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# Class in the Household: A Power-Control Theory of Gender and Delinquency<sup>1</sup>

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This paper extends a power-control theory of common delinquent behavior developed by Hagan, Gillis, and Simpson in 1985. It does so by bringing the class analysis of delinquency into the household, using a new model of class relations based on the relative positions of husbands *and* wives in the workplace. In patriarchal families, wives have little power relative to husbands, daughters have little freedom relative to sons, and daughters are less delinquent than sons. These differences are diminished in egalitarian families. Power-control theory explains this variation in terms of (1) gender divisions in domestic social control and (2) the resulting attitudes toward risk taking. Power-control theory thereby accounts for class-specific declines in gender-delinquency relationships that previously required separate deprivation and liberation theories of gender and delinquency. The new theory calls for major changes in the study of class, gender, and delinquency, as well as for a new appreciation of the importance of gender and structures of patriarchy in many other social processes.

In truth, woman, like children, has but one right and that is the right to protection. The right to protection involves the obligation to obey. [George Fitzhugh, *Sociology for the South* (1854)]

Economic independence for women necessarily involves a change in the home and family relation. [Charlotte Perkins Gilman, *Woman and Economics* (1898)]

A recently formulated power-control theory of common delinquent behavior (Hagan, Gillis, and Simpson 1985) brings together a macro-level

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consideration of class in the workplace with a micro-level analysis of gender differences in the parental control and delinquent behavior of adolescents. This initial formulation of power-control theory was based on a class analysis of heads of households. However, it is increasingly evident that power in the family derives from the positions in the workplace held by husbands *and* wives (Coser and Coser 1974).

Summarizing a large research literature, Coser writes that

power depends on resources, and women who do not have occupational resources are in a poor position to share it equally with their husbands [Coser and Coser 1974]. Conversely, the fact that the distribution of power in the family changes in favor of the wife wherever she contributes financial means to the household has been amply demonstrated. Blood and Wolfe [1960, pp. 40–41] and others have shown this to be true for the United States, and Hyman Rodman [1967] examined this for all countries for which data are available—Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Japan, the United States, and Yugoslavia—and found this to be true throughout. [1985, p. 1]

Coser cautions that these power gains for women may be more evident in higher than in lower classes, but the more general point persists: power in the family derives from the positions in the workplace of wives as well as of husbands.

The question for power-control theory therefore is this: What differences do the relative class positions of husbands *and* wives in the workplace make for gender variations in parental control and in delinquent behavior of adolescents? This paper extends power-control theory by developing a model of familial class relations that is then used to answer this question. In this model, power-control theory subsumes two earlier deprivation and liberation theories of gender and delinquency.

The ability of power-control theory to subsume earlier formulations is important because, as Homans points out, a good test of a theory is its ability to deduce a variety of empirical findings from a limited number of general propositions, “with the help of a variety of given conditions” (1967, p. 27). Below, we demonstrate that circumstances of deprivation and liberation constitute scope conditions within which power-control theory makes important, and perhaps surprisingly similar, predictions. However, specification of these scope conditions requires an analysis of the class dynamics of the family. The origins of this class analysis are in the deprivation and liberation theories of gender and delinquency.

## FROM DEPRIVATION TO LIBERATION

It is well known that men markedly exceed women in criminality, and, until recently, it was believed that only economic deprivation might ap-

preciably alter this relationship. For example, early in this century Bonger articulated the important effect deprivation may have on gender and crime, observing that "the criminality of men differs more from that of women in the well-to-do classes than in classes less privileged" (1916, p. 477). Bonger's point is that differences in the "manner of life" for the sexes decrease as we descend the social scale and that therefore only in the underclasses should the criminality of women be expected to approach that of men.

A modern version of this deprivation theory of gender and crime is offered by Giordano, Kerbel, and Dudley, who argue that contemporary increases in the criminality of women "reflect the fact that certain categories of women (e.g., young, single, minority) are now in an even more unfavorable position in the labor market at the same time that they are increasingly expected to function independently" (1981, p. 81). The Giordano et al. formulation focuses particular attention on female-headed households, which are of recurring concern in contemporary studies of delinquency and poverty (see McLanahan 1985). These households are of special interest for our extension of power-control theory and our analysis of the class dynamics of the family. Because men are not an integral part of these households, these families constitute a unique comparison group that is useful in assessing the impact on children of power relations between husbands and wives in households with two active parents.

The "expectations of independence" noted by Giordano et al. bring us to the liberation theory of gender and crime. This theory is most provocatively formulated by Freda Adler (1975), who asserts that female criminal behavior has become widespread in recent years largely as a result of the women's movement. Adler argues that we are observing "a gradual but accelerating social revolution in which women are closing many of the gaps, social and criminal, that have separated them from men" (1979, pp. 93–94). This is clearly a different kind of formulation from that found in the writings about deprivation and gender discussed previously. However, both deprivation and liberation are assumed to decrease differences between men and women. "The closer they get," writes Adler, "the more alike they look and act. . . . Differences do exist . . . but it seems clear that those differences are not of prime importance in understanding female criminality" (1979, p. 94).

Perhaps the most interesting fact about the deprivation and liberation theories is that, although they both specify conditions under which men and women seem to become more alike, both socially and in terms of criminality, they do so by pointing to opposite ends of the class structure. While deprivation theory points to the lower end, and, increasingly, to female-headed households, liberation theory points to the upper end, where the liberation of women may be most likely to occur. Empirical

tests of deprivation and liberation theories of gender and crime have produced equivocal results (for a recent review of this literature, see Box and Hale 1984). We believe this is because the structural relationships that can result in gender equality and that are found at high and low positions in the class hierarchy have not yet been adequately conceptualized or operationalized.

#### POWER-CONTROL THEORY AND THE CLASS DYNAMICS OF THE FAMILY

Our extension of power-control theory begins with the observation of Weber (1947) that an important juncture in the development of modern capitalism was the separation of the workplace from the home. Two distinct spheres, which Weber regarded as crucial to the rationalization of an industrial capitalist economy, resulted from this separation: the first was populated by women and focused on domestic labor and consumption, and the second was populated by men and centered around labor power and direct production. The new family, and particularly its mothers, was responsible for socially reproducing (Vogel 1983) the gender division of these separate spheres. This family was patriarchal in form and created a "cult of domesticity" around women (Welter 1966).

Today, there is a declining division of the consumption and production spheres, which is reflected in the increased participation of women in the labor force (Coser 1985). The studies mentioned above indicate that, as women joined the labor force, they gained new power in the family, particularly in the upper class. This results in a considerable variation in family structures in our model of family class relations. These structures can be thought of as varying between two extreme family class relations that form real-life counterparts to two ideal-type families.

The first of these ideal types is largely a residue from the earlier period, in which the consumption and production spheres were more strictly divided by gender. To reflect this legacy, we will call this the patriarchal family. Of the family class relations we identify below, the one that should most closely correspond to the ideal-type patriarchal family consists of a husband who is employed in an authority position and a wife who is not employed outside the home. It seems plausible that patriarchal families would tend to socially reproduce daughters who focus their futures around domestic labor and consumption, as contrasted with sons who are prepared for participation in direct production. We will say more about how this happens. Here we simply repeat that Weber regarded this process of social reproduction as crucial to the rationalization of industrial capitalism.

At the other extreme is an ideal type we call the egalitarian family, in

which the consumption and production spheres are undivided by gender. Of the family class relations we identify below, the one that should most closely correspond to the ideal-type egalitarian family includes a mother and father who both are employed in authority positions outside the home. It seems plausible that egalitarian families will tend to socially reproduce daughters who are prepared along with sons to join the production sphere. Such families are therefore a part of an overlapping of the consumption and production spheres, which a postindustrial society no longer so clearly keeps apart; such families are a part as well as a product of changing economic relations.

So the patriarchal family perpetuates a gender division in the consumption and production spheres, whereas the egalitarian family facilitates an overlapping of these spheres. How does this happen and what are its consequences? Power-control theory answers these questions by joining a class analysis of the family with an analysis of domestic social control labor, the link between them being based on parents' social reproduction of their own power relationships through the control of their children. The key process involves an instrument-object relationship (Hagan, Simpson, and Gillis 1979) that is at its extreme in the patriarchal family. Here fathers and especially mothers (i.e., as instruments of social control) are expected to control their daughters more than they do their sons (i.e., objects of social control). In regard to mothers, we should note that our point here is not that they are, in any ultimate causal sense, more important than fathers in the control of daughters but rather that mothers are assigned a key instrumental role that involves them more in the day-to-day control of their children, especially their daughters, in patriarchal families. This imbalanced instrument-object relationship is a product of a division in domestic social control labor and is a distinguishing feature of the control of daughters in patriarchal families. The instrument-object relationship is a key part of the way in which patriarchal families socially reproduce a gender division in the spheres of consumption and production.

Alternatively, it is through the diminution of this relationship that egalitarian families can generationally reproduce an overlap of the production and consumption spheres. This does not necessarily mean that fathers will become as involved as mothers are in the parental control of children; indeed, there is continuing evidence that this is not the case (e.g., Huber 1976). What it does mean is that parents in egalitarian families will redistribute their control efforts so that daughters are subjected to controls more like those imposed on sons. In other words, in egalitarian families, as mothers gain power relative to husbands, daughters gain freedom relative to sons. In terms of social reproduction, the

presence of the imbalanced instrument-object relationship helps perpetuate patriarchy and its absence facilitates equality.

Our next theoretical task is to link this discussion of ideal-type families and the instrument-object relationship with predicted gender differences in common delinquent behavior. This final intervening link involves attitudes toward risk taking. At one extreme, the patriarchal family and its acute instrument-object relationship between parents and daughters engenders a lower preference for risk taking among daughters. Risk taking is the antithesis of the passivity that distinguishes the "cult of domesticity." So, in patriarchal families, daughters are taught by their parents to avoid risk. Alternatively, in egalitarian families, daughters and sons alike are encouraged to be more open to risk taking. In part, this accommodation of risk is an anticipation of its role in the entrepreneurial and other activities associated with the production sphere, for which daughters and sons are similarly prepared in egalitarian families. Control theories have often regarded delinquency as a form of risk taking (Thrasher 1937; Bordua 1961; Hirschi 1969), sometimes seeing it as an unanticipated consequence of a rewarded willingness to take risks (Veblen 1934, p. 237; Sykes and Matza 1961, p. 718). Bearing this in mind, we use power-control theory to predict that patriarchal families will be characterized by large gender differences in common delinquent behavior while egalitarian families will be characterized by smaller gender differences in delinquency. In egalitarian families, daughters become more like sons in their involvement in such forms of risk taking as delinquency.

Note that we have not yet said anything about either the female-headed households emphasized in deprivation theory or the various other kinds of households that we will be considering. We have formulated the theory in terms of households with both parents present and in terms of the polar ideal types of power relations (patriarchal and egalitarian) that can result. However, the theory does have important implications for female-headed households, as well as for other kinds of families. For example, because fathers are not an integral part of female-headed households, there should be no manifest power imbalance between parents, and therefore, here, too, daughters should gain in freedom relative to sons. These female-headed households provide a unique kind of comparison group; a special kind of egalitarian family that allows us to test our theory further. The expectation is that female-headed households should parallel other kinds of egalitarian households in many of the characteristics and consequences so far discussed. It is the common focus on freedom from male domination in these different kinds of households that allows our extension of power-control theory to subsume both deprivation and liberation theories of gender and delinquency.

This discussion of patriarchal, egalitarian, and female-headed households provides a set of scope conditions to be used in testing our extension of power-control theory. Each condition carries with it a predicted set of consequences in terms of gender variations in parental control, risk taking, and common forms of delinquent behavior. These conditions take into account a range of circumstances that previously generated separate deprivation and liberation theories of gender and delinquency. However, many other kinds of households also exist. We turn now to a more inclusive model of family class relations that can be used in a more extensive test of our theory.

#### A DAHRENDORFIAN MODEL OF FAMILY CLASS RELATIONS

The extension of power-control theory tested here asserts that the gender-based relationships we have discussed are conditioned by the combined class positions of fathers *and* mothers (i.e., the class composition of the household). Parents of 463 students from a survey conducted in 1979 in the Toronto metropolitan area (see Hagan et al. 1985) were followed up by telephone to collect the information we now use to construct a new model of family class relations.

Our new model of family class relations is based on Dahrendorfian conceptions of power and authority and their use in the control of collective units. Following Dahrendorf (1959, p. 198), these collective units include all “imperatively coordinated associations”; that is, they include the family as well as the workplace. Because they occupy so central a place in most people’s lives, authority relations in industrial production often overshadow and determine authority relations in other collective units, including the family (see Litwak 1968). In fact, this is our fundamental point—that to understand the effects of class position in the workplace on crime and delinquency it is necessary to trace the way that work relations structure family relations, including, for example, the instrument-object relationship between parents and daughters that has previously been described. The crucial link that we now add to power-control theory is the variable role of women in the workplace and its impact on the social organization of domestic social control.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Others, notably Kohn (1977) and Miller and Swanson (1958), also analyze relationships between features of the workplace and the structure of the family. Our perspective differs from these important efforts. Kohn is concerned primarily with the influence of work technologies on the formation of attitudes that influence socialization processes. Miller and Swanson are concerned mainly with the influence of relations between persons in the workplace on socialization attitudes. Neither Kohn nor Miller and Swanson emphasize, as we do, the central importance of the presence or absence of dominance relations on gender-linked control processes or the importance of considering the class positions of wives relative to those of husbands. In recent papers, Kohn,



Dahrendorfian classes (see Dahrendorf 1959, pp. 166–74) are distinguished on the basis of their relations to authority. We follow Lopreato (1968) and Robinson and Kelly (1979) in using the terms “command class” and “obey class” to distinguish Dahrendorfian class positions. Members of the *command class* exercise authority, regardless of whether they are subject to it themselves. In contrast, persons in the *obey class* are subject to the authority of others and exercise none themselves. Finally, a small classless group neither exercises authority nor is subject to it; its members work on their own. Robinson and Kelly (1979, p. 44) demonstrate that separating the latter classless group from the obey class adds nothing to the explained variance in their analysis of income and attitudes, so these classes are therefore collapsed in our analysis.

We use the above ideas in the following ways: We begin with households in which both parents are present and the father is employed (female-headed households are brought into our analysis below). In these households, fathers are categorized as exercising authority on the basis of affirmative responses to questions asking whether there are people who work for him or are supervised by him. Where these conditions are not met, fathers are categorized as not exercising authority. Mothers are divided into three categories, being considered (1) unemployed if they indicate, in response to an item asking about full- or part-time work, that they were “not employed during the past year,” or, if they are or were employed part- or full-time during that period, as (2) exercising or (3) not exercising authority on the basis of responses to questions like those posed for fathers. The dichotomized measure of father’s workplace authority is then cross-classified with our trichotomized measure of mother’s workplace authority to generate the six family class relations indicated in table 1.

In three of the class categories indicated in table 1, both parents are located in the same class, and the class relation therefore has an unambiguous meaning in Dahrendorf’s scheme. For example, when both the father and mother have authority in the workplace, the family is located in what we call the upper command class (12.45% of our sample). This is the class relation that most closely corresponds to the ideal-type egalitarian family above. When neither the father nor mother has workplace authority, the family is located in the obey class. Two obey classes are distinguished in table 1 by whether the mother is employed. In the upper

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Slomczynski, and Schoenbach (1968) consider the separate influence of mothers’ and fathers’ social positions on childrens’ values, and Mirowsky (1985) examines the effects of marital power on depression. By bringing women into their analyses, both these papers come closer to our concerns—although not, of course, in the context of gender-linked control processes and delinquency. A very important paper by Curtis (1986) on family and inequality theory appeared as this paper went to press.

TABLE 1  
DAHRENDORFIAN MODEL OF FAMILY CLASS RELATIONS

WIFE'S AUTHORITY IN WORKPLACE	HUSBAND'S AUTHORITY IN WORKPLACE	
	Has Authority	Has No Authority
Has authority . . . . .	Upper command class: husband and wife in command class (12.45% [57]) <sup>a</sup>	Husband in obey class and wife in command class (6.77% [31]) <sup>b</sup>
Has no authority . . . . .	Husband in command class and wife in obey class (20.96% [96]) <sup>b</sup>	Upper obey class: hus- band and wife in obey class (18.12% [83]) <sup>a</sup>
Not employed . . . . .	Husband in command class and wife not em- ployed (16.38% [75]) <sup>b</sup>	Lower obey class: hus- band in obey class and wife not employed (10.48% [48]) <sup>a</sup>

NOTE.—Family class relation not subsumable under table categories: female-headed household (14.85% [68]).  
<sup>a</sup> Balanced class relation.  
<sup>b</sup> Unbalanced class relation.

obey class, the mother is employed (18.12%); in the lower obey class, the mother is not employed (10.48%). Upper- and, to a lesser extent, lower-obey-class families could also be thought of as constituting egalitarian families, in the sense that both spouses occupy obey-class positions. However, given the lesser likelihood noted by Coser (1985) of women's work being translated into power in lower-class families, we probably should qualify our egalitarian expectations for upper-obey-class families—and the expectations for lower-obey-class families are certainly no higher. In any case, the egalitarian family is an ideal type, and we can look to the data to see how closely these families approximate the relationships that power-control theory would otherwise predict for families approaching this form. In the first part of the analysis reported below, we take advantage of the common class locations of husbands and wives in these families to form an aggregate that is designated in table 1 as "balanced class relations." This grouping is subsequently disaggregated into the more refined class distinctions described above.

The three remaining family class relations in table 1 are each characterized by an unbalanced authority-subject relationship, in that one member of the household has authority in the workplace while the other does not. In two of these conditions, the father occupies a position of authority while the mother is either unemployed (16.38%) or employed in a position without authority (20.96%). These are the family class relations that come closest to matching the conditions of the ideal-type patriarchal family

described above, with the first relation providing the clearest empirical match. The final and most unusual family class relation (6.77%) shows the father employed in a position without authority and the mother employed in one with authority. Because this kind of family is so atypical, in size as well as meaning, we do not consider it in subsequent analyses.<sup>3</sup> The power differential in the above families is indicated in table 1 by their aggregate designation as “unbalanced class relations.” Aggregated and disaggregated analyses of these class relations are presented below.

Table 1 is not intended as an exhaustive categorization of family class relations. For example, we have not considered families in which both parents are present and the father is unemployed. Because there are few such families in our sample, we can only discuss them briefly below (see n. 5). However, there are a substantial number of female-headed households (14.85%;  $N = 68$ ), and, for reasons indicated above, we include this category as a comparison group that is predicted to produce many of the same consequences we would expect in more conventional egalitarian families.<sup>4</sup>

Finally, a Marxian dimension can be added to the above model by including consideration of business ownership as a means of distinguishing, within the Dahrendorfian upper command class, between spouses in the “capitalist” or “employer class” and spouses in the “managerial class.” This further distinction allows us to isolate a class that

<sup>3</sup> It is not that we regard this class category as unimportant but rather that we have too few data and too few cases to undertake a proper analysis here. We are disproportionately sampling this class relation in a study currently under way. Meanwhile, our decision to exclude this class from the current analysis is similar to the decision made by Wright and Perrone (1977, p. 43) and others to exclude the *petite bourgeoisie* from class analyses of survey data.

<sup>4</sup> Our operational definition of a female-headed household is one in which the mother is not married and has affirmatively answered a question asking whether she is the sole or major source of family income. This operationalization excludes 11 cases in which the spouses are no longer married but the spouse is still the major source of income. These cases illustrate a more general point—that when fathers leave, they nonetheless often maintain some kind of presence in the family. That is why we include a paternal control variable in our analysis of female-headed families. Finally, an anonymous reviewer notes that female-headed households may be heterogeneous in terms of the class positions of the women that head them. Although this is certainly possible, few of the women heading the households in our sample are in the command class and removing them does not substantially alter our results. The same reviewer also notes that there are more girls than boys (see table 2) in the female-headed households in our sample and suggests that this may result from a selection out of the more delinquent (older) boys through nonresponse, selection out of school (and therefore from the sampling frame), and/or different living arrangements (possibly with fathers or on their own). Each of these possibilities should be reflected in a mean age difference between sons and daughters in female-headed households. However, these means are nearly identical, being 15.032 and 15.157, respectively. Nonetheless, the selection issue is interesting and deserves further research.

comes even closer to the social relations that should form the basis of the ideal-type egalitarian family (i.e., families in which the spouses are both managers) and a class that reintroduces the potential for patriarchy (i.e., a family class structure in which the husband is an employer while the wife is only a manager). However, this modification of our model involves the creation of very small class categories, and we will therefore defer their consideration.

Again, our basic premise is that authority in the workplace is translated into power in the household, with consequent effects on the relationship between gender and delinquency. More specifically, our refined power-control theory predicts that the relationship between gender and delinquency should be reduced in those family class structures in which the potential for the existence of more balanced, egalitarian family relations is greatest—that is, in the lower levels of the class structure (e.g., in the upper obey class and in female-headed households) and also in the higher levels of the class structure (e.g., in the upper command class). Alternatively, the relationship between gender and delinquency should be most intense in the unbalanced family class relations that most closely approximate an ideal-type patriarchal family, that is, in those situations in which the father has authority in the workplace and the mother is either unemployed or employed in an obey-class position.

The intervening theoretical link in these predictions is that, in the class relations that characterize life in female-headed, upper-obey-class and upper-command-class families, mothers and fathers are less likely to reproduce, through the control of their daughters, the aversion to risk taking that produces large gender differences in delinquency. In these more balanced, egalitarian families, daughters and sons alike are prepared for life in the productive sphere. Alternatively, it is precisely this instrument-object relationship that our theory predicts will characterize the unbalanced class relations identified above, especially, for example, the family class relation that forms the most likely base for the ideal-type patriarchal family in our data—that is, that family class relation in which the husband occupies a command-class position and the spouse is either not employed or employed in a position without authority. It is here that we expect the instrument-object relationship between parents and daughters and the gender differences in risk preferences to be particularly apparent—and the gender-delinquency relationship to be consequently quite strong. These relationships, power-control theory argues, are part and parcel of patriarchy. They are the basis of the “cult of domesticity” and an accompanying gender division between the consumption and production spheres. Before we test these predictions, however, some additional issues of measurement must be addressed.

## MEASUREMENT OF INTERVENING AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Parental controls are the key intervening variables in our proposed power-control theory. Our additively scaled measures of maternal ( $\alpha = .66$ ) and paternal ( $\alpha = .78$ ) control ask, "Does your (father/mother) know (where you are/who you are with) when you are away from home?" We use these items to explore the instrument-object relationship emphasized between parents and daughters.

"Taste for risk" is a socially acquired attitude expected to mediate further the link between gender and delinquency. Taste for risk ( $\alpha = .67$ ) is measured by adding Likert-scaled responses to two statements: "I like to take risks" and "The things I like to do best are dangerous." Power-control theory predicts that taste for risk is sexually stratified and that this attitude in turn stratifies perceived risks of getting caught in delinquent behavior, our last intervening link. Three "risk of getting caught" items from the work of Jensen, Erickson, and Gibbs (1978) form an additive scale ( $\alpha = .76$ ). They involve the following estimations: "Could you (break into a spot/steal from a store/write graffiti) and not get caught?"

We use an adapted version of Hirschi's (1969) self-report delinquency scale as our dependent variable. The six-item additive scale asked how often in the last year the respondents had taken little things (worth less than \$2/between \$2 and \$50/more than \$50) that did not belong to them; taken a car for a ride without the owner's permission; purposely banged up something that did not belong to them; and, not counting fights with a brother or sister, purposely beaten up on anyone or hurt anyone ( $\alpha = .78$ ).

## THE ANALYSIS

Our extension of power-control theory explicitly predicts that the relationship between gender and delinquency is conditioned by family class composition. Our analysis therefore proceeds within the aggregated and disaggregated family class relations and female-headed households identified in table 1. This analysis includes a series of within-class correlations presented in table 3 and the results of estimating a series of regression equations are shown in tables 4, 5, 6. Between-class comparisons of gender regression coefficients are presented in table 7, and a refinement of our class analysis, anticipated in table 3 and above, is presented in table 8. Descriptive statistics for our variables are presented in table 2.

Our first interest is in determining whether the instrument-object relationship postulated by our theory varies as predicted with family class relations. Correlations relevant to this issue are presented in table 3. (Discussion of the "refined" findings reported toward the bottom of this

TABLE 2  
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF VARIABLES USED IN REGRESSION EQUATIONS

Variables	Unbalanced Class Relations	Husband Commands/ Wife Not Employed		Husband Commands/ Wife Obeys		Balanced Class Relations		Lower Obey Class		Upper Obey Class		Upper Command Class		Female- Headed Households
Gender .....	.550 (.499)	.547 (.501)	.552 (.500)	.527 (.501)	.542 (.504)	.556 (.499)	.456 (.503)							.324 (.471)
Maternal control ...	5.702 (1.451)	5.667 (1.446)	5.729 (1.462)	5.622 (1.422)	5.688 (1.518)	5.639 (1.393)	5.544 (1.402)							5.765 (1.467)
Paternal control ...	4.947 (1.610)	4.733 (1.536)	5.115 (1.654)	4.963 (1.489)	5.000 (1.624)	5.000 (1.465)	4.877 (1.428)							3.971 (1.079)
Taste for risk .....	6.322 (1.975)	6.547 (2.107)	6.146 (1.858)	6.218 (1.094)	6.167 (1.837)	6.205 (1.962)	6.281 (1.906)							6.662 (1.707)
Perceived risk ....	8.926 (2.513)	8.533 (2.354)	8.677 (2.626)	8.926 (2.513)	9.042 (2.657)	9.000 (2.249)	8.719 (2.541)							8.838 (2.629)
Self-reported delinquency ....	9.140 (3.544)	9.280 (3.570)	9.031 (3.538)	9.021 (3.458)	8.896 (3.502)	8.759 (3.165)	9.509 (3.823)							9.779 (4.370)

NOTE.—Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.

TABLE 3  
CORRELATIONS WITHIN AGGREGATED AND DISAGGREGATED CLASS CATEGORIES OF  
GENDER WITH MATERNAL AND PATERNAL CONTROLS, TASTE FOR RISK, AND  
PERCEIVED RISK

Class Categories	1 Maternal Control	2 Paternal Control	3 Taste for Risk	4 Perceived Risk
Unbalanced class relations: . . . . .	-.341****	-.257****	.267****	-.272****
Husband commands/ wife not employed . . . . .	-.398****	-.264***	.263***	-.294***
Husband commands/ wife obeys . . . . .	-.297***	-.256***	.275***	-.256***
Balanced class relations: . . . . .	-.275****	-.081	.120**	-.194***
Lower obey class . . . . .	-.275**	-.156	.084	-.049
Upper obey class . . . . .	-.369****	-.167*	.229**	-.242**
Upper command class: . . . . .	-.156	.104	-.006	-.276**
Husband employer/ wife manager . . . . .	-.446**	-.498**	.164	-.470**
Husband and wife managers . . . . .	-.024	.347***	-.060	-.185
Female-headed households . . . . .	.025	.078	.119	-.114

\* *P* < .10.  
\*\* *P* < .05.  
\*\*\* *P* < .01.  
\*\*\*\* *P* < .001.

table is reserved until later, when these categories are described.) The first column in this table presents correlations between gender and the maternal control scale within the aggregated and disaggregated family class categories. As expected, these correlations are generally negative, indicating that mothers control their daughters more than they do their sons. Note further that the correlations between gender and maternal controls are generally stronger than the correlations between gender and paternal controls, shown in the second column. In table 2 we can also see that mean levels of maternal control are uniformly higher than paternal levels of control. Across classes, then, mothers are more involved than fathers as instruments of parental controls, and the objects of these controls are more often daughters than sons.

A further premise of our theory is that these instrument-object relationships can originate in family class relations between husbands and wives. If this premise is accurate, the correlations reported in table 3 should vary across family class relations in predictable ways. Using this premise, we predicted that the more egalitarian (i.e., balanced) class relations that characterize the obey and upper command classes—and, by default, female-headed households—will moderate the instrument-object relation-

ship between parents and daughters. Alternatively, our extension of power-control theory leads us to predict that these instrument-object relationships will be more characteristic of unbalanced class relations, including, for example, the most unbalanced family class relation, which most resembles the ideal-type patriarchal family—that is, the family with a command-class husband and an unemployed wife. In this class relation, we should find fathers, and especially mothers, to be particularly controlling of their daughters.

Table 3 generally confirms the above predictions. It is in the female-headed households and the upper command class that the maternal instrument-object relationships are weakest (.025 and  $-.156$ ), and it is when the head commands and the spouse is not employed that this instrument-object relationship is most acute ( $-.398$ ). However, this relationship remains rather strong in the lower ( $-.275$ ) and upper obey ( $-.369$ ) classes, as well as in the class in which the husband commands and the wife obeys ( $-.297$ ). The latter finding is consistent with the expectations of our theory, while the former findings are consistent with Coser's suggestion that women in the lower classes are least likely to benefit from changes in family power relations, even when they join the work force. Overall, the maternal instrument-object relationship is stronger in unbalanced than in balanced class relations and weakest in female-headed households.

The within-class gender-paternal control correlations parallel those noted above, but at lower levels. Thus, the correlation between gender and paternal control is stronger in unbalanced class relations and most acute in those families that are most patriarchal. In balanced class relations, including the more egalitarian upper command class and female-headed households, the correlation is weaker. The remaining family class relations are, as expected, somewhere between these extremes.

The fact that mean levels of maternal control are essentially constant across the family class categories (table 2) shows that the instrument-object relationships do not vary across these class categories simply as a result of the time that mothers spend in or away from home; overall levels of maternal control remain approximately the same, regardless of whether mothers work. Variations in the instrument-object relationships must therefore occur as a result of the redistribution of maternal controls vis-à-vis sons and daughters in these homes.

The final sets of correlations in table 3 concern taste for and perceived risk. In all class categories in which the correlation of taste for risk with gender is significant, the relationship is in the expected direction of sons preferring risk taking more than daughters do; the correlation of gender with perceived risk is negative, indicating that daughters perceive greater risks than do sons. However, of greater interest is the finding that the



correlations between gender and the risk variables are stronger in the unbalanced than in the balanced class relations. For example, the correlation between gender and taste for risk is strongest in those patriarchal classes in which the husband commands and the wife is either not employed (.263) or employed in a position without authority (.275) and is weakest in the more egalitarian settings of the upper command class ( $-.006$ ), the lower obey class (.084), and in female-headed households (.119). The correlation of gender with taste for risk in the upper obey class is perhaps somewhat stronger than expected (.229), but otherwise these findings are quite consistent with the intervening role assigned to risk taking in this extension of the power-control theory of gender and delinquency. Patriarchal families do seem to discourage risk taking among daughters as compared with sons, while egalitarian families seem more likely to encourage a taste for risk among daughters as well as among sons. Overall, the implications are similar for the measure of perceived risk.

We move now to the estimation of regression equations in tables 4, 5, and 6. The purpose of these equations is to test the theory's refined specification of the gender-delinquency relationship across class categories and its identification of intervening links between gender and delinquency within these class categories.

We begin with the aggregated balanced and unbalanced family class categories analyzed in table 4. Recall that Bonger (1916) predicted that the relationship between gender and delinquency would increase with upward movement through the class structure. However, the refined power-control theory modifies this prediction by taking into account the combined class positions of spouses; it predicts that, when both parents occupy positions of authority or when neither has such a position, a rough balance will be established and a more egalitarian pattern is to be expected—and, therefore, that the relationship between gender and delinquency will decline. That we observe weaker correlations between gender and maternal—as well as paternal—controls and between gender and the risk variables when we compare the balanced with the unbalanced classes encourages this prediction. The results of estimating equation (1) in table 4 (presented in the first two columns) now directly confirm this prediction: the zero-order gender coefficient in the unbalanced class relation ( $b = 2.996$ ) is much larger than the gender coefficient in the balanced class ( $b = 1.833$ ). These results are disaggregated in table 5 and compared with those in female-headed households. Here we find that the largest gender coefficients are, as expected, in the most unbalanced and patriarchal of families—that is, in those in which the father commands and the mother is either not employed ( $b = 3.420$ ) or is employed in a position without authority ( $b = 2.668$ ).

TABLE 4  
REGRESSIONS WITHIN AGGREGATED BALANCED AND UNBALANCED CLASS CATEGORIES OF SELF-REPORTED DELINQUENCY

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	EQUATION (1)		EQUATION (2)		EQUATION (3)		EQUATION (4)		EQUATION (5)	
	Unbalanced	Balanced	Unbalanced	Balanced	Unbalanced	Balanced	Unbalanced	Balanced	Unbalanced	Balanced
Gender .....	2.996*** (.422)	1.833*** (.265)	2.136*** (.301)	1.173** (.170)	2.367*** (.333)	1.717*** (.249)	2.092*** (.295)	1.164** (.164)	1.576*** (.222)	1.043** (.151)
Maternal con- trol .....			-.867*** (- .355)	-.845*** (- .348)			-.526** (- .215)	-.864*** (- .355)	-.333 (- .193)	-.339* (- .139)
Paternal con- trol .....					-.760*** (- .345)	-.481** (- .207)	-.461 (- .210)	.028 (.012)	-.308* (- .140)	.075 (.032)
Taste for risk ....									.437*** (.243)	.810*** (.446)
Perceived risk ....									-.264*** (- .193)	-.178* (- .130)
Constant .....	7.494	8.056	12.909	13.155	11.599	10.504	13.273	13.129	11.218	6.564

NOTE.—Numbers in parentheses are standardized coefficients.  
 \*  $P < .10$ .  
 \*\*  $P < .05$ .  
 \*\*\*  $P < .01$ .

TABLE 5  
WITHIN-CLASS CATEGORY REGRESSIONS OF SELF-REPORTED DELINQUENCY

Independent Variable	Female-headed Households	Lower Obey Class	Upper Obey Class	Husband Commands/ Wife Not Employed	Husband Commands/ Wife Obeys	Upper Command Class
Equation (1):						
Gender .....	1.670 (.180)	2.157** (.310)	2.027*** (.319)	3.420*** (.480)	2.668* (.377)	1.540 (.202)
Constant .....	9.239	7.727	7.611	7.412	7.558	8.806
Equation (2): gender ...	1.728	1.452	1.700** (.268)	2.699*** (.372)	1.803*** (.255)	.904 (.119)
Maternal control .....	(1.86)	(.209)				
	-.739**	-.852***	-.318	-.669**	-.995***	-1.462***
	(-.248)	(-.369)	(-.140)	(-.271)	(-.411)	(-.537)
Constant .....	13.479	12.952	9.586	11.623	13.737	17.211
Equation (3): gender ...	1.640	1.882***	2.016***	3.064***	1.840***	1.852*
	(.177)	(.271)	(.318)		(.260)	(.244)
Paternal control .....	.170	-.546*	-.022	-.436*	-.980***	-1.053***
	(.042)	(-.253)	(-.010)	(-.189)	(-.458)	(-.393)
Constant .....	8.576	10.606	7.726	9.672	13.025	13.800

NOTE.—Numbers in parentheses are standardized coefficients.

\*  $P < .10$ .

\*\*  $P < .05$ .

\*\*\*  $P < .01$ .

TABLE 6  
WITHIN-CLASS CATEGORY REGRESSION OF SELF-REPORTED DELINQUENCY

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	MATERNAL AND PATERNAL CONTROLS IN EQUATION					
	Female-headed Households	Lower ObeY Class	Upper ObeY Class	Husband Commands/ Wife Not Employed	Husband Commands/ Wife Obeys	Upper Command Class
Equation (4):						
Gender .....	1.659 (.179)	1.431** (.206)	1.668*** (.263)	2.615*** (.367)	1.738 (.246)	1.073 (.141)
Constant .....	12.231	12.939	1.720	2.615	13.858	17.564
Equation (5):						
Gender .....	1.041 (.112)	1.528* (.175)	1.107* (.220)	2.051*** (.288)	1.290** (.182)	.908 (.119)
Maternal control .....	-.058 (-.019)	-.374 (-.162)	.010 (.009)	-.160 (-.065)	-.334 (-.138)	-.685 (-.251)
Paternal control .....	-.218 (-.054)	-.102 (-.047)	.149 (.069)	-.159 (-.068)	-.487* (-.228)	-.094 (-.035)
Taste for risk .....	1.410*** (.445)	1.121*** (.588)	.592*** (.367)	.472*** (.279)	.379** (.199)	.711*** (.355)
Perceived risk .....	-.282 (-.170)	.298* (.226)	-.408*** (.313)	-.354** (.253)	-.216* (.160)	-.271 (.180)
Constant .....	5.541	1.101	7.272	9.746	12.268	11.242

NOTE.—Numbers in parentheses are standardized coefficients.

\*  $P < .10$ .

\*\*  $P < .05$ .

\*\*\*  $P < .01$ .

TABLE 7  
COMPARISON OF CLASS-CATEGORY GENDER COEFFICIENTS

Comparison	Equation (1) Difference in Gender <i>b</i> 's	<i>t</i> -Value of Difference	Equation (5) Difference in Gender <i>b</i> 's	<i>t</i> -Value of Difference
Balanced class relation with un- balanced class relation . . . .	1.163	2.369**	.533	.661
Command-class father/mother not employed with:				
Upper command class . . . . .	1.880	2.186**	1.143	1.473
Upper obey class . . . . .	1.393	2.010**	.944	1.439
Female-headed households . . . . .	1.750	2.103**	1.010	1.158

\*\* *P* < .05.

Meanwhile, the smallest gender coefficient in this table (*b* = 1.540) is in the balanced upper command class, and the coefficient for gender in female-headed households is only slightly larger (*b* = 1.670).<sup>5</sup>

Gender coefficients from these equations are compared across classes according to size and statistical significance in table 7. Our first interest is in determining whether the gender coefficient in the aggregated unbalanced class relation is significantly larger than the gender coefficient in the aggregated balanced class relation. It is (*t* = 2.369). In turning next to the disaggregated results, our interest is in whether the gender coefficient in the most unbalanced and patriarchal family we have considered—that in which the father commands and the mother is not employed—is significantly larger than the gender coefficient in the more egalitarian families we have considered—that is, those in which both parents (1) command (the upper command class) or (2) obey (the upper obey class) or (3) the household is female headed. The *t*-values reported in the lower-left-hand part of this table reveal that, as power-control theory predicts, all three of these comparisons are statistically significant. That is, the gender-delinquency relationship is significantly stronger in the patriarchal class relation than in any of the more egalitarian class relations (*t* = 2.186, 2.010, 2.103).

Now we must demonstrate that the intervening links proposed in our theory really help explain our gender-delinquency relationships. We turn first to the intervening role of the instrument-object relationship between mothers and daughters. We have already seen in table 2 that mothers are

<sup>5</sup> An anonymous reviewer asks the interesting question—whether the effect of gender in the female-headed households is similar to that in households where the husband is present but unemployed. Although it must be noted that there are only 14 such families in our sample, the answer is yes (*b* = 1.711, *P* > .10).

more involved than fathers in the control of their children and, in table 3, that mothers, more than fathers, control their daughters more than their sons, particularly in unbalanced, patriarchal families. In explaining the gender-delinquency relationship, equations (2), (3), and (4) in table 4 further explore the roles of maternal and paternal controls by separately and then jointly adding these scales to equation (1) in table 4. Both procedures yield similar conclusions; we will summarize only the latter. The results of entering the parental control variables jointly in table 4 indicate that maternal controls ( $b = -.526$ ) have a slightly larger direct effect than paternal controls ( $b = -.461$ ) on delinquency in the aggregated unbalanced class relation and a much larger direct effect ( $b = -.864$  and  $.028$ , respectively) in the aggregated balanced class relation. The implication in causal terms is that in unbalanced, patriarchal families (with gender held constant), mothers *and* fathers play important roles in controlling the delinquency of their children. However, we have already noted that, in relative terms, mothers are more involved as the instruments of this control, especially with daughters as their objects, and the compound path that estimates the indirect effect of gender on delinquency in these families through maternal control ( $-.992 \times -.526 = .522$ ) is again greater than the comparable path that estimates the effect of gender through paternal control ( $-.887 \times -.461 = .409$ ). Of course, power-control theory emphasizes that fathers play a key role in that it is they who assign an instrumental role to mothers in domestic social control in patriarchal families. So it would be inappropriate to infer from this analysis that mothers are in any ultimate causal sense more important than fathers. Our data simply demonstrate the instrumental influence of maternal controls in patriarchal families. Meanwhile, in the balanced families, the strong direct effect of maternal controls and the diminished direct effect of paternal controls is of further interest. The latter finding implies that it is the decrease in paternal power more than the increase in maternal power that may account for the more egalitarian outcomes in these families. This possibility deserves further research.

When maternal and paternal controls are entered separately in equations (2) and (3) for the disaggregated class relations in table 5, the effects of maternal controls are again larger than those of paternal controls. The joint effects of these controls can be seen in the reduced gender effects between the estimations of equations (1) and (4) in tables 5 and 6.<sup>6</sup> For

<sup>6</sup> Because maternal and paternal controls are strongly correlated ( $r$  between  $.5$  and  $.6$ ) and because the number of cases in each of the disaggregated family classes is reduced, the estimates of the maternal and paternal coefficients in equation (4) of table 6 become slightly less stable. However, if a  $.10$  rather than a  $.05$  level of significance is applied, the substantive patterns of results is essentially the same. We have conserved space by

example, in families in which the husband commands and the wife is not employed, the reduction is from 3.420 to 2.615; and, in families in which the husband commands and the wife obeys, the reduction is from 2.668 to 1.738. Maternal and paternal controls of daughters relative to controls of sons are important in explaining the gender-delinquency relationships in these patriarchal families.

All the intervening variables in our theoretical discussion are finally entered into equation (5), and the results of estimating this equation are presented in tables 4 and 6. In addition to maternal and paternal controls, this equation includes our scales for taste for risk and perceived risk of capture. Both these scales exercise significant effects on delinquency; the effects of taste for risk are particularly pronounced. A central premise of a power-control theory of gender and delinquency is that the instrument-object relationship established with daughters particularly discourages risk taking among the latter. From this perspective, it should be expected that the gender-delinquency relationships in equation (5) should be substantially reduced from those in equation (1)—and they are. The role that gender-linked thoughts about risk taking plays in mediating the effect of gender on delinquency can be measured by comparing the gender coefficients in equation (5) with those in equation (4), in which both the maternal and paternal control scales are included but the risk-taking variables are not; for example, when the risk variables are introduced in those patriarchal families in which the husband commands and the wife is not employed outside the home, the gender coefficient declines from 2.615 to 2.051. Differences in attitudes about risk taking therefore play the expected role in mediating the effects of gender on delinquency within this and other family class categories. Further evidence of the intervening role of the risk variables can be observed in the reductions of the effects of the maternal and paternal control variables in the estimations of equations (4) and (5) in table 4. Finally, turning to the last two columns of table 7, we see that controlling for our intervening variables has the theoretically predicted result of removing all significant differences between the gender-delinquency relationships in the unbalanced and most patriarchal as compared with the more balanced and egalitarian families. In other words, delinquency is more strongly related to gender in the unbalanced and patriarchal class relations because of the instrument-object relationship and differences in risk taking emphasized in power-control theory.

Looking back over the analysis, it is clear that the upper command class is, as predicted, the class that varies most from Bonger's original

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not presenting the maternal and paternal coefficients from equation (4) in table 6. They are available on request.

expectation that the relationship between gender and delinquency should increase with upward movement through the class structure. We will now make two final points about how this relationship declines in the upper command class and about how, on the basis of our theory, its reappearance can also be predicted. When equation (1) is estimated in the upper command class in table 5, the constant (8.806) attains a value that is exceeded only by that for female-headed households (9.239). Because gender is the only variable in equation (1) and is treated as a dummy variable with females coded zero, the row of constants for this equation in table 4 reflects the mean score of females within each class on the self-reported delinquency scale. The average male scores can be calculated by adding the unstandardized gender coefficient to the constant within each class. Doing so shows that the relationship between gender and delinquency decreases in the upper command class, not because the average male score declines but because the female score increases. The same can be said of female-based households. Our data show that girls are most delinquent in the upper command class and in female-headed households.

Power-control theory explains these increases in female delinquency by focusing on conditions of gender equality that characterize both kinds of households. We will consider several features of the upper command class before further comment on the female-headed households. Prior research indicates that upper-command-class husbands and wives tend to translate their parallel positions of authority in the workplace into parity positions of power in the household. In the upper command class this results in a diminished instrument-object relationship between parents, especially mothers, and their daughters, or, in other words, in an increase in the freedom of daughters relative to that of sons. Yet we should not too easily assume that, because husbands and wives from this class both have authority positions in the workplace, they are entirely equal in power.

Marxian conceptions of power would superimpose on the Dahrendorfian scheme that we have used a consideration of business ownership that goes beyond simple authority in the workplace. We have resisted including this Marxian dimension because it results in small class categories and because the Dahrendorfian link between authority relations in the workplace and the home is so clear. However, in table 8 we extend our analysis in this direction by drawing a distinction between upper-command-class husbands who are in the employer rather than the managerial class (see Wright and Perrone 1977; Robinson and Kelly 1979; Hagan and Albonetti 1982; Hagan and Parker 1985).

Employer-class husbands own businesses and have one or more employees, while managerial class husbands do not own businesses but do have subordinates. When the upper command class, with its command-class spouses, is subdivided in this way, the class becomes polarized, with



TABLE 8  
MARXIAN REFINEMENT OF UPPER COMMAND CLASS

Equation (1) Values	Husband Employer/Wife Manager ( <i>N</i> = 14)	Both Spouses Managers ( <i>N</i> = 43)
Gender .....	6.833*	.198
Beta .....	.489	.047
Standard error .....	3.129	.651
Constant .....	9.250	8.652
	Difference in gender <i>b</i> 's = 6.635	
	<i>t</i> -Value of difference = 4.160****	

\* *P* < .10.  
\*\*\*\* *P* < .001.

one set of class relations moving in the direction of greater balance (i.e., becoming more egalitarian in form) and the other set moving toward greater imbalance (i.e., toward patriarchy). Power-control theory therefore predicts (1) that, when the husband is in the employer class and the wife is in the managerial class, the instrument-object relationship between mothers and daughters should reappear, along with the gender-delinquency relationship, and (2) that, when both spouses are in the managerial class, both of these relationships should further decline.

The refined results presented in tables 3 and 8 confirm the above predictions. Recall first that the overall upper-command-class relationship in table 3 between gender and maternal controls was  $-.156$  (with mothers controlling their daughters more than they did their sons). However, when an imbalance is reintroduced into this class by separating out situations in which the father is an employer and the wife a manager, the above relationship jumps to  $-.446$ . Alternatively, when both spouses are managers, the relationship is reduced to  $-.024$ . The predicted changes in the gender-delinquency relationship resulting from our refinement of these class categories and the expected changes in the gender-maternal control relationship are shown in table 8. Although there are only 14 cases in the former (imbalanced class) relation, the unstandardized gender coefficient is significant and increases to 6.833 ( $P < .05$ ). Meanwhile, in the latter (balanced class) relation, this coefficient declines to .198 ( $P > .10$ ). This coefficient is not only statistically insignificant; it is almost nonexistent. Furthermore, the difference between these two gender coefficients is, as predicted, significant at the .001 level.

Finally, it is of interest to note points of similarity that exist between the new joint-managerial-class relationships we have identified and the female-headed households we discussed earlier. In both kinds of households the instrument-object relationships between mothers and daughters

and the relationships between gender and risk preference as well as between gender and delinquency are weak, while the average levels of female participation in delinquency are relatively high. The implication is that daughters are freest to be delinquent in families in which mothers either share power equally with fathers or do not share power with fathers at all.

## DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The goals of this paper include a revival of two traditions toward which current delinquency research is skeptical. The first of these traditions involves studies of class position and delinquent behavior; the second tradition consists of research on family relationships and delinquency. Both traditions are stalled, the first by uncertain results (Tittle, Villemez, and Smith 1978) and the second by a decline in interest (Wilkinson 1974). Our point is that, when reconceived and combined through power-control theory, these two traditions can contribute to a new understanding of the relationship between class and delinquency. However, a key to this new understanding is a full appreciation of the role of gender in the class dynamics of the family and in delinquency.

The social organization of work and family relations influences the social distribution of delinquency through the gender stratification of domestic social control. To recognize this point fully it is necessary to incorporate both husbands and wives into models of family class structure. Traditional theories of crime and delinquency, as well as the original statement of power-control theory, do not fully incorporate the position of the spouse into their class analyses; the extension of power-control theory presented here does do so, by making the relative positions of husbands *and* wives a basis for a new model of family class relations.

Central to our extension of power-control theory is a conceptualization of class and family that focuses on power relations in the workplace and the home. A key premise of our extended theory is that positions of power in the workplace are translated into power relations in the household and that the latter, in turn, influence the gender-determined control of adolescents, their preferences for risk taking, and the patterning of gender and delinquency.

We have argued that a predominantly male pattern of delinquency results from the class structure of modern patriarchal families. This patriarchal family structure is historically rooted in a separation of family from work that Weber saw as crucial to the rationalization of modern industrial capitalism. In these families, an instrument-object relationship takes the form of fathers' and, especially, mothers' controlling their daughters more than their sons. This relationship plays a key role in the social

reproduction of a gender division between family and work—that is, between a sphere focused on domestic labor and consumption and a sphere concerned with labor power and direct production. Our argument is that the instrument-object relationship that characterizes the parent-daughter relationship in patriarchal families tends to prepare daughters for a “cult of domesticity” that makes their involvement in delinquency comparatively unlikely.

First, using a Dahrendorfian model of family class relations, our power-control theory predicts that the instrument-object relationship between parents and daughters will be most acute—and disparities in risk preferences and delinquency by gender most apparent—in unbalanced, patriarchal families, for example, those in which husbands are employed in positions of authority and their spouses are either not employed or employed in positions without authority. Alternatively, our theory predicts that this instrument-object relationship will be least acute—and disparities in risk preferences and delinquency by gender therefore least apparent—in more balanced, egalitarian kinds of families, in which husbands and wives occupy more balanced class positions, for example, families in which neither or both are in positions of authority in the workplace or in which fathers are mostly absent (i.e., in female-headed households). In these egalitarian kinds of families, daughters gain a kind of freedom that is reflected in a reduced control by fathers and mothers and an increased openness to risk taking that, among adolescents, includes some common forms of delinquent behavior.

Our data are generally consistent with this extension of power-control theory. For example, in our most patriarchal families, in which fathers have authority in the workplace and mothers are not employed outside the home, the instrument-object relationship is most acute; daughters are discouraged from taking risks, and sons are more delinquent than daughters. In more egalitarian kinds of families—for example, those in which mothers and fathers both have authority in the workplace—the instrument-object relationship between parents and daughters is reduced, risk preferences of daughters are more like those of sons, and gender differences in delinquency decline, with average levels of delinquency among daughters increasing. Interestingly, these latter patterns also prevail in families from which fathers are largely absent (i.e., female-headed households). So, apparently, circumstances of both liberation and deprivation can produce the results we have described. Power-control theory asserts that what both these kinds of circumstances have in common is a freedom from male domination; that is, our analyses demonstrate that gender differences result from unbalanced and patriarchal as compared with more balanced and egalitarian kinds of family class structures and, in turn, confirm that these differences can be removed when variables asso-

ciated with unbalanced, patriarchal class relations are taken into account. When daughters are freed from patriarchal family relations, they too become delinquent.

A Marxian consideration of business ownership provides an interesting kind of additional evidence for our theory. This refinement of our class analysis further specified power relations that increased and decreased gender-control and gender-delinquency relationships. More specifically, within the upper command class, we were able to show that extremely large gender differentials in maternal control and delinquency occur when the father is in the employer class and the mother is in the manager class and that these differentials are almost entirely absent when both spouses occupy managerial positions. The latter is the most egalitarian kind of family structure we were able to establish in our data, with the possible exception of female-headed households (from which fathers are largely absent). These are the two kinds of families in our data in which daughters are freest to be delinquent.

We should again emphasize that, by giving particular attention here to the instrument-object relationship between mothers and daughters, we have not meant to imply that mothers are, in any ultimate causal sense, more responsible than fathers for the control of daughters. Our point is that, in patriarchal settings, mothers in particular are assigned an instrumental role in imposing this selective control. Our theory actually implies that fathers and/or a patriarchal social structure are the sources of this role assignment. Exactly how, why, and with what consequences this role assignment occurs are important issues for further research. One purpose of power-control theory is to call attention to such issues.

By fully incorporating power relations between spouses into our class analysis, using a common set of concepts, and focusing on power relations at low and high ends of the class structure, we can use power-control theory to account for declines in gender-delinquency relationships that previously either went unexplained or required for their explanation separate theories of deprivation and liberation. We have here reduced those two theories to one power-control theory.

Power-control theory encourages a new approach to the study of class and delinquency. What is most significant is that it encourages class analysts of delinquency to become attentive to family power relations. Our approach focuses first on the relational positions of spouses in the workplace and, second, on how these determine spouses' relations to one another in the home. The theory then focuses on gender-specific authority relations between parents and adolescents and on how these influence the attitudes and behaviors of adolescents. The combination of these interlocking relationships suggests a gender-based link between class and delinquency. The implication is that, in explaining the relationship between

social structure and common delinquent behavior, it may no longer be sufficient to consider only the fathers' years of education, dollars of income, units of occupational prestige, or even relational positions in the workplace. Our theory and data indicate that important relationships among class, gender, and delinquency are only discovered by taking account of the relative positions of husbands *and* wives in the workplace. These relative positions are changing as more egalitarian family class structures replace more patriarchal forms of family life. In this sense, the changing class dynamics of gender and delinquency are part of a larger process of social change that involves the decline in gender division between consumption and production spheres in postindustrial society.

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