a rocky phase of democratic consolidation but have instead become “electoral authoritarian.”¹ While the reasons for such democratic decay are manifold, one aspect is noteworthy from a cross-national perspective: widespread political apathy in the face of a drift towards electoral authoritarianism. This is all the more remarkable given that recent waves of democratization in eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa have been characterized by transitions “from below,” with popular protest movements playing a decisive role.² Many examples—among them Milošević’s Serbia, Shevardnadze’s Georgia, and Ukraine under Kuchma—reveal that people can remain passive even in the face of gross human rights violations and/or a thorough corruption of government.

Yet only a short time after such pessimistic diagnoses, tens or even hundreds of thousands of citizens poured onto the streets of Belgrade (2000), Tbilisi (2003), and Kiev (2004), full of determination to get rid of their electoral authoritarian rulers. Vitali Silitski has nicely summarized why so many people were astonished by these revolutionary “eruptions” in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine: “The greatest story in all three revolutions is the emergence of a true democratic spirit in societies written off by many observers (often including insiders) as passive, indifferent, submissive, and inherently unfit for democracy.”³ Not only opposition activists, but also powerholders were caught by surprise. It was only a matter of weeks or even days before these regimes surrendered power. How can such a sudden and powerful mass mobilization be explained?

The crucial turning point occurred only a short time before people started demonstrating. Massive antiregime protests broke out after “soft” authoritarian rulers engaged in blatant electoral fraud. More precisely, interference in the electoral process occurred at the last moment: conventional, that is, more subtle means of keeping elections under control in advance had failed. It became a common perception that the opposition had actually defeated the regime. The last resort for cornered autocrats was to falsify crudely the final results or to annul the electoral contest altogether.

Stolen elections can be defined as elections in which the regime hinders an actual or perceived opposition victory at the ballot box through blatant manipulation of the vote count or by annulling the electoral result itself. While in a normative sense every act

of manipulation amounts to an act of stealing, it is useful to reserve the word “stolen” for elections in which the regime is believed to have lost the voting despite attempts at manipulation. Ordinary people can reach this conclusion in several different ways. Sometimes rulers are so surprised by electoral defeat that voting officials start publishing actual results before they receive orders to stop counting (or they go through with the count, only to have the election annulled altogether). In other cases, exit polls and parallel vote counts provide solid evidence for the actual outcome. International and pro-opposition media as well as movement activists can easily spread such information in a heightened postelectoral atmosphere. There is the possibility of hype in this process (what ultimately matters is the perception of an election’s being stolen), but usually the opposition’s claims are based on some kind of credible evidence.⁴

Understood this way, a stolen election is not just the final straw that breaks the autocrat’s back. Rather, it constitutes a powerful transformatory event which fundamentally reshapes political contestation and thus deserves to be distinguished from other forms of electoral fraud. This finding is not only of interest to students of contemporary democratization. Through an analysis of stolen elections as triggering events, a useful contribution can also be made to the study of revolutions. As the next section will show, attempts to emphasize revolutionary precipitants have encountered persistent academic resistance. By systematically demonstrating the impact of a short-term event like stolen elections, this mainstream view can be challenged.

The significance of stolen elections will be shown in three ways. First, a model will be introduced that reveals the potential for theorizing this triggering event among different groups of actors: citizens, activists, and regime members. Second, stolen elections will be situated in the structural context of electoral authoritarianism. Blatant cheating on the scale of annulling an opposition victory is crucial in overcoming strong collective action barriers that are peculiar to this type of regime. Third, stolen elections were more than just the final straw in the democratic uprisings that swept away the autocratic regimes of Slobodan Milošević, Eduard Shevardnadze, and Leonid Kuchma. Had stolen elections been merely the spark igniting an already explosive situation, then other, equally reprehensible political acts should have yielded a similar effect. Finally, examination of other cases beyond Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine can determine how far the argument about stolen elections can be carried.

Triggering Events and Theories of Revolution

Disagreement over long-term versus short-term causes has plagued the sociology of revolutions since its beginnings, but differences of opinion became more pronounced in the twentieth century. Scholars in the natural history of revolution tradition reserved a place for triggering events, as did later theories or syntheses written in less metaphorical language. While the link between triggers and revolutionary consequences remained

undertheorized, at least precipitants were recognized as being of potential importance.⁵ Not surprisingly, proponents of the structuralist school, who assumed the impact of long-term developments to be overriding, by and large ignored the events immediately preceding a revolution. Well-known works by Barrington Moore, Jeffery Paige, and Theda Skocpol are telling in this respect.⁶ Skocpol, the most influential structuralist theorist of revolutions, is best known for her resolute rejection of voluntarism, but her account leaves equally little room for the impact of short-term events.

Although purely structuralist accounts no longer dominate the study of revolutions—Charles Kurzman speaks of a poststructuralist consensus—skepticism about the importance of short-term events persists.⁷ Only recently have some scholars identified short-term temporality as a neglected topic and started to build a new research agenda around it.⁸ But so far existing studies are dominated by approaches stressing general “eventfulness.” Sometimes this involves a culturalist emphasis, in which the cultural transformation brought about by key events is stressed over resource distributional and political consequences.⁹ In other cases where such factors are emphasized, a series of crucial events (“accelerators”) are considered as stepping stones to revolution.¹⁰ But this view neglects singular events that lead to rapid political change (metaphorically forging a river directly to revolution).

As no systematic attempt has yet been undertaken to demonstrate the key role played by a trigger, strong objections persist against conceding such events much causal importance. Michael Kimmel, for example, in his standard account of revolutions, acknowledges triggers as an indispensable prerequisite but stresses the need to search for the “structural roots” of revolutions. He likens prerevolutionary situations to a house that is “vulnerable to a stray spark from a match” because it consists of highly flammable materials. Once the house has burnt down there is a danger of mistaking the immediate reason for the long-run causes. “A stray match does not cause a fire; it creates the missing—often accidental—ingredient in the fire-prone situation.”¹¹ Precipitating events in this picture are replaceable because it does not really matter what exactly starts the fire. Edgar Kiser and Margart Levi offer a more scathing critique. They applaud the structuralist perspective for being aware “that the events most immediately preceding revolutions are ‘trigger events’ rather than causes.”¹² In this perspective, short-term precipitants have lost any relevance.

How may this dismissal be founded on empirical grounds? Timothy Wickham-Crowley, another outspoken critic, who ascribes only a “severely limited causal role” to triggering events, argues that explanations focusing on precipitants resemble the (now widely despised) volcano model of revolutions.¹³ A common objection against this approach has been comparative, and Wickham-Crowley mounts a similar challenge to the analysis of triggering events. Are there not numerous similar incidents which were *not* followed by a “volcanic social response?”¹⁴ Why then should triggers be taken at all seriously in explaining revolutions?

This objection remains valid only if the properties of sufficient (or quasi-sufficient) conditions are ascribed to triggers and their potential is judged independently of the context in which they are operating. The fact that the same event does not lead to a

revolution everywhere (or not even in most of the cases) does not disprove the role it might assume in a specific context (for instance, a stolen election in an electoral authoritarian system). Instead it might be appropriate to reveal first a trigger's significance for a smaller set of cases by employing before-after research designs. In a second step it can then be determined if generalizations across time and space are possible. Critics furthermore overlook that triggers may be related to revolutionary outcomes as well: their nature can decide whether a movement triumphs over the state's security forces and may influence who prevails if the old order collapses.

On the surface, disagreement over the place triggers deserve in revolutionary theory stems from disagreement about their actual causal importance. There may well be a methodological fear involved as well. Would not bringing triggers back in mean opening the door to ever more contingency in the explanation of revolutions, increasing the number of idiosyncratic case studies?¹⁵ Without doubt, any inclusion of short-term events will result in less parsimonious explanations. But this does not mean that triggering events can not be understood theoretically. Precipitants such as stolen elections can be linked to well-established theories, above all the rich literature on social movements. In addition, it is possible to contextualize triggering events, that is, to show their relationship to longer-term structures.

Stolen Elections as Triggering Events: A Model

This article is not the place for a comprehensive typology of triggering events or a review of their role in a variety of revolutions. A single example may be enough to cast severe doubt on the view that there is no purpose in studying triggers, as this position is expressed in a very general fashion. The point will be exemplified by offering a model of stolen elections—an authoritarian regime trying to reverse the outcome of an election that has already been lost (de facto or at least in the perception of most people concerned). Stolen elections greatly enhance the chances for staging a democratic revolution in an electoral authoritarian system. Democratic revolutions are largely nonviolent popular uprisings that take place with the goal of bringing about a democratic transition. Analytically, this variable can be split up into a revolutionary situation (the best indicator being mass mobilization) and a revolutionary outcome (the accomplishment of regime change).¹⁶

In order to explain why this exemplary trigger is so powerful, it is also necessary to distinguish between different groups of actors: ordinary citizens, opposition activists, and regime elites. By showing that in an ideal-type situation the influence of stolen elections occurs at several levels, the significance of triggering events in overcoming collective action problems can be underlined.

Stolen Elections and Ordinary Citizens A stolen election increases ordinary people's willingness to participate in antiregime protests for two main reasons. On the one hand, it

conveys a strong message that a political opportunity for staging an uprising has emerged. This is important for individual calculations of the risks and chances of protesting before deciding to join in.¹⁷ On the other hand, stolen elections produce deeply felt and widely shared grievances.

The perception of a golden opportunity for rebellion results partly from the impression that large numbers of people are prepared to join antiregime protests. The fact that the regime has lost the election, often by an overwhelming margin, documents exactly how widespread dissatisfaction has become. Under less than democratic circumstances anger may be widespread, but it may also be hidden from view. When the opposition wins an election, private preferences become public, and individuals in society learn they are not alone in their dislike of the regime. Collective action seems likely to receive broad-based support within society, reducing the chances of sanctions and approaching the critical mass necessary for toppling the regime.¹⁸

A sense that the moment of decision has arrived can also be inferred from more direct signs of regime weakness. For reasons considered below, a stolen election is likely to undermine regime cohesion and lead to open splits within the ruling elite. Such a development can spur popular protest because it indicates that the repressive capacities of the authorities have diminished. A stolen election also changes people's impression of the top leadership, especially those hardliners who bear responsibility for stealing the vote. The loss of an election deals a serious blow to the rulers by shattering their nimbus of invincibility. Electoral authoritarians are often skilful tacticians who gain a reputation even among their adversaries for knowing how to play the game. For them, suffering electoral defeat is especially devastating because it destroys their reputation as political masterminds. The image of vulnerability may be fostered if the regime is so wrong-footed by the opposition victory that its postelectoral maneuvers look visibly helpless (for example, when delaying the announcement of final results). At the same time, people's sense of political efficacy has increased because it was they who inflicted the defeat upon the regime.¹⁹

The subjective emergence of a political opportunity is by no means a purely cognitive affair. It also possesses a strong emotional dimension.²⁰ Feelings of optimism and hope, enthusiasm and joy, empowerment and pride characterize the postelectoral mood. The psychological impact will be particularly strong in societies in which the regime had previously appeared unshakable. Having lost the electoral contest, rulers can be zestfully ridiculed like the emperor without clothes.

The second way in which stolen elections contribute to societal mobilization is by creating a set of powerful grievances. Depriving people of their victory at the ballot box leads to the disappointment of expectations built up during the opposition's election campaign. However naive it may appear to outsiders, it is striking how enthusiastically voters participate in such elections although there appears little chance that the regime would accept defeat. Casting one's ballot is nonetheless seen as a promising way of bringing about political change. Such hopes appear particularly well founded under the conditions of electoral authoritarianism, where manipulation is less comprehensive or at

least less visible to the voters. Outrage when the election is stolen is correspondingly great. Frustrated hopes set stolen elections apart from many other incidents of authoritarian injustice that are not preceded by increasing expectations.²¹

Moreover, it should already be clear that postelectoral dissatisfaction is deeply moral in nature. In James Jasper's phrase, one can speak of "moral shocks" caused by stolen elections.²² Moreover, blatant fraud works like a magnifying glass in that it focuses on the unjust character of the regime. Even if the regime had little popular legitimacy before the election, the actual stealing of the result creates a clear moral front between the people's will and an evil regime bent on thwarting it.

Again, this focus is of particular importance in an electoral authoritarian setting. Such regimes are not completely devoid of formal legitimacy, or at least people do not see them as outright dictatorships. As the participation before stolen elections indicates, institutional channels are still regarded as holding the potential for change. A flagrant stealing of the vote, however, rips away the last remnants of regime legitimacy and removes whatever doubts there may have remained about the rightfulness of revolutionary action. Disrespecting the choice of the electorate deeply offends people's dignity as citizens, engendering a strong sense of moral obligation to join protests that can outweigh the perceived costs of participation or overcome a possible free rider dilemma.

It is not only the quality of grievances (fundamentally heightened and morally grounded) that matters after a stolen election, but also the extent to which these grievances are shared among the population. While authoritarian regimes constantly violate citizens' rights, few incidents personally affect most of the populace at the same time. Stolen elections do. Stealing the results creates an imagined community of millions of robbed voters.

Advantages for Opposition Activists All of the mechanisms elaborated so far can also be applied to the narrower group of opposition activists. Yet it makes sense to deal with them separately because of their specific task of mobilizing the population. Stolen elections facilitate this effort in two respects. First, it becomes easier to create resonant collective action frames.²³ Second, in terms of the resource mobilization paradigm, at the moment an election is stolen, opposition activists already have an effective organizational apparatus at their disposal.

Revolutionary activists offer their own interpretation of the political situation in order to draw people into antiregime protests. The resonance of social movement frames partly depends upon their credibility. A well-defined and strongly emotionalizing event like a stolen election helps in constructing the right frames. Diagnostic framing, with its attribution of blame to the regime, now coincides with people's first-hand experience of electoral manipulation. The same holds for the opposition's attempts to convey a sense of urgency. Quick reaction is required before the window of opportunity, temporarily opened by the election, closes again. The opposition's shopworn talk about the need for urgent action suddenly sounds very convincing.

Electoral campaigning improves the opposition's organizational capabilities. It is

rarely enough just to have a convincing message against an adversary who enjoys vast structural advantages. The opposition also needs to form a broad coalition, choose a common candidate, redouble its efforts to reach out to voters, and engage in poll-watching activities. Building a broad electoral coalition can be extremely difficult for opposition parties, and divide-and-rule strategies are common tools of electoral authoritarians. But it may be even harder to forge a united front seeking revolutionary change. As long as the system is not entirely closed, factions of the opposition may opt for more moderate means of challenging the regime (not to mention the possibility of their being coopted). Once an election is called, pressure for opposition unity rises, and those who do not join a coalition may be marginalized during the electoral campaign. But even if divisions persist, a broad-based coalition is likely to emerge after the elections as the regime becomes the object of popular protest that has entered a revolutionary phase.

Opposition unity often finds its expression in the selection of a single candidate who runs for president or prime minister. Campaigning creates strong ties between him or her and the voters, particularly through personal campaign appearances since opposition presence in the media is often severely limited. By the time of the election a clear leader figure has emerged. Door-to-door canvassing efforts by volunteers and a push to get out the vote on election day further contribute to the opposition's organizational capabilities. Perhaps most important, the opposition often tries to create a network of independent election observers to come up with a vote count independent of the government's. Not only is this task crucial in showing that the elections have in fact been stolen, but it also generates a network of activists that can be mobilized for further collective action after the balloting. In short, efforts to achieve victory at the ballot box enhance capacities for postelectoral mobilization as well.

A similar point can be made regarding international assistance. Foreign support is often crucial in overcoming the tremendous hurdles set up by an electoral-authoritarian regime. By aiding the construction of campaign and poll-watching infrastructures, external actors simultaneously prepare the ground for ensuing protest movements. Under normal circumstances it is extremely difficult for outsiders to promote political participation among an apathetic citizenry (let alone to encourage the emergence of a powerful popular movement). Yet when foreign assistance is targeted at electoral contests, it can contribute to the outbreak of massive protest movements. It is no coincidence that international actors, who want to stem the current tide of electoral authoritarianism, have increasingly been drawn to elections as focal points.

Ultimately, however, it depends on domestic circumstances whether a strategy of promoting electoral revolutions from abroad succeeds. Moreover, the impression of massive external interference in recent colorful revolutions (often exaggerated to the point that foreign forces are depicted as pulling the strings) may provoke drastic authoritarian countermeasures. As a consequence, electoral playing fields have become less competitive, and promotion of international democracy a more difficult endeavor.²⁴

The Impact on the Regime Elite Stolen elections are not only triggers in society. They

can also lead to open rifts among regime elites. Elite defections are important for several reasons. Citizens perceive them as an indicator of regime weakness, which in turn will spur their willingness to engage in acts of protest. Mobilization will also be facilitated once the state-controlled media machinery crumbles from within. Last but not least, elite divisions undermine the ability to repress mass mobilization. Even when its legitimacy is low, a regime can hold onto power by retaining the loyalty of key civilian officials and military elites. But a stolen election is likely to undercut this loyal behavior sufficiently to weaken the regime severely. As a consequence, not only the probability for a revolutionary situation, but also the likelihood of a revolutionary outcome increases


Why do stolen elections put the loyalty of the regime staff to the test? One reason is that the unjust character of the regime has become obvious to its own members. A loss of elite legitimacy may be crucial for a peaceful uprising, as examples from Communist eastern Europe demonstrate.²⁵ Ideology is far less important in electoral authoritarian systems, but upholding certain democratic standards is of genuine concern for at least some members of the elite. Having long cooperated within a pseudo-democratic framework, they become disgusted by the blatant disregard of the people's will and side with regime opponents due to genuine feelings of shame.

More frequently, however, defections from the ruling circle occur out of strategic calculation. The election showed that the current regime lacks legitimacy and that an alternative center of power has emerged, backed by a large part of the population. Now that the regime has been openly questioned and is under great pressure, beneficiaries of the current system have to take a stance: either to stick with a discredited leadership or abandon it. Many prefer to change sides before it is too late. On the other hand, parts of the elite may have been plotting ways of ousting the leadership for some time already. They may have never had an opportunity to translate their plans into action, however. The weakening of the regime internationally and domestically after a stolen election signals that the time to take action has come. Simultaneously, it becomes harder for these groups or individuals to assume power by themselves. It is difficult to replace the current leadership in order to install another dictatorship since a new opposition center of power, backed by an unambiguous popular mandate, has surfaced. In sum, it may be said that a stolen election has an enabling and constraining effect on regime defections. The main arguments presented here are summarized in Figure 1.

The Structural Context of Stolen Elections as Triggers

The discussion thus far has shown that a multitude of causal mechanisms can be specified when modeling the triggering effect of a stolen election. In addition, theory building is possible through locating triggering events in their structural environment. Examples of the event-structure relationship between stolen elections and electoral authoritarianism have already been mentioned, but in the following the focus shifts directly to the question why this specific kind of election fraud helps to ripen such regimes for revolution.

Figure 1 Stolen Elections as Revolutionary Triggers



From one point of view, to stage an uprising in an electoral authoritarian regime appears to be a comparatively easy task. Unlike in “harder” authoritarian regimes, there are no intricate communication problems to be overcome, and the fear of suffering from repression is much lower for would-be protesters. Such relatively open political environments probably formed a necessary background condition for the postelectoral uprisings considered in this article. On the other hand, many recent studies of revolution claim that revolutions occur only in highly exclusionary political contexts and/or regimes that resort to violent, arbitrary repression. People are forced to rebel because rulers show no willingness to reform, offer no channels for political participation, and/or indiscriminately repress political opponents. Sultanistic dictatorships (like Nicaragua under Somoza) or posttotalitarian Communist rulers defying reform (such as Honecker in East Germany) had to be brought down through popular uprisings, while in neighboring countries insurrections were not encompassing enough to achieve a revolutionary breakthrough or regimes were transformed through negotiation between softliners who dominated the government and a moderate opposition.²⁶ More open or institutionalized systems are likely to divert revolutionary pressure or avoid its emergence in the first place. Paraphrasing Leon Trotsky, people resort to revolutionary action only if there is “no other way out.”²⁷ Jeff Goodwin claims that “[e]ven imperfect and poorly consolidated democracies tend to diffuse revolutionary pressures.”²⁸

It follows from this argument that electoral authoritarian regimes are rather resistant to revolutions since they allow relatively extensive political pluralism and outright acts of repression are not common. Most important, elections, while not providing an even playing field, are held on a regular basis and often develop into fierce contests. Opposition

parties may find it hard to form a broad revolutionary coalition under such circumstances. A plethora of them typically exists, and some factions may simply prefer to vie for power through institutionalized channels. With elections still an option, it is also more difficult to draw broader support from society. Citizens may prefer to wait for the opposition to offer a credible alternative at the ballot box rather than engage in relatively costly protest actions with questionable prospects of success. Finally, as was said before, even manipulated elections bestow some degree of legitimacy on the regime, which makes attempts to stage an overthrow look like an insurrection.

By stealing an election outright, however, electoral autocrats change the character of their rule abruptly. The uncertainty produced by the political competition still going on in these kinds of regimes is replaced by the certainty that change through institutionalized channels alone will be impossible. Political closure through a stolen election leads to the realization that there is “no other way out” than revolutionary action. The regime has stripped itself of any semblance of democratic legitimacy, and an uprising may now be judged a “revolt in defense of the constitution.”²⁹

The Importance of Stolen Elections as Triggers in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine

The theoretical discussion has shown how stolen elections can trigger sudden and significant behavioral changes in three groups of actors: citizens, activists, and members of the regime. It was also argued that relatively open regime environments tend to inhibit opposition mobilization, but circumstances alter dramatically when incumbents deprive the opposition of victory by stealing elections. Yet how can it be demonstrated that stolen elections were in fact of overriding importance for ousting electoral autocrats in Serbia (September-October 2000), Georgia (November 2003), and Ukraine (November-December 2004)? One possibility would be to offer a thick analytic narrative by corroborating the causal mechanisms outlined above with empirical evidence. As such detailed process-tracing would go beyond the scope of this article, an attempt will be made instead to establish the centrality of stolen elections by comparing stolen elections to other potential triggers. If the just-the-final-straw perspective on stolen elections were correct, these previous events should have likewise led to revolutionary explosions. Indeed, several such would-be triggers occurred in these three countries: attacks on the antiregime media, the assassination of regime critics, and, in the case of Serbia, a lost war. Yet they did not lead to popular uprisings against the regime.

It may be objected that such a juxtaposition of stolen elections with triggers that failed is misleading. Instead of viewing these events in isolation, it might be argued that each was a crucial step toward revolution. Stolen elections appear more powerful only because they benefited from a cumulative build-up of revolutionary potential. More generally, longitudinal comparisons that highlight the importance of a particular factor run the risk of overlooking the fact that other factors have changed over time as well. In answer to

this objection, two alternative explanations derived from analyses of other authors will be considered: the possibility, first, that in successful uprisings regime opponents could capitalize on previous mobilization efforts and, second, that the ruling clique had started to fragment in the meantime.

On the first potential trigger, assaults on media critical of the regime, an important feature of most electoral authoritarian systems is the existence of independent or opposition-leaning media with a considerable audience. In order to keep their influence under control, rulers usually employ “more subtle means of repression than their counterparts in authoritarian regimes.”³⁰ But occasionally they may feel compelled to resort to outright repression. Because open attacks mean a departure from the conventional pattern, they may be interpreted as major infringements on political liberties and thus provoke public outrage. One high profile incident occurred in Serbia just months before the ouster of Milošević. In May 2000 police raided an important opposition broadcasting center in Belgrade. Yet protests against this blatant crackdown were short-lived and did not reverse the trend of declining participation in the anti-Milošević movement. In Georgia a raid of the independent Rustavi-2 television company in late 2001 attracted several thousand people to antiregime demonstrations. This number is not negligible if it is taken into account that the revolutionary movement in Tbilisi in 2003 was much smaller than the movements in Belgrade and Kiev. Nevertheless, the protests did not develop the dynamic necessary to topple Shevardnadze. In the following years, Georgia’s president sided openly with the hardliner faction of his regime.

Attacks on the media overlap with another possible catalyst of antiregime action, the murder of regime critics. Critical journalists are often targeted for assassination. Among the cases considered here, the murder of Ukrainian investigative reporter Georgiy Gongadze in September 2000 stands out. Leaked audiotapes that implicated President Kuchma and other high-ranking officials in the killing sparked off mass protests in early 2001. Although the regime emerged badly weakened from the crisis, the protest eventually petered out. The movement resurfaced in the following years, but again demonstrators did not succeed in getting rid of Kuchma. In the two other countries considered, assassinations fell short of having a similar mobilizational effect. The slayings of Slavko Ćuruvija, a Serbian newspaper owner and editor, in April 1999 and of Georgian television anchor Giorgi Sanaia in July 2001 were both believed to be politically motivated. Several thousand people attended the funerals, but no protests erupted. In a similar vein, assassination attempts against Serbian opposition leader Vuk Drašković (in October 1999 and June 2000) failed to boost the ailing anti-Milošević movement.

Serbia’s strongman, however, had to survive a crisis that leaders in Georgia and Ukraine did not face: a lost war. When Milošević agreed to NATO’s peace terms in June 1999, it meant Belgrade’s *de facto* loss of Kosovo. What had remained of Milošević’s national savior image was irrevocably shattered. The economic outlook was bleak as well. Yet for over a year the opposition waged an increasingly desperate struggle to unseat the regime. Daily marches and rallies started in September, but the number of demonstrators soon declined, and the movement ultimately fizzled out in mid December

1999. The pattern repeated itself when the opposition started another round of protests in spring 2000. Most citizens responded with resignation rather than political activism to the catastrophic results of Milošević's policies.

All these examples indicate stolen elections were a much more powerful revolutionary trigger. What accounts for this difference? First, in the case of political assassinations it is often difficult to establish a clear chain of responsibility (even as of this writing, courts have failed to uncover who commissioned some of the crimes mentioned above). By contrast, the attribution of blame in case of a stolen election is a straightforward matter. Second, even where it is obvious that responsibility for outrageous acts lies with the regime, not all parts of society may feel personally affected. For instance, media that become the target of government attacks frequently do not reach beyond a certain region (for example, the May 2000 raid against oppositional media in Belgrade was a localized event, whereas a couple of months later hundreds of thousands from all over the country flocked to the capital to defend their vote). Third, among all the events considered, only stolen elections allowed citizens and oppositionists to draw clear inferences about regime vulnerability. These inferences in turn affected the calculations of potential defectors from the regime. It was obviously not the right moment to change sides when large-scale protests had failed to take place. Fourth, none of the alternative triggers was preceded by rising expectations that could then have been disappointed. By contrast, voters in Serbia and Ukraine looked upon the impending presidential elections as watershed events. Finally, incidents not related to large-scale electoral fraud, however despicable, did not constitute a descent into full authoritarianism. Sometimes rulers could even make concessions to the public (for example, by setting up "criminal investigations" or by dismissing a cabinet member as a scapegoat). Such attempts to deflect popular anger were not an option after stolen elections, however, because the vote had raised fundamental questions about the distribution of power. Depriving the opposition of its victory meant that semiautocratic rulers no longer could reap the benefits of retaining a relatively open political order. One example of the importance of such electoral authoritarian payoffs can be found in Paul D'Anieri's observation that "protesters living in tents in central Kyiv were able to force the resignation of the Ukrainian prime minister in 1990, when the country was still ruled by the Soviets, but the same tactics...failed in 2002, in large part because Kuchma...has a strong electoral basis for his legitimacy."³¹ In other words, before stolen elections in 2004 the electoral authoritarian system established in Ukraine was open enough to absorb popular pressure even as it faced the severe crisis prompted by the Gongadze murder.

The varying impact of events may be rooted elsewhere, though. Arguably, it could be traced back not so much to their intrinsic features as to a change in external circumstances. In all three cases, learning processes had occurred prior to the massive postelection mobilizations, and civil society (especially in the form of youth movements) had been gradually gaining strength. In Ukraine this tendency was visible since the "Kuchmagate" scandal in late 2000. In the words of Taras Kuzio, "[t]he experience of popular protests during those four years prepared and equipped Ukraine's opposition members to lead the Orange Revolution."³² Yet because such protests had repeatedly failed, one of the most

important lessons taken to heart by opposition actors was that obstinate rulers had to be challenged through elections. Moreover, many of the skills, resources, and networks that proved so valuable in organizing the eventual uprisings were only developed in the election campaigns.³³ Finally, it would be problematic to subscribe to the view that an experienced, organized, and well-funded civil society could somehow “make” these revolutions. In order to bring down unyielding rulers, activists needed to mobilize many more people than they themselves could muster, and much of the revolutionary rank and file seem to have made their decision to join in a spontaneous manner. For example, when Milošević denied the opposition its victory in the September 2000 presidential election, workers at the Kolubara coal mine decided to take things in their own hands and went on strike without having received any clear instructions.³⁴ To be sure, Serbia’s organized opposition had called for a nationwide work stoppage, but similar appeals had fallen on deaf ears in the months before.

In hindsight, it is tempting to view successful democratic revolutions as having been inevitable. It is easily forgotten how pessimistically the prospects for protest activities were judged not long before stolen elections took place. Opinion polls carried out in Serbia just months before indicated that most citizens did not view street protests as a useful tool for bringing about political change (this finding helps explain the muted, if not apathetic, response to opposition leaders who organized a series of protests before elections had been called).³⁵ Sociologists who carried out preelection opinion polls in Ukraine in 2004 remained skeptical about whether electoral fraud would lead to popular outrage.³⁶ Even opposition leaders, who reckoned with the necessity of taking to the streets, were stunned by the massive turnout.³⁷ In Georgia two respected and otherwise not overly pessimistic observers stated only half a year before the Rose Revolution that “Georgia today is a different country from what it was in the 1980s, when it was possible to rally the masses in support of national independence and democracy: the mass enthusiasm of those days will be difficult to recover.”³⁸ There is no evidence earlier protests had increased the willingness to take part in further antiregime activities (beyond perhaps a hard core of regime opponents).

One can even go a step further and argue that previous mass mobilization, despite enhancing organizational skills and capacities, actually discouraged further protest. Serbia, with its decade-long history of protests, is a case in point. By the late 1990s Milošević had outlived numerous protest movements, and citizens had grown extremely skeptical of rallies and demonstrations as a means of affecting political change. Even after the Kosovo war, when a certain momentum was regained, it did not take long until a similar pattern emerged: opposition protest rallies became smaller and smaller as citizens grew disillusioned by previous failures. Longer-term mobilization periods can lead to growing pessimism and protest fatigue instead of strengthening people’s determination to bring a regime down.

It is thus difficult to argue that stolen elections evoked a more powerful response than prior incidents because they tapped into more fertile ground. But perhaps the chances for a revolution had improved because the regime had grown more fragile. It has indeed been

frequently remarked that the three rulers of the countries discussed here were very badly weakened by the time they faced popular revolts because of increasing divisions within the regime elite. Thus, the postelection mobilization against Shevardnadze was spearheaded by former members of his Citizens' Union of Georgia. Their withdrawal from the ruling party in 2001 and 2002 was decisive for the poor showing of progovernment forces in the 2003 elections. At the same time, it is highly improbable that these politicians would have been capable of coordinating sustained street protests prior to the elections—after all, they did not even manage to form an electoral alliance. The impact of regime fragmentation is most frequently invoked in the case of the Orange Revolution. With the loyalty of Ukraine's oligarchs to the regime in doubt, several former regime officials now leading oppositionists, and members of the state apparatus favoring the opposition, the regime seemed unstable even before the vote in 2004.³⁹ Elite support was a precondition not only for winning elections against a well-oiled political machine, but also for the success of the Orange Revolution itself. On the other hand, a closer look reveals that many crucial rifts in the regime appeared only after the votes had been cast. In the words of Henry E. Hale, Ukraine's "elite stand-off gradually began to resolve itself after the first and second rounds of the election took place, giving elites who were hedging their bets more information about who was likely to win."⁴⁰ Defection is not a decision to be taken lightly, even where loyalty remains fragile. In Serbia there were few defections at all before the September 2000 vote, and while there were certainly tensions within the inner circle of power, most observers did not forecast its breakup in the immediate future. Only when Milošević's defeat at the polls seemed to spell disaster did the heads of his extensive security apparatus decide to jump ship. Finally, regime fragmentation does not say very much about how rulers are going to lose power—a massive popular uprising, an internal coup, or something else. But the mode of transition may, of course, strongly influence future political developments.

Other Stolen Elections That Triggered Revolutions

The trigger of stolen elections greatly facilitates the emergence and breakthrough of revolutionary movements in electoral authoritarian settings. In Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine, only a short time before the stolen elections, other events had failed to trigger a similar popular response. While this combination of factors certainly does not amount to a sufficient condition, the underlying theoretical reasoning points to a broader set of cases, and it would be instructive to see if other stolen elections, in similar regime contexts, were also followed by a regime change from below. Additional positive cases would lend further support to the argument, whereas stolen elections without a subsequent uprising would require that the scope conditions of this trigger be specific.

There are at least two more electoral authoritarian regimes that experienced an uprising after a stolen election. In the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos, mass mobilization had

been underway for several years already before he was finally ousted in 1986. But the impressive protest movement set off by the assassination of opposition leader Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. in 1983 failed to achieve its objective of getting rid of Marcos. Not long before the crucial election Marcos seemed as firmly in power as ever.⁴¹ With hope in a peaceful uprising decreasing, the initiative shifted to more radical organizers. If Marcos had not announced elections at all, there might have never been a democratic revolution, and a Communist insurrection might have succeeded in removing him from power instead. Another consequence of Marcos' downfall in the wake of a stolen election was that army officers who started to rebel were unable to establish a military regime as they had hoped. They were too dependent on the powerful position that opposition candidate Corazon C. Aquino had acquired by de facto winning the election. Thus, this case not only reaffirms the view of stolen elections as being more effective than other triggers. It also shows more clearly than previous examples that a seemingly small event may have a decisive impact on who is going to replace the *ancien régime*.

Almost completely overlooked by studies of electoral revolutions is Madagascar, where in 2002 a month-long uprising brought about the removal of president Didier Ratsiraka, another unrepentant election loser. It was not the first time that Ratsiraka was forced out of office by a massive protest movement; a month-long general strike effectively ended his regime in 1991. However, Madagascar's young democracy never consolidated, and only a couple of years later Ratsiraka returned to power. Despite the authoritarian setback, few people were willing to take to the streets once again. Thus, all the more astonishing was the outpouring of public anger in 2002 after Ratsiraka tried to force his challenger, Marc Ravalomanana, into a second round of presidential elections, despite evidence that his opponent had already garnered the majority of votes.

If the Philippines and Madagascar are added to the three examples from eastern Europe, it becomes obvious that stolen elections turned weak or extremely revolutionary potentials into mighty popular insurrections in quite diverse environments. Furthermore, powerful movements in defense of election victories seem to have emerged even without the international diffusion effects that certainly helped inspire the opposition in Georgia and Ukraine.⁴²

The Dog That Didn't Bark: Stolen Elections That Did Not Trigger Revolutions

Are there cases of electoral authoritarianism in which a ruler brazenly snatched away an electoral victory from the hands of the opposition and managed to stay in power nonetheless? In general, the universe of stolen elections is much smaller than it might appear at first glance. It is important to recall that the argument advanced in this article is founded on a narrow definition of stolen elections. Lesser forms of election fraud are disregarded because some of the most crucial causal mechanisms outlined above pertain only to a situation in which there is widespread perception that a regime actually lost at

the polls. The fact that recent electoral shenanigans by authoritarian rulers in Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Belarus were not followed by democratic uprisings does not challenge the role of large-scale fraud in the making of the Rose or Orange revolutions because the definition of stolen elections used here only applies to the latter cases. Rather than seeing the failure of postelectoral protests in Georgia's and Ukraine's neighbors as proof that stolen elections were not of overriding importance, it is more plausible to argue that the difference between stolen elections and electoral fraud that falls short of this category is a key explanation of these varying outcomes.⁴³ Other cases (such as Kenya in 1997 and Zimbabwe in 2002) that may possibly be invoked to question the significance of stolen elections also fall short in the sense of the term used here.⁴⁴

There is one clear-cut example of a stolen election that did not lead to the overthrow of an electoral authoritarian regime, and interestingly it occurred in one of the cases considered initially—Serbia. In November 1996 Milošević deprived the opposition of a number of victories in communal elections. The massive protest that occurred as a result strongly supports the argument about the dynamic unleashed by such an act, especially since in the months before other potentially explosive events had failed to incite a similar response.⁴⁵ But Milošević managed to stay in power for almost four more years. It is rather obvious why there was no revolutionary outcome then: the demand that unified the protesters—the recognition of the opposition victories in several towns and cities—did not focus on the country's most important, that is, national, political institutions. When Milošević finally gave in, the movement quickly disintegrated. It is thus necessary to add a qualification to the theory. If an election is limited in scope (for instance, for local offices only), an autocratic ruler may well reverse his decision of stealing, concede defeat, and stay in power nonetheless.

To be sure, there are also instances of key elections being stolen that have not set off democratic revolutions. But they have happened not in electoral, but in "hard" authoritarian settings. In Panama (1989), Burma (1990), Algeria (1991–92), and Nigeria (1993), the most prominent examples since the late 1980s, stolen elections left a lasting impact. They led to the reshuffling of regime elites in Algeria and Nigeria, hastened the U.S. invasion of Panama, and forced the Burmese military to keep tight control over election winner Aung San Suu Kyi. But it would be farfetched to speak of revolutionary consequences. Peaceful mass protests staged in Panama and especially Nigeria turned out to be either short-lived or of limited reach. The brutal civil war unleashed by the refusal to allow an Islamist victory in Algeria also can not be likened to the sort of popular mobilization considered in this article. In Burma no major postelectoral protests took place. Elections in these countries that fall well short of the electoral authoritarian regime type were preceded by only a brief phase of political liberalization. They lacked (at least for a decade) an electoral tradition that would have produced expectations of minimum standards for elections to which incumbents must adhere. Outrage in electoral authoritarian regimes, by contrast, is arguably greater after stolen elections because such standards existed there. Elections (despite repeated manipulation) were seen as a vested right that simply could not be taken away.

A more important point, though, is that intimidation was much more prevalent in these “harder” authoritarian regimes (all are, or were, military dictatorships). In Panama, Noriega’s Dignity Battalions moved with brute force against protesting opposition politicians. Repression in Algeria was even greater. But sometimes mere fear of reprisal, based on the experience of past repression, is enough to preempt popular protest. The Burmese example is the most notable in this respect: in 1990 people remained intimidated by the horrendous massacre carried out by the armed forces against protesters two years earlier.

These negative examples thus underline the importance of an electoral authoritarian—and thereby civilian—context for the operation of stolen elections as triggers. On the other hand, the fact that a legacy of political violence may easily ward off postelectoral protests should not lead to the conclusion that it was actually the relative openness of electoral authoritarianism that produced impressive uprisings from Ukraine to Madagascar. This more subtle form of authoritarian rule tends to generate its own collective action dilemmas, making a successful popular overthrow by no means a foregone conclusion.

Conclusion

Paul Pierson has recently issued a plea that more attention be paid to the “slow-moving dimensions of social life” instead of focusing on “triggering or precipitating factors.”⁴⁶ When it comes to the study of revolutions, however, short-term causes in the form of events may not have been studied enough. In this article, the example of a specific kind of electoral fraud disputes the still widely held view that short-term catalysts are negligible in comparison with the long-term developments that precede them. A range of theoretical approaches from social movement studies can be fruitfully employed to show why this particular trigger should be so powerful. In the context of electoral authoritarianism, stolen elections assume a particularly significant role. As neoinstitutionalist theories of revolution suggest, the relative openness of electoral authoritarian regimes inhibits mass protest. But when such leaders steal elections, their rule undergoes closure, increasing the probability of successful mass protest. Stolen elections are triggering events that suddenly transform the structural setting in favor of revolutionary efforts.

For Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine, the relevance of stolen elections was underscored when earlier potential events failed to bring about a revolutionary endgame. While these other events were not insignificant and weakened the regimes, they did not necessarily make the emergence of a revolutionary situation more likely. Even when additional variables (like previous mobilization efforts and increasing regime fragmentation) are taken into account, it is difficult to discern how they should have fundamentally altered the chances of revolution (this conclusion becomes especially apparent when the widespread apathy prior to stolen elections is recalled). The inclusion of other cases further supports the nexus between stolen elections and an electoral authoritarian context.

Undoubtedly, the analysis of a single type of triggering event, unfolding in a rather specific political environment, does not allow inferences to be drawn about other kinds of triggers, contexts, revolutions, or, more generally, protest movements. There might well be instances of popular upheavals where the nature of the triggering event was of lesser importance. But this question needs to be answered empirically. If the analysis of the exemplary catalyst of stolen elections is correct, it reveals that triggers can not be dismissed out of hand by merely contending that structural factors carry overwhelming explanatory weight.

NOTES

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1. An overview of this research agenda can be found in Andreas Schedler, ed., *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2006).
2. Mark R. Thompson, *Democratic Revolutions: Asia and Eastern Europe* (London: Routledge, 2004).
3. “Has the Age of Revolutions Ended?,” *Transitions Online*, Jan. 13, 2005.
4. The potential for stirring up popular anger by merely alleging an election was stolen became apparent after Mexico’s 2006 presidential election. In the absence of compelling evidence, however, neither streets protests nor a self-proclamation as the legitimate president could prevent the official winner from being installed.
5. See, for instance, Lyford P. Edwards, *The Natural History of Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970); Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (Boston: Little Brown, 1966).
6. Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); Jeffery M. Paige, *Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export-Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World* (New York: Free Press, 1975); Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
7. Charles Kurzman, “The Post-Structuralist Consensus in Social Movement Theory,” in Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper, eds., *Rethinking Social Movements: Structure, Meaning, and Emotion* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), pp. 111–20.
8. William H. Sewell, Jr., “Historical Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille,” *Theory and Society*, 25 (December 1996), 841–81; Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); James M. Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography, and Creativity in Social Movements* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).
9. Sewell, p. 862.
10. Jean-Pierre Reed, “Emotions in Context: Revolutionary Accelerators, Hope, Moral Outrage, and Other Emotions in the Making of Nicaragua’s Revolution,” *Theory and Society*, 33 (December 2004), 653–703.
11. Michael S. Kimmel, *Revolution: A Sociological Interpretation* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), pp. 9–10.
12. Edgar Kiser and Margaret Levi, “Using Counterfactuals in Historical Analysis: Theories of Revolution,” in Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, eds., *Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological and Psychological Perspectives* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 204.
13. Timothy Wickham-Crowley, “Structural Theories of Revolution,” in John Foran, ed., *Theorizing Revolutions* (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 68 n27.

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 47–48.
15. An earlier statement by Harry Eckstein on the study of “internal wars” reflects this position: preconditions are seen as “amenable to systematic inquiry,” precipitants “as defy[ing] systematic inquiry.” Harry Eckstein, “On the Etiology of Internal Wars,” *History and Theory*, 4 (February 1965), 140.
16. Applying the label “regime change” to the events discussed here will not go uncontested. The very features of electoral authoritarianism place this kind of regime close to the category of procedural democracy, thus obscuring that a real transition has occurred. And although a popular uprising does not guarantee democratic consolidation, it opens the possibility of democratization in the first place.
17. On the concept of political opportunity structures, see Goodwin and Jasper, eds.
18. Preference falsification poses a particular obstacle to collective action in highly oppressive contexts, but also in electoral authoritarian regimes the full extent of political dissatisfaction may not be known. On the concept of preference falsification, see Timur Kuran, *Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).
19. The framework so far could easily be restated in the language of rational choice theory. Cf. Joshua A. Tucker, “Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions,” *Perspectives on Politics*, 5 (September 2007), 535–51, for such an approach.
20. On the role of emotions in popular protest, for example, see Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, eds., *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).
21. The logic behind this argument is derived from relative deprivation theory.
22. Jasper, p. 106.
23. On frame analysis, see Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes, eds., *Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005).
24. Thomas Carothers, “The Backlash against Democracy Promotion,” *Foreign Affairs*, 85 (March–April 2006), 55–69.
25. See, for example, on the case of the German Democratic Republic, Daniel V. Friedheim, “Democratic Transition through Regime Collapse” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1997).
26. The best account of this argument is Jeff Goodwin, *No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
27. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 303.
29. Ghia Nodia, “Breaking the Mold of Powerlessness: The Meaning of Georgia’s Latest Revolution,” in Zurab Karumidze and James V. Wertsch, eds., *Enough! The Rose Revolution in the Republic of Georgia* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2005), p. 99.
30. Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” *Journal of Democracy*, 13 (April 2002), 58.
31. Paul D’Anieri, “Leonid Kuchma and the Personalization of the Ukrainian Presidency,” *Problems of Post-Communism*, 50 (September–October 2003), 59–60.
32. Taras Kuzio, “The Opposition’s Road to Success,” *Journal of Democracy*, 16 (April 2005), 129.
33. Cf. Joerg Forbrig and Pavol Demeš, *Reclaiming Democracy: Civil Society and Electoral Change in Central and Eastern Europe* (Washington, D.C.: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2007).
34. Darko Marinković, “Strike at Kolubara—a Case Study,” *South East Europe Review*, 6 (2003), 41–71.
35. *Between Disappointment and Hope—Public Opinion in Serbia, September 1999* (Belgrade: Centar za Proucavanje Alternativa, 1999).
36. Ihor Zhdanov, Oleksandr Lytvynenko, and Yuriy Yakymenko, “Ukraine before Elections—What Will It Be Like?,” *National Security & Defence*, 6 (June 2004), 2–14.
37. Kuzio, p. 125.
38. David Usupashvili and Ghia Nodia, *Electoral Processes in Georgia: Attempts to Establish Democracy in Georgia* (Stockholm: IDEA, 2003), p. 14.
39. See, for instance, Lucan A. Way, “Kuchma’s Failed Authoritarianism,” *Journal of Democracy*, 16 (April 2005), 131–45.
40. Henry E. Hale, “Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia,” *World Politics*, 58 (October 2005), 154; Way, pp. 143–44; Kuzio, p. 128.
41. See Mark R. Thompson, *The Anti-Marcos Struggle: Personalistic Rule and Democratic Transition in the Philippines* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), ch. 7.
42. On diffusion dynamics in the postcommunist world, see Mark R. Beissinger, “Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions,” *Perspectives on*

Politics, 5 (June 2007), 259–76.

43. David R. Marples, “Color Revolutions: The Belarus Case,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 39 (September 2006), 363, makes this point in an analysis of revolutionary failure after the 2006 presidential elections in Belarus.

44. The most recent Kenyan election, in December 2007, does appear to have been stolen, but its violent consequences have been shaped by ethnic divisions, a variable not discussed in the argument developed here.

45. Cf. Florian Bieber, “The Serbian Opposition and Civil Society: Roots of the Delayed Transition in Serbia,” *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, 17 (September 2003), 84.

46. Paul Pierson, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 14.